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Abstract 
My thesis investigates the distributional consequences of euro area (EA) membership 
in the so-called “peripheral” countries (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal) 
prior to the eruption of the crisis. I focus on these countries, even though the periphery 
label hides significant differences among them, because they had to adjust the most to 
enter to the EA. In the years prior to the introduction of the euro, the dominant 
narrative was that the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank 
and the fiscal constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact would lock 
countries into a “golden straitjacket”. This would leave no room for democratic 
politics and redistributive concerns. After the introduction of the euro, the misfit of 
the ECB’s monetary policy rate led to new concerns and discussions of why the euro 
could be detrimental for inequality, this time due to the creation of bubbles and the 
increasing financialisation of these economies. The question about potential and actual 
distributional effects of the euro is addressed by identifying and testing empirically 
policy relevant channels through which EA membership can affect wealth and income 
inequality (paper 1) above all the channel of interest rate convergence. Then I study 
these channels with in-depth studies of comparative country cases. The first follows a 
most different systems design of Greece and Ireland (paper 2) which tries to explain 
their increased social spending on pensions, and its distributional consequences, when 
lower costs of public debt and debt-driven growth created “fiscal space”. The other 
applies a most similar comparative research design of Spain and Italy (paper 3) to 
examine how EA membership affected wealth inequality through housing and 
mortgage markets. These comparative case studies identified that the various channels 
were filtered by domestic institutions, policies and politics. The three papers 
contribute to a similar conclusion. They do not support the received wisdom that the 
loss of monetary and fiscal autonomy unduly restrains government’s capacity to tackle 
inequality. My thesis suggests that a crucial explanatory factor for the effect of 
monetary integration on inequality in countries of the “periphery” is market forces 
unleashed by the EA. In particular capital movements did not constrain and in some 
policy areas might even have expanded national governments’ degrees of freedom. 
This then still allowed domestic politics and policies to shape the final distributional 
outcome in the EA. 
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1. Introduction  
Inequality has been a major concern among policy makers and academics, especially 
after the crisis. There is a vast literature, which investigates potential determinants of 
inequality. The intense academic debate and political interest in economic inequality 
in recent years is a product of inequality trends themselves: they have been increasing 
in most countries over the last decades due to the rapid political and economic change, 
even before the crisis. One of these major changes was the creation of the European 
Monetary Union between a set of diverse nation states, which is arguably one of the 
biggest experiments in history. However, the distributional outcome of this monetary 
regime shift has not been studied systematically, which is somewhat surprising. 
This thesis aims to shed light on this rather underexplored link between inequality and 
currency unification. It specifically asks whether inequality outcomes and European 
Monetary Union are linked. It focuses on economic inequality (income and wealth).  
It consists of an attempt to systematically map out and evaluate this connection – a 
connection of immense relevance to our academic research and beyond. My thesis 
investigates the distributional consequences of euro area (EA) membership in four of 
the so-called ‘peripheral’ countries: Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Italy. This summary 
term hides significant differences among them as will be discussed later.  
The question about potential and actual distributional effects of the euro is addressed 
by identifying policy relevant channels through which EA membership can affect 
inequality, above all interest rate convergence. Following this, I investigate these 
channels using in-depth comparative country case studies. The first one uses a most 
different systems design approach (Greece and Ireland) and the second one builds on 
a most similar comparative research design (Spain and Italy). This allows me to 
investigate how the distributional outcomes of these channels have been filtered 
through domestic institutions, policies, and politics.  
My PhD project consists of three academic papers that contribute in different ways to 
our understanding of the impact of monetary integration on inequality outcomes. The 
three papers build on the political economy of monetary integration and on the 
economics of inequality, using the analytical tools of both disciplines. Each paper has 
a distinct contribution to the literature and investigates different empirical puzzles. 
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The theoretical expectations outlined below link monetary integration with income 
inequality and redistribution (from pre- to post-tax and transfer income) but also with 
wealth inequality. Thus, the three papers explore links to different inequality concepts. 
All three papers aim at providing insights about how the monetary regime change 
interacted with domestic institutional domains in affecting the distribution of income 
and wealth in the EA ‘periphery’.   
Yet, the three papers contribute to a similar conclusion, which goes against the 
established wisdom in the field. The debate on the euro and inequality has so far been 
dominated by the idea that the loss of monetary and fiscal autonomy would restrain a 
government’s options for redistributive policies, leading to negative consequences for 
inequality outcomes. However, the inequality outcomes are too diverse and cannot 
support this generalisation. On the contrary, this thesis studies the implications of 
massive capital flows for inequality, which have been overlooked in the euro 
inequality discussion until recently. The thesis sustains that monetary integration for 
the countries of the ‘periphery’ unleashed market forces that did not constrain– and in 
some policy areas even expanded – national governments’ degrees of freedom. This 
allowed domestic institutions and policies to shape the final distributional outcome in 
the EA context by filtering the supranational forces and often mitigating their effects. 
The Introduction – together with the Conclusion – provides a contextual framework 
for the three papers. More specifically, the introduction starts by setting out the wider 
context of this thesis. It continues by exploring the predominant narratives and 
theoretical concerns, which linked monetary integration and inequality outcomes in 
the literature twenty years ago. This was the state of the art until recently. Then, it 
reports the inequality trends between 1995 and 2008. Using the insights from this 
empirical overview, it explains the reasons of the case selection. The next section 
identifies other channels, which connect EA and inequality, based on the most recent 
literature of monetary integration and the Eurozone crisis, explaining the shift in the 
debate and reviewing the most relevant contributions. The sixth section presents the 
theoretical stance of this thesis and discusses how these recent political economy 
contributions provide a sound theoretical and empirical basis on which this thesis 
builds on. At the same time, it underlines what seems to be missing from the literature, 
and what this thesis aims to add to the euro inequality debate. The last section provides 
an overview of the three papers, followed by a discussion and an outlook.  
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1.1 The wider context of this study: inequality, democracy, and 
monetary integration 
While inequality is a global phenomenon, much of the academic literature focuses on 
the increase of wealth and income inequality in the US. One of the reasons is that 
inequality has increased massively on the other side of the Atlantic. The second reason 
is that despite differences among European countries, the European social model is 
still considered as being dynamic in general, with distinctive European welfare reform 
process, which is deeply embedded in the notions of equity and solidarity 
(Featherstone, 2004). EMU has challenged all these- European monetary integration 
has been considered to be largely shaped by business interests- leaving labour interests 
to member states (Hemerijck and Ferrera, 2004). This question of whether and how 
EA membership is associated with income and wealth inequality outcomes is very 
relevant for an older but ongoing debate. Do global forces undermine the autonomy 
of governments in policy-making?  
In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty suggested that the increasing 
inequality trends are actually endemic to capitalism. Rising inequality can be 
attributed to the fact that r (the rate of return to capital) over the long term is 
systematically larger than g (the overall rate of growth), attributing this global increase 
to the fact that capitalism consists a “force for divergence”. While his analysis is based 
on long-term historical data, recently the one-size-fits-all ‘neoliberal’ version of 
market capitalism is considered responsible by numerous scholars for the excessive 
gains at the top of the distribution (Schmidt, 2002). Indeed, world leading trade 
economists, such as Krugman (2007) argued that that globalisation has a significant 
impact on the income distribution in the United States. In contrast to Piketty (2014), 
Krugman considers trade and other channels, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and offshore activities, as the major drivers. Piketty is singular in identifying the level 
of interest rates as a secular driver of inequality trends, which is important for my 
study. 
Contributions that are more recent also suggest that the exponential growth of financial 
markets had a significant impact on economy and society, leading to an increase of 
income disparities (Van der zwan, 2014). The scholars who support that shareholder 
value is the main driver of corporate behaviour, suggest that the expansion of the 
financial sector redirected economic resources from production-based sector to the 
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financial sector. This increased the income and wealth of financial workers and 
affluent households, at the expense of poorer households and non-financial workers 
(Lin and Tomaskovic–Devey, 2013). At the same time, other scholars who perceive 
financialisation as a new regime of accumulation, suggest that this has empowered 
individuals that receive their income form financial assets. Yet, this happened at the 
expense of wage earners, which increased their indebtedness to keep up with 
consumption (Stockhammer, 2012). High debt levels create an unstable system and 
when crisis erupts indebted households can go underwater- which will increase wealth 
and income disparities (Lapavitsas, 2013).  
The literature has recognized, however, that these trends are not overriding specific 
institutional arrangements but are filtered by them. While these un-equalizing 
economic forces are perceived to be endemic to capitalism, and globalisation and 
financialisation affect the macro labour share and mainly top incomes, their final 
impact on the distribution of disposable income depends on institutional factors. These 
institutional factors are idiosyncratic and country specific and may mitigate or 
reinforce this effect (Bourguignon, 2017). The most direct impact on inequality is 
stemming from the policies that directly redistribute income through taxes and 
transfers and (Bourguignon, 2017). 
Other country specific policies also influence the income distribution. Labour market 
institutions have been the focus of scholarly attention. Even the OECD, a 
supranational organisation always in search of ‘best practices’, has found that 
minimum wages can increase the lower tail inequality of earnings, reversing its 
position that they would always lead to higher unemployment and thus hurt those they 
are meant to serve (OECD, 2011). Wage setting institutions are also important in 
explaining pay dispersion. Other scholars have emphasized the importance of trade 
unions and the share of the labour force that is covered by collective bargaining 
agreements for achieving more equitable distributions of income (Wallerstein, 1999; 
Rueda and Pontusson, 2000). In general, policy choices, regulations, and institutions 
are very important in shaping the income distribution.  
At the same time, domestic institutions are influenced by globalisation. The decrease 
in marginal income tax rates in advanced capitalism democracies can be seen as a 
response to potential capital flight (Bourguigon, 2017). It is often argued that interests 
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of multinational companies, businesses and investors seem to have influenced various 
policies i.e. labour, and social policies, which in turn, results in higher inequality in 
advanced capitalist nations. Rodrik (2011) argues that globalisation, especially low 
wage competition in trade along with the ability of companies to locate wherever they 
want, threatens the foundations of the welfare state. 
EU membership is believed to intensify the pressures of globalisation. Beckfield 
(2006, 2009), in particular, emphasizes the impact of regional integration on economic 
inequality, especially in the European Union (EU) context.  The Single Market comes 
with a huge labour pool and creates new opportunities for investment in other EU 
countries. Hence, foreign factors of production can more easily substitute domestic 
workers and firms. In that sense, European integration decreases the bargaining power 
of organised workers even more intensely than globalisation. This increasing 
competition across borders but also increased elasticity of labour demand thanks to 
technical advances can be seen as a direct weakening of trade union’s market power 
(Busemeyer and Tober, 2015) 
Despite the fact that monetary integration produces losses of national autonomy and 
control, the literature on monetary integration and inequality remains limited. Indeed, 
national currencies were replaced by the euro and monetary policy – a core policy for 
national governments – was delegated to the supranational European Central Bank 
(ECB). The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) intended to diminish member states’ 
discretion over fiscal policy (Martin and Ross, 2004a).  
Most of the debate emphasizes on the distributional implications of EA membership, 
between debtor and deficit countries (Lapavitsas et al. 2010). Yet, the few scholars 
(Bertola. 2010, Busemeyer and Tober, 2015) that have written about it expected that 
EA membership would contribute to rising economic inequality. These empirical 
studies have often based their motivation on the fact that that EA is a ‘Trojan horse’, 
bringing a neoliberal policy shift, which deteriorates the foundations of the European 
social model (McNamara, 1998). Many believed that the EA, given its stringent 
institutional framework, would reinforce low growth and high unemployment and, 
thus, increase pressure on welfare financing. Some even argued that EA could 
undermine Europe’s growth potential by triggering a vicious cycle of deflationary 
beggar-thy-neighbour strategies involving internal devaluation through social 
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dumping and competitive wage moderation (Hemerijck and Ferrera, 2004). The 
‘sound money, sound finances’ principle for the design of the EA seemed to threaten 
the traditional redistributive capacity of national welfare states, leading to an increase 
in disposable income inequality.  
These various and diverse strands of the literature can be captured by Rodrik’s 
Trilemma, since it talks about the tensions inherent in the simultaneity of the economic 
forces unleashed by openness, domestic redistribution and an elite policy consensus 
that supported European integration. In his article “Feasible Globalizations”, he 
conceptualises the political trilemma of the global economy by arguing that the nation-
state system, democratic politics, and full economic integration are mutually 
incompatible. Only two of the three could coexist. Rodrik (2002) suggests that if we 
want to push global economic integration much further, we have to give up either the 
nation state or democratic politics. If we want to maintain and deepen democracy, we 
have to choose between the nation state and international economic integration. In 
addition, if we want to keep the nation state, we have to choose between democracy 
and international economic integration. Specifically, one can claim that in Rodrik’s 
view, the European Union is choosing the ‘Golden Straitjacket’ of deep economic 
integration and a neoliberal consensus that values competition for its own sake. 
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Figure 1.1: The Political Trilemma of the World Economy 
 
Source: Rodrik (2002) p. 25 
The “golden straitjacket” equilibrium or regime is characterised as follows: in a fully 
integrated global economy, states would seek to exhibit an image of credibility 
towards financial investors. In that sense, domestic institutions would be reoriented 
towards the promotion of international commerce and capital mobility. Subsequently, 
the respective national taxation and the regulatory framework would follow such a 
rationale, i.e. being completely harmonized with international standards, or being 
structured in a way that causes minimal hindrance to international economic 
integration. In effect, the state would provide only public goods that are compatible 
with this form of economic integration (Rodrik, 2002). Tight monetary policies, low 
taxation, flexible labour legislation, product market deregulation and a limited and 
small state are all seen as indispensable for the attraction of trade and capital inflows. 
According to Thomas Friedman (1999), these policies have created a “golden 
straitjacket” of international commitments, based on a liberal neoclassical view of 
growth conditions that this would be most conducive to growth. The “golden 
straitjacket” provides a small array of ‘good governance’ policies or ‘best practices’, 
which narrow down the alternatives that national, formally sovereign governments 
have. In national democracies, the commitment to deep economic integration clashes 
with the voters’ quest for social protection and equitable income distribution. Thus, 
the preferences of investors are inherently opposed to the preferences of domestic 
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constituencies, so the factor of democratic politics is a constant irritant for the “golden 
straitjacket”. 
In Rodrik’s theory, an alternative to the “golden straitjacket” is to abandon the concept 
of the nation-state altogether: the solution of “global federalism”. Global federalism 
would entail that markets replace different jurisdictions and eliminate “border effects”. 
In such an arrangement, political decision-making would be relocated to the global 
level, a model close the United States, but on a global scale. In the US, the presence 
of a national constitution, national government, and federal judiciary guarantees that 
an integrated market can be governed with a democratic mandate, despite the different 
regulatory and taxation regimes of states. In a regime of global federalism, national 
governments would not necessarily disappear but will be complemented and 
ultimately governed by supranational legislative, executive, and judicial authority. 
Finally, one could imagine that an alternative option would be to sacrifice the goal of 
deep economic integration. An example of such a regime would be the Bretton Woods 
GATT regime where states had to remove a number of border restrictions on trade and 
commit to not discriminate among their trade partners, while their national policy 
preferences in all other issues were left unchecked (Rodrik, 2002).  
As Matthijs (2017) suggest the Eurozone is an obvious case of deep economic 
integration, so Rodrik’s globalization trilemma could apply. Following this idea, EA 
is incompatible with either sovereignty of national elites or democratic politics. 
National elites would fear that idiosyncratic national laws and policies would result in 
reduced inward investment or even capital flight. To avoid this, they fashion their rules 
to suit the requirements of ‘markets’, rather than to respond to the wishes of citizens 
(Rodrik, 2002).  
Yet, it would be an oversimplification to claim that deeper economic integration would 
directly lead to welfare retrenchment and thus higher inequality. The seminal work of 
Paul Pierson (1994) has indicated that while changes in the global economy put 
pressures on welfare states, support for the welfare state policies continues to be 
popular intense and broad. Most citizens receive or have received social benefits or 
share a household with someone who does. Hence, the gains of retrenchment for 
welfare state opponents are generally diffuse; the core constituencies for the welfare 
state have a concentrated interest in the maintaining existing benefits. Moreover, 
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welfare state's electoral base is very large and it is ready to punish politicians for 
unpopular initiatives (Pierson, 2014). In addition, the EU Treaty left almost all other 
policies, including policies over welfare state and employment relations in the hands 
of member states (Featherstone, 2004).  
Moreover, as we shall see neither the ECB’s monetary policy played out restrictively 
everywhere across the EA, nor were the fiscal constraints imposed by the SGP 
implemented as strictly as originally requested. Market forces, which came with the 
EA, did not necessarily impose fiscal pressures on peripheral states. The sharp drop in 
interest rates and the elimination of exchange risk in all countries of the EA ‘periphery’ 
increased capital flows. This could have allowed these countries to escape the narrow 
limits of their domestic financial markets and supported domestic consumption 
growth. Budgetary room for manoeuvre may have increased rather than tightened both 
due to the reduction of the cost of public debt, but also depending on the tax system 
and especially the taxation of real estate. Yet, these developments were different 
across different institutional settings. This fiscal capacity could actually provide 
alternatives and room for additional domestic policy-making and even welfare 
expansion. All these provide new insights into the literature of EA and inequality. In 
the next parts, I analyse in depth, how financialisation studies when entering the 
territory of institutionalist analyses of political economy provide a stimulating body 
of thought, which can add to our understanding of EA within country inequality 
developments. Moreover, this thesis takes the Rodrik (2002) trilemma as a sharp lens 
with which to analyse the impact of the common European currency on inequality in 
its member states as a broader question of how redistributive policies and politics 
relate to market integration. 
1.2 The EA policy institutions and its effects on inequality 
Although a systematic empirical examination of the relationship between monetary 
integration and economic inequality was missing in the political economy literature 
before the crisis, there were a number of influential scholars highlighting the negative 
effects of monetary integration on equality. These concerns were based on two basic 
points: the dedication of the ECB to ensuring price stability, on the one hand, and 
fiscal constraints imposed by numerically defined rules, on the other.  
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The Maastricht Treaty provided the legal framework for launching EA and defined 
the convergence criteria: a stable inflation rate (1.5 per cent above the inflation rates 
in the three best performing member states), stable interest rates (an average nominal 
long-term interest rate of no greater than 2 per cent above the interest rates of the three 
best performing economies), limited exchange rate fluctuation (within a narrow band 
of ERM of less than 2.5 per cent around the central rate), no currency devaluation in 
the ERM for at least two years, and low budget deficit and low debt levels  (3 % and  
60% of GDP).  
The prospect of the euro led political leaders and social partners to deploy the standard 
policy tools to address their historic problems of high inflation and periodic 
devaluations. This made governments with weaker currencies more determined than 
ever to join EA, as a means of containing the power of international currency 
speculators (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999). There was a widely held view that 
governments wanted to emulate Germany’s stability culture (McNamara 1998). The 
Bundesbank in particular, became an ideational model for other central banks that 
envied its independence from government and its performance in achieving price 
stability and a strong currency (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999). This growing 
consensus on a model required to ensure low inflation coincided with, and was 
possibly caused by, a spread of neoliberal monetary policy ideas (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999).  
This ‘ordo-liberal’ philosophy which was adopted based on market principles of 
‘sound money, sound finances’ soon raised concerns between heterodox economists 
(Ryner, 2015). One of the earliest concerns in the literature was that the dedication to 
price stability and the ways in which ECB is likely to pursue this was that it would 
keep employment growth in the EA low. The ECB was seen as a conservative 
monetary authority with a strong mandate for price stability and a weak responsibility 
for stabilizing output and employment fluctuations (Martin and Ross, 2004).    
The academic debate on the distributional consequences of monetary policy is not 
new. It can be traced back to Keynes (1936) who studied the distributional 
consequences of high interest rates by the Bank of England in the 1920s and 1930s. 
The topic gained prominence again in the Volcker disinflation period, when heterodox 
economists investigated the links between monetary policy and inequality. They had 
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been warning about the impact of restrictive monetary policies on wealth and income 
distributions. Galbraith (1998) suggested when governments abandoned the goal of 
full employment and focused on the goal of low inflation, inequality rose. High 
interest rates halted economic growth and led to continuous recessions that increased 
unemployment, which in turn led to a vast increase in inequality. Thus, as he argues, 
inequality cannot be treated as an unavoidable evil but as the consequence of economic 
policies and in particular monetary policy. Besides monetary policy, the predominant 
narrative was that the EA would affect inequality via national fiscal policies even if 
EA membership would deliver higher growth. This was expected especially for the 
countries of the EA ‘periphery’. These arguments had as their origin the constraints 
imposed on EA member states’ fiscal policy, as outlined in the Maastricht criteria and 
in Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
In 1998, the governments supported the Commission’s proposal that EA should be 
launched between 11 member states even through only three had met all convergence 
criteria. Greece was the only member that wished to join from the start but was 
excluded for not meeting the convergence criteria. It eventually joined on 1 January 
2001 when the currency was physically introduced in the other 11 member states as 
well. Since more members were set to join than the German government had expected, 
the German treasury proposed the establishment of a Stability Pact to prevent 
governments from running large deficits once EA was launched (Hix and Hoyland, 
2011).  
Finally, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was adopted in July 1997 and was 
designed to significantly strengthen the constraints imposed on national fiscal 
autonomy by the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, the Excessive Deficit Procedure of the 
Pact gave the ECOFIN Council the competency to sanction a government for 
exceeding the borrowing limits. However, a political decision in the Council was 
needed to impose sanctions (Hix and Hoyland, 2011).  
Meeting the convergence criteria for EA membership was thought to pose major 
problems for those member states with substantial public deficits. In many countries, 
there was only one powerful option to meet these criteria: cut spending in social 
welfare provision (Korpi, 2003). This built on recommendations by the IMF at this 
time to focus on large-scale social security reforms to consolidate public finances 
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(Kopits, 1997).  Yet, in Southern Europe and Ireland, euro membership was an 
unquestioned national objective with only marginal, and mostly extremist, political 
forces offering an alternative view (Hopkin, 2015). The overriding sentiment was that 
the participation in the EA would ‘lock in’ the gains of EU membership, further 
spurring modernisation and growth. Moreover, EA membership would provide and 
anchor and a ‘vincolo esterno’ (externally imposed economic discipline, external 
constraint) to improve institutions and to facilitate reforms. In that sense, governments 
could identify strategic advantages for political competition from claiming that they 
are bound by EA commitments. The government could signal that it had lost parts of 
its national autonomy to a supranational decision-making system but would, 
paradoxically, be empowered vis-à-vis domestic opponents (Dyson and Featherstone, 
1999). 
 The rationale underlying these proposals was that the member states, lacking their 
own monetary policy – and having severe restrictions imposed on their fiscal policy – 
would need to implement structural reforms that they were previously reluctant to 
adopt. Some of these reforms would be in the sphere of redistributive policy. These 
reforms might also lead to modernisation, especially in the fragmented and 
underdeveloped welfare states of the ‘periphery’. However, the predominant narrative 
was that EA accession would increase inequality (Scharpf, 2002). The ability of 
welfare states to counteract rising inequality trends depends on the mix of policies and 
the progressivity of taxes and transfers. One of the most robust findings of the 
literature is that post-tax and post-transfer levels of inequality are on average lower in 
countries with more generous welfare states. Hence, it was mainly considered that if 
EA reduces the ability of member states to freely enact accommodating fiscal and 
social policies, the result would be higher levels of disposable income inequality 
(Busemeyer and Tober, 2015). 
Hence, the first channel found in the literature via which member ship is linked to 
inequality is the fiscal channel. Despite the fact that the literature linking EA to 
inequality is limited most of the early contributions are link the adoption of the 
common currency with a reduction in welfare spending. This effect is expected to 
manifest itself in disposable income inequality (after tax and transfers) and usually 
this literature assumes as uniform effect among member states (Berola, 2010 ; 
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Busemeyer and Tober, 2015) The next section provides a first overview that questions 
this deeply held belief in the literature. 
1.3 Economic inequality in the EA: An empirical overview  
In Europe, concerns about inequality have been raised especially in countries which 
were at the epicentre of the Eurozone crisis. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus 
signed macro-economic adjustment programmes. Spain was granted European funds 
to recapitalise and restructure its banking system. Italy was several times on the brink 
of a bond market crisis and still poses a potential threat to the EA due to its worsening 
public finances and a banking sector saddled with non-performing loans. Against this 
background a popular perception took hold that the EA has from the start been biased 
in favour of business interests and developed at the expense of the social dimension. 
The crisis has made this perspective worse as it required sacrificing social standards 
in order to achieve economic adjustment. This argument has formed the starting point 
for most of the research endeavours which have investigated inequality and poverty in 
the country’s most hit by the crisis.  The ensuing debate has placed for the first time 
the euro and the policy architecture of the euro area at the forefront of inequality 
discussions (Bertola, 2010). Overall, research has shown that the crisis has been 
detrimental for lower income brackets and had ambiguous inequality effects even 
though the crisis has also reduced profits. Consequently, especially Euro-sceptic 
parties and anti-austerity movements have blamed the euro for causing adverse 
inequality trends. 
The crisis was, however, a secular event comparable only to the Great Depression, not 
confined to and not originating in the euro area. It is therefore important to remember 
that the euro existed for more than ten years before the crisis in the euro area erupted.  
Democratically elected governments in these crisis-hit countries had previously 
convinced their electorates or their representatives that joining the EA would be in the 
national interest. To understand the validity of these hopes and the role of monetary 
integration in the distribution of wealth and income requires an evaluation of the 
relationship between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ within EA member states predating the 
crisis period. 
Details will follow in the first paper, but here is a summary of how overall inequality 
of household incomes developed in the initial EA member states between 1995 and 
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2008. In the next graphs I report, economic inequality measures that are available for 
the EA countries in the period of interest: disposable and market income. I do that in 
order to observe the trends before and after the implementation of government policies 
enacted to correct inequalities created by the market. I do not report wealth data in this 
section, not because it is not a relevant dimension of inequality in the EA context, but 
due to the lack of data availability. In the chapters that follow I do focus on wealth 
inequality in the cases of Spain and Italy - the two member states for which there are 
available wealth surveys.  
Disposable income is composed of labour and capital income, cash transfers, and 
pensions, all net of taxes. Market income is composed of labour and capital income 
before taxes and transfers. The most commonly used inequality measure is the GINI 
index, which measures the extent to which the actual distribution deviates from a 
perfectly equalized distribution. The coefficients range between zero (maximum 
equality) and one (maximum inequality). Income inequality data is available for most 
EA countries. However, the problems of the GINI are well documented. These 
indicators do properly take into account the relationship between the lower tail and the 
upper tail of the income distribution. Moreover, Perry and Steinberg (2012) 
investigated how the crisis has impacted economic inequality in the United States. 
They did so by analysing, earnings, disposable income, consumption and wealth. They 
argue that a more in-depth analysis on the different income sources is crucial for 
having an accurate picture of what drives inequality. However, this cannot be revealed 
simply by using GINI of disposable income. An increase in the GINI does not reveal 
the income sources from which inequalities stem and nor does it take into account 
these changes in the tails.This analysis tries to address this problem by focusing on 
different dimension of inequality and by using a range of inequality indicators. The 
advantage to using a Gini coefficient is nevertheless that in the first instance it 
summarizes all the information about the distribution of income and thus allows for 
easy preliminary comparison. For this reason I use cross-country GINI coefficients in 
the first macro paper of this study.  
The most common problem with inequality data for EA countries is that there are 
missing values for the period immediately after the adoption of the common currency. 
For the period between 1994 and 2001, data are taken from the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP). However, the ECHP expired in 2001 and was replaced by 
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the European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) in 2003/2004. 
Due to the transition between end-ECHP and start-EU-SILC, there is a disruption in 
the time series between 2001 and 2005. 1. This is the reason that in this thesis, the 
GINI coefficients of pre-tax and pre-transfer income are drawn from Solt (2009) and 
the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID).  
Wealth data is even less well documented. There are dedicated wealth services, which 
provide important steps for an accurate measurement of wealth: the Spanish Survey 
of Household Finances (EFF), the Italian Survey of Households Income and Wealth 
(SHIW), and the UK Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) are examples for this. The 
ECB has recently started a bi-annual survey of household wealth. 
A first look at the income inequality data (Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2) reveal that the 
inequality of market income increased for all countries with the exception of Spain. 
Interestingly, the increase is more pronounced in Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, 
and Ireland, compared to Portugal, Italy, and France where the increase is more 
modest. Overall, in all initial member states, market income inequality was higher on 
the eve of the crisis in 2008 than in 1998, the year before the euro adoption. At a first 
glance, this supports the concerns raised by the literature reviewed above which sees 
the adoption of the euro as a regressive process of the ‘winner takes it all’.  
Yet, disposable inequality trends are more mixed in the EU12. It is striking that prior 
to the crisis inequality did not increase but even fell in the so-called periphery. This is 
despite good reasons to expect otherwise – notably constraints on redistributive 
budgetary policies. Moreover, a core-periphery divide is revealed in the data but not 
in the expected way. While most peripheral countries experienced a reduction in 
income inequality after taxes and transfers, most core countries report an increase. 
                                                 
1 For the period between 1994 and 2001, harmonised data were collected by the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP). However, the ECHP expired in 2001 and was replaced by the European 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) in 2003/2004. Due to the transition between the 
end of the ECHP and the start of EU-SILC, there is a disruption in time series between 2001 and 2005.  
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Despite the break in the series, in all peripheral countries, disposable income 
inequality is lower in 2008 than in 1998. 
Figure 1.2: Gini of market income, EA12 countries, 1995-2008. 
 
Source: SWIID. 
Figure 1.3: Gini of equivalised disposable income2, EA12 countries, 1995-2008. 
 
Source: Eurostat.  
                                                 
2  The ‘equivalised income’ is the concept most frequently used in measuring inequality. It means 
that each individual in the population is arbitrarily allocated the income of the household where 
he/she lives and Equivalised disposable income would also include taxes and cash transfers, 
divided by the weighted number of people in the household. 
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Different summary measures of inequality (e.g. GINI, variance of logarithms, mean 
log deviation) are generally correlated. However, in some cases, the analysis of tails 
of distribution and especially the top incomes highlight significant features regarding 
the way overall inequality has evolved. The evidence suggests again that the market 
income of the top 1% has risen relative to lower income strata in all EA-12 member 
states for which data are available. Unfortunately, only two Southern European 
countries are among them. 
Figure 1.4: Top 1% of market income inequality, EU12 countries, 1995-2008. 
 
Source: WID 
An alternative approach to measure income inequality is to compare relative 
(disposable incomes) of the top two deciles of the distribution with the bottom two 
deciles. The income quantile share ratio is the measure of the S80/S20 indicator and 
reveals the income of the person at the 80th percentile in the distribution of incomes 
relative to the income of the person at the 20th percentile. A higher value, thus, 
indicates a higher level of income inequality.  Disposable income inequality measured 
as a S80/S20 ratio follows similar trends to the GINI coefficient of disposable income. 
Countries of the ‘periphery’ report a declining trend in disposable income inequality. 
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Figure 1.5: S80/S20 ratio of disposable income, EU12 countries, 1995-2008. 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Overall, this first overview of the data suggests that in peripheral countries for the 
measures of economic inequality that are available, market income inequality 
increases, yet, more modestly than in the core. However, inequality of disposable 
income does not increase in all countries but even falls in some countries regardless 
of the indicator used. This happened in a period in which these countries underwent a 
significant change in their framework of economic governance. It is this factor that 
most political economists expected would promote the interest of capital at the 
expense of the working classes, and, hence, lead to an increase in inequality.  
1.4 Case selection and period under consideration  
Given the expectations expressed in the literature, the findings reported in the last 
section are surprising. Inequality of disposable income does not increase in all 
countries and actually falls in some countries regardless of the indicator used. This 
happened in a period in which these countries underwent a significant change in their 
framework of economic governance. It is this factor that most political economists 
expected would promote the interest of capital at the expense of the working classes, 
and, hence, lead to an increase in inequality.  
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Departing form this empirical puzzle, this thesis focuses on the countries of the so-
called EA ‘periphery’: Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland. Their economies 
were characterised by weaker currencies, high inflation, with most of them 
experiencing high current account deficits. Some of these economies had had to adjust 
a great deal to enter the EA and were therefore the ones in which the distributional 
outcome of the monetary regime change could be expected to be most significant.  
 These countries are often grouped together, but even so they provide significant intra-
regional variation. Firstly, the countries witnessed different macroeconomic 
developments in terms of economic growth, public debt levels, and inflation rates 
during the euro years up until the crisis. Secondly, they demonstrate substantial 
differences in terms of economic structures and domestic institutions. This is 
especially intriguing for investigation into how common ‘EA effects’ were absorbed 
by these structures and institutions and what this meant for inequality trends. 
Economic structures and domestic institutions can either insulate or further expose a 
member state to the global forces of finance. Overall, this shows a great variation 
among the ‘periphery’ countries besides their mentioned commonalities. Moreover, 
this calls for a more nuanced view on these countries than has been suggested by the 
use of the term during the recent crisis. All member states that needed external 
financial assistance were classified as ‘peripheral’ (Schelkle, 2017). The ‘periphery’ 
countries were considered debtor countries and contrasted with the ‘core’ and creditor 
countries during the crisis. In order to precisely understand the periphery’s experience 
during the euro years before the crisis, this thesis goes beyond the broad periphery 
narrative used during the crisis years.  
This thesis focuses on the period of ‘catch up growth’, from the phasing in of the euro 
to its actual introduction until 2008, the year in which the financial crisis broke. This 
is arguably the time when the common currency could be deemed to deliver on its 
promises of convergence and ‘rising tides’ lifting perhaps not all, but most ‘boats’. 
The ‘peripheral’ states that voluntarily joined the EA may have seen other advantages 
for stability and prosperity besides the fact that EA would play out as a ‘vincolo 
esterno’ (externally imposed economic discipline, external constraint), which, after 
all, was an incentive to adopt the euro that was difficult to make politically popular. . 
Yet, the question that remains is how the benefits and losses of monetary integration 
were spread across the population in the peripheral countries.  
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The busts are hard for everyone and this is why the debate on inequality was stimulated 
during this period. Indeed, many scholars have investigated how the crisis affected 
inequality developments in the EA. Moreover, the EA has been criticized for 
amplifying the booms and the busts (De Grauwe, 2018). Jacoby (2013) with a focus 
on new member states of CEE emphasized how EU membership and the single market 
encouraged economic policy liberalization played a role in promoting the economic 
boom and contributed to very sharp fall during the recession. These scholars suggest 
that EU increased vulnerability, which led to detrimental consequences during the 
bust.  
However, one should keep in mind that booms and busts are endemic to capitalism, 
and capitalism is inherently unstable. The crisis was global in nature and started on 
the other side of the Atlantic. European banks were involved but through global 
imbalances and financial innovations that were primarily created by US investment 
banks. I explain in the individual papers that the EA crisis was de facto a number of 
different national crises that did not have a uniform root cause. The Greek crisis was 
fiscal. Portugal and Italy did not have financial cycles that deviated much from the 
average of the EA. The problem of competitiveness was more relevant for Spain and 
Portugal than in Italy, while the fiscal stance of Spain and Ireland was prudent (Jones, 
2015).The role of EA architecture was that it limited safety nets for member states that 
can lead to self-fulfilling speculative attacks. This has been analyzed by others and 
goes beyond my thesis (De Grauwe, 2018; Jones, 2015). 
By only looking at the crisis, does not allow for a full picture of the impact of the EA 
on income and wealth distribution. Recent research revealed especially in the other 
side of the Atlantic, that even in booming periods, inequality does not always go down. 
This study aims to discuss the developments in these first years of the adoption of the 
common currency to evaluate whether the peripheral country’s decision to join choice 
was of a wider national interest- or whether it benefits the upper classes as the “original 
fears” suggested.  
This thesis focuses on the interaction between euro adoption and inequality, but 
whether these channels differ between crisis and non-crisis period is a valid question. 
During the crisis, the transmission of mechanism of monetary policy is broken, the 
fiscal rules were tightened, and capital inflows stopped. In the next sections, I suggest 
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that some of the channels of interaction between monetary integration and inequality 
nevertheless (?) not only remained relevant for the crisis period but that the 
phenomenon in question also travel beyond the cases which have been examined in 
the thesis. I come back to this discussion in the conclusion.  
 Lastly, each chapter of this thesis focuses on several but not all of the mentioned 
‘periphery’ countries, depending on the research question and its operationalisation. 
Overall, the first paper focuses on all initial 12 EA member states and the second and 
third papers study in-depth the country cases of Spain, Italy, Greece, and Ireland. 
Focusing on the gains and losses for different income groups in these different member 
states can help to explain why these peripheral countries voluntarily participated in 
this large-scale monetary experiment, which is a puzzle for those who perceive the 
euro as exclusively bad news for fiscal space and redistribution.  
1.5  Economic Inequality in the EA: The new concerns 
With the benefit of hindsight and in search for the root causes of the Eurozone crisis, 
there is an extensive discussion on what exactly happened in the peripheral states the 
first decade of the Euro. The introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999, changed the 
conditions of membership significantly. The irony is that the entry into the EA led to 
the dismantling of the institutional arrangements that had secured low inflation in the 
countries in the run up to the EA: a national central bank with the capacity to raise 
interest rates if wages did not develop as desired. Joining the euro meant that 
inflationary price hikes or wage rises would not necessarily lead to a policy response 
from a monetary authority (Hall and Gingrich 1998, Hopkin, 2015). Moreover, the 
procedures of imposing financial penalties under the SGP were relaxed in 2005, 
although the Commission continued to monitor and advise member states on fiscal 
diligence in detail (Hix and Hoyland, 2011). Hence, these developments point to new 
channels of interaction between EA and inequality, which go beyond the fiscal 
channel. 
There is no doubt that monetary union not only deprived member states of the ability 
to adjust exchange rates, but also replaced national monetary policy by common one-
size-fits-all interest rates. Since the common interest rate must necessarily respond to 
average conditions in the euro area at large, real interest rates might be too high for 
economies in recession and too low for countries that are overheating. This is the 
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essence of the so-called Walters critique (1988) of the ERM. Despite the shift to much 
greater price stability, inflation differentials remained across the EA states, except for 
Italy (De Grauwe, 2012a). From the perspective of investors, domestic and from the 
northern Europe, low real interest rates combined with high growth potential presented 
an attractive business opportunity (Perez and Rhodes, 2012).  
Lower real interest rates created the room for private and public borrowing and set the 
stage for a debt-driven growth cycle (Pérez and Rhodes, 2014). While, housing and 
mortgage debt was considered as high-quality collateral globally, it is unquestionable 
that the build-up of the housing booms in the periphery has been also linked with the 
lowering (or even negative) interest rates, which came with the euro (Bohle, 2017). In 
addition, the elimination of exchange risk has favoured financial markets and their 
institutions, reducing the risk of mobile financial capital across borders. The EA has 
increased the role of finance-related activities for the economic system of member 
states (Rossi, 2013).  
Among the heterodox economists there is discussion about a new channel which links 
EA to inequality:  the financialisation channel. They derive their theoretical 
framework form Keynes’ and Minsky’s work. They define financialisation as an 
accumulation regime and suggest that the financial fragility in combination with 
declining wages has created a growth regime that that relies on debt-driven 
consumption and housing bubbles. They suggest that internationally, the liberalisation 
of capital flows has created imbalances (Lapavitsas. 2013). This seems to be a relevant 
channel for the countries of the ‘periphery’:  the liberalisation of capital and the 
elimination of exchange rate risk increased massively intra EA capital inflows and 
these economies experienced higher current account deficits compared to the countries 
of the North. While this discussion is mainly on inequality among countries, it can 
also be extended to intrapersonal inequality.  
The increasing share in the sectors of finance, insurance companies and real-estate 
(FIRE) and the vast decline in the share of non-financial businesses’ profits occurred 
in the peripheral countries before the euro area crisis erupted (Rossi, 2013). The 
decreases in the profitability of the real sector of the economy, compared to the FIRE 
sectors, leads to lower salaries and wages for middle and low class workers employed 
in productive industries. Moreover, the increasing importance of the financial sector 
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as the main source of profit in the economy has been associated in the literature with 
the diminishing importance of domestic institutions that traditionally have an 
equalizing effect i.e. union density, (Kus, 2012). It needs to be noted that maybe this 
channel is more relevant for some peripheral countries rather than others. Spain and 
Ireland were the countries which experienced financial cycles of increasing duration 
and magnitude due to increase in private debt (Franks, 2018). Lower real interest rates 
led to housing and construction booms in Ireland and Spain which turned into bubbles, 
while for Portugal and Italy capital inflows remained more modest (Franks, 2018).  
Another interpretation of the EA crisis is the ‘competitiveness’ hypothesis which 
focuses attention on wage negotiators (Jones, 2015). According to this view, the 
fundamental problem in the Eurozone crisis is the structural imbalance between 
export-led countries with current account surpluses and domestic demand-led 
countries with current account deficits. The persistence of these current account 
deficits in the euro periphery made the markets nervous, which then pushed these 
economies to crisis. The monetary regime was more compatible with the so-called 
‘export-led’ growth models pursued by northern European member states such as 
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Finland. However, it would not be beneficial 
for ‘demand-led’ growth models pursued by Southern member states, notably Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Italy and France (see Hall, 2012, 2014; Johnston et al., 2014).  
Taking the Eurozone crisis and the growth model literature as his starting point, 
Matthijs (2016) suggests that the EA may have a led to divergent inequality trends 
among member states through the competitiveness channel. More specifically, he 
suggests that the institutional design of the EA may lead to an increase in inequality 
in the Northern CMEs. He claims that as capital flows from the North to the South 
intensified, the core countries, due to their bargaining systems, had the ability, to 
restrain growth in their overall wages and prices in order to compete in a currency 
union with the lower-wage ‘periphery’ members. This in turn led to higher income 
inequality in the North. The ‘periphery’ experienced a reduction of interest rates, due 
to the capital inflows and the returns were lower because of the diminishing returns of 
a rapidly increasing capital stock. Lower interest rates permitted these economies to 
implement inflationary policies in the booming euro years, resulting in higher wages. 
The combination of higher wages and lower returns on capital in the ‘periphery’ led 
to a reduction of income inequality during the boom period.  In his view the channel 
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will work in reverse during the crisis. In Southern MMEs had no choice but to respond 
to the euro crisis by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. These 
policies intensified recessions and led to widening income inequality. The Northern 
CMEs not so much hit by the crisis by inflationary policies domestically by letting 
their automatic stabilizers kick in, which led in turn to declining levels of domestic 
inequality.  
Hopkin (2015) investigates the distributional consequences of euro adoption in an in-
depth case study of Italy and Spain. While he does not make direct links to income 
inequality, he finds that the introduction of the euro indeed brought mainly large gains 
in the sheltered sectors of these economies such as construction and retail, as well as 
large parts of the public sectors and banking. Nevertheless, he suggests that the 
introduction of the euro led to stagnation in the Mediterranean countries’ 
manufacturing sectors as these became more heavily exposed to international 
competition. His analysis confirms the importance of examining the interaction 
between monetary regime change and the structure of economies and wage-bargaining 
systems that the growth models literature focuses on.  
A closer examination of the case of Germany challenges this view and suggests that it 
was not an overall wage restraint but it was redistribution of rents between the 
sheltered and the manufacturing sector that sapped wage inequality outcomes 
(Johnston et al 2014). Ochsenfeld (2018) suggests that the EA has reinforced 
dualisation as well as the insider-outsider cleavage in the country’s welfare state and 
production models. The introduction of the euro supposedly distorted real interest 
rates and exchange rates and the resulting imbalances redistributed rents from the 
domestic sector to the manufacturing sector in Germany. According to Ochsenfeld 
(2018) this shift in industry rents explains the increase in wage inequality in Germany 
under the euro. These studies suggest that indeed the Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001) and growth regime literature remain relevant for the euro inequality 
debate. However, peripheral economies are often referred to as one group in the 
literature, even though they differ substantially in terms of macro-economic 
performance both before and after the euro. 
However, the competiveness explanation seems to be more relevant for countries like 
Spain and Portugal. Not all countries experienced competitiveness problems (Jones, 
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2015). A closer look of Italy’s export performance before the crisis suggest that Italian 
firms managed to hold on world export manufacturing shares but also manufacturing 
employment (Jones, 2015). In Greece, the real effective exchange rates appreciated by 
less after it joined the euro than they did beforehand (Jones, 2015). 
To summarize, most of the early literature has focused on how the policy architecture 
of EA would lead to an increase in inequality across the euro area, as the latter was 
built on stability-oriented monetary policy and prudent fiscal policy: (this will be 
referred to in the thesis as the fiscal channel). However, these concerns were not 
justified for all countries of the ‘periphery’.  More recently, additional concerns have 
also been based on a competitiveness hypothesis, which suggests that the growth 
models of the North and the South are incompatible together due to the interplay 
between central banks and wage bargains (Johnston et al., 2014). This hypothesis 
seeks to explain different inequality dynamics between the North and the South with 
the latter group of countries experiencing a decline in income inequality: (This will be 
referred to in the thesis as the competiveness channel).  These two channels are mainly 
relevant for the EA case because they are particularly linked with the institutional 
design of the EA: the competitiveness channel with the centralization of monetary 
policy and the fiscal channel with the rules of fiscal governance. Finally, a third 
channel   is inspired by the literature on financialisation.   Heterodox economies would 
also support that EA led to an increase of capital inflows that were absorbed by the 
FIRE sectors of peripheral states, and that it was mainly affluent households that 
benefited. This led in turn to an increase of pre-tax income inequality (financialisation 
channel). 
1.6  The theoretical stance of this thesis: The interest rate channel 
In the next section I explain why I focus on the so-called “interest rate channel” as a 
key channel of interaction between EA and inequality. This thesis is inspired by the 
literature of financialisation but it takes an institutionalist perspective. Despite the fact 
that this availability of credit led to an increase of economic imbalances, comparative 
political economists provide an explanation of why Southern countries would still 
have had an incentive to join. I adopt the same starting point as comparative political 
economists who claim the incentive of peripheral countries to join the monetary union 
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was to enjoy the benefits of low and less volatile interest rates and exchange rate 
stability (Iversen et al., 2016). 
Moreover, this thesis follows the institutionalist strand of CPE (comparative political 
economy) that has stressed the relevance of institutional settings. Hence, I also expect 
their insights to be relevant for the interest rate channel. However, while the VoC and 
the growth model literature provide a useful framework for understanding Northern 
and Southern countries’ different experience under the euro and give a compelling 
story about their inequality trends, they broad-brush the differences between the 
periphery. As Schelkle (2017) stresses that structural diversity of member states is not, 
per se, a reason why some member states entered a crisis with all its negative 
consequences for income distribution. 
This interest rate channel is more complex than the Walter’s critique implies (Walter, 
1990). According to Schelkle (2017, p.117), high and volatile interest rates affect the 
economy in at least four different ways. There is first the effect on economic activity: 
interest rates act like a tax on debt-financed investment. The higher the interest rate 
tax, the lower profits for investors and the shorter the time horizon of investors, 
making them less likely to innovate. Theoretically, the distributional effect of this 
reduction of interest rate is difficult to determine a priori. To the extent that low 
nominal and real interest rates succeed in stimulating economic activity, lower rates 
would increase both income and corporate profits, and the effect on inequality would 
depend on whether wages will raise more than profits and on the distribution of labour 
and capital income across households (Pannetta, 2015). When real and nominal 
interest rates converged downwards in the ‘periphery’, this stimulated investment 
substantially and spurred growth and employment. Secondly, interest payments on the 
stock of public debt are also a major component in public expenditure (Schelkle, 2017, 
p.116).  Rising interest payments can push a sovereign into a debt trap, from where it 
must raise debt in order to service the existing stock. Thus, a decline in interest rates 
can be a great boon for countries with high levels of public debt, notably Italy and 
Greece. With interest expenses falling and tax revenues increasing fiscal space 
increases and governments can use and allocate the freed up funds for other purposes, 
or lower taxes. To the extent that this funding is used also for increased redistribution, 
lower interest rates on public debt could also lead to lower inequality especially in 
peripheral countries, which are traditionally considered as being laggards in social 
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policy provision (Sotiropoulos, 2004). Thirdly, interest rate influences the price of 
equities, real estate, and bonds. However, housing price variations affect a much larger 
part of the population than bond or equity price changes. That said, the biggest 
investment a household typically makes is the acquisition of a home and it is typically 
financed by debt.  In countries with high rates of homeownership and flexible 
exchange rates, an increase in interest rates can threaten the households’ solvency and 
wellbeing (Schelkle, 2017, p.117). A small but growing body of academic literature 
in political economy has underlined the importance of housing in contemporary 
capitalism for the politics of wealth inequality (Ansell, 2014; Bohle 2017). At the 
individual level, costs of accommodation are the single largest item in most household 
budgets. They seriously limit the degrees of freedom that households have to spend 
disposable income. For low-income homeowners, housing wealth is often the only 
asset they have at their disposal.  
Variation in house prices has a large impact on households’ wealth and permanent 
income, as well as on their borrowing capacity. Moreover, in the EU, residential 
investment usually comprises around twenty percent of Gross Domestic Capital 
formation and the construction sector provided five to ten percent of all European 
employment (Maclennan et al, 1998). Lower interest rates and higher house prices 
stimulate construction activity and real estate transactions, increasing revenues for the 
government and reducing unemployment. Finally, interest rate levels and changes also 
have a direct impact on banking (Schelkle, 2017). High interest rates make refinancing 
from the central bank more expensive, and tend to squeeze bank margins. As banks 
see economic activity to decrease, they also become more risk averse and aggravate 
the downturn. As interest rates rise, the number of non-performing loans is likely to 
rise. Conversely, lower interest rates that came with the euro lowered banks’ cost of 
refinancing credit, increased housing prices, and made local banks lend more against 
the rising value of collateral. This positive feedback loop fed the mortgage credit and 
housing boom (De Grauwe, 2012a). 
Overall, the interest rate effect seems to have various interlinked implications for the 
peripheral economies that affect also inequality trends in various ways. This thesis 
focuses specifically on two mechanisms, which link the interest rate channel not only 
with the income but also with the wealth distribution. I analyze in depth how 
financialisation studies provide a stimulating body of thought for institutionalist 
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analyses of the political economy and can add to our understanding of EA within 
country inequality developments. Building on the literature of political economy and 
housing, it asks how national differences in housing and finance systems, rather than 
labour markets and wage bargaining systems, absorbed this decrease in interest rate 
and what this meant for wealth inequality trends (paper 3).  It also reports that 
institutions also may change under the impression of capital flows. 
While interest rate convergence leads to asset price variations it also increases fiscal 
space via the increasing tax revenues and the reduction of the cost of public debt. 
Hence this thesis departs from the political economy literature of public finances, 
which emphasizes on the downside of easy finance, namely soft budget constraints 
which lead to reform postponement (Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2013). In contrast, it 
engages with more recent post-Keynesian analysis of the EA crisis which explain how 
increased financialisation of the peripheral economies may come with welfare 
expansion (Stockhammer et al., 2016). It adds to this literature, by investigating how 
these loose budget constraints are not only linked with higher social spending but it 
asks whether this spending is used in a progressive way. This contrasts to the literature 
which emphasizes that loose budget constraints would only lead to institutional 
deterioration.   
Changes in welfare provisions and the increase of the housing prices are developments 
which affect not only the top or the bottom of the distribution but rather most 
households within the peripheral states. While most of the work on inequality has 
focused more on the differences between the top and the bottom this study also tries 
to tackle inequalities from a perspective, which is relevant for all the different income 
groups but with a particular focus on middle classes. The reason why one should also 
put emphasis on middle classes stems from the traditional power resource theory, 
which even today continues to provide an interesting explanation on patterns of 
redistribution. A rich literature in this tradition documents how the size and structure 
of the welfare state is related not only to the power of the political left but also to 
alliances with the middle classes (Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990). It is almost 
conventional wisdom that middle classes are crucial for the welfare state 
developments and that they are an electorally important group. 
40 
However, when political leaders single-mindedly pursue the agenda of deep 
integration and the demands of foreign creditors clash with the needs of domestic 
constituencies then the literature suggests that democratic concerns and median 
voters’ interests are ignored. Hence, national sovereignty remains in the sense that 
elected governments can decide how they implement international commitments to 
openness but these commitments are no longer open day-to day democratic 
contestation. As explained above, the EA is then seen as locking countries into a 
‘golden straitjacket’. 
Rodrik (2002) claims that the “golden straitjacket” regime leaves only a small set of 
policy choices, narrowing the alternatives those national governments have.  Most of 
the conventional wisdom after the crisis follows this rationale and suggests that that 
the combination of deep integration and social protection cannot be any longer 
sustainable despite the fact that the latter may be democratically desirable. I challenge 
this view and explain that the interests of domestic constituencies are not necessarily 
and permanently opposed to the changes that international capital flows bring about. 
Surely, international investors tend to challenge existing firms and their employment, 
but capital inflows also provide an abundance of credit that benefits liquidity-
constrained households (Crouch, 2009). Hence, domestic constituencies’ interests did 
not always collide with the interests of market actors. This thesis goes beyond the 
view, which suggests that various aspects of deep economic integration influence 
negatively social protection, despite the fact that the latter is democratically supported. 
I suggest that that the relationship between integration and equality can also be 
compatible - conditional upon other domestic-political factors (Burgoon, 2012). I 
argue that in the pre-crisis period the euro came with market forces, for the periphery, 
which not only did not restrict but also expanded government degrees of freedom for 
redistributive politics  
While this study focuses on the interest rate channel in the pre-crisis period (and its 
effect on disposable income and housing wealth), one should ask whether this channel 
would play out in reverse when the crisis occurs. The reality is that there was a massive 
capital outflow, and government bond spreads increased massively in the first years 
of the crisis. However, the ECB’s announcement of the OMT (Outright Monetary 
Transactions), and the implementation of the Quantitative Easing led to a decrease of 
sovereign bond yields. Interest rates were lower in these economies compared to the 
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pre-EA years after ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures. While these 
governments were fiscally restrained during the crisis, still, this interest rate effect may 
have allowed for some leeway even in the hard years of the bust. Different crisis paths 
and inequality dynamics in the periphery generate the question of whether there is 
leeway for governments even in periods of economic hardship and whether this leeway 
will  be ‘accepted’ by the markets. Statements from IMF officials reveal that the 
imposition of conditionality in EA member states entailed additional challenges and 
societal backlash beyond those faced in less mature democracies (Henning, 2017). 
This suggests that democracy cannot be so easily ignored. I return to these issues in 
the conclusion.  
1.7 The operationalisation of the argument  
To summarize, the overview of the channels above suggests that there are good 
reasons to believe that EA may have an effect on pre-tax but also after tax income 
distribution and also wealth inequality. Given these theoretical expectations, 
financialisation may affect the distribution of market income. The interaction between 
then loss of monetary autonomy and domestic wage bargaining systems are most 
likely to affect the distribution of wages.  
However, the emphasis of this thesis is on inequality of disposable income and housing 
wealth. There are several reasons for this. The first is that in this thesis, EA adoption 
means a reduction in real interest rates in ex-high inflation economies and this thesis 
focuses on this interest rate channel. This affected the prices of asset and especially 
housing. When housing is the most important assets in household’s portfolio its effects 
on wealth disparities is sizeable (paper 3).  
Secondly, the descriptive evidence suggests that inequality of disposable income 
follows surprising trend in the years before the crisis because it is reduced in the 
countries of the periphery. Moreover, the empirical investigation of the first paper 
provides strong evidence for the association between euro membership and disposable 
income inequality. Besides the empirical puzzle there are good reasons to believe that 
the EA framework is linked with these patterns: Contrary to what has been originally 
claimed this influence on fiscal space is not found in the common rules of fiscal 
governance but it is rather due to the market forces that came with the EA and interest 
rate convergence. . 
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Thirdly, this thesis is interested not only in how economic forces have affected income 
and distributions but also in how government responded to these forces of divergence. 
This makes disposable income (which is income after taxes and transfers) inequality - 
the appropriate concept of inequality to apply. This is linked with the overarching 
framework of this thesis, which is the conflictual relationship between democracy and 
capitalism.  
Having reviewed these theoretical considerations, the aim of this thesis is to answer 
the following initial questions:  
Is there indeed a link between currency unification and inequality in the 
periphery; if so, is it different from the core and is the association positive or 
negative? 
How did the monetary and fiscal policy framework, which came with the EA 
accession, affect income and wealth inequality and redistribution policies? 
Did the original concerns indeed materialise, and if not why? 
What was the role of the domestic institutional framework and what were the 
degrees of freedom of the national governments in defining the final 
distributional outcomes? 
This thesis investigates these questions both theoretically and empirically. While the 
first paper sets the theoretical and empirical basis for exploring the topic, the other two 
papers deliver in-depth case studies. The analytical logic of this thesis is comparative. 
The second and third papers present a paired evaluation of two carefully selected 
cases. The next section briefly outlines the questions addressed in each paper and the 
data methods. Moreover, it provides a first examination of their conclusions. Separate 
introductions, specific backgrounds, research designs and methods, and empirical 
analyses are given in each paper.  
The above questions have been the driving puzzles behind the design of this thesis. It 
should be noted that this thesis does not claim that the EA is the only or even the prime 
determinant of inequality trends. It is indeed true that there is considerable difficulty 
in determining the net distributional effect of currency unification, a priori, because 
currency unification works via wealth and income channels and would depend on a 
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series of economic and institutional characteristics of the different economies. Given 
the numerous channels of transmission, which are described in depth in paper 1, 
conducting a valid study on all potential channels is, unfortunately, beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Instead, this thesis will embark on an in-depth study of the channels that 
can be hypothesised as having the most significant distributional consequences. Paper 
1 provides thick evidence for the selection.  
Secondly, most of the literature focusing on the impact of EA membership on 
inequality looks at income distribution as such. However, this thesis devotes greater 
attention to the flow of income to specific groups of individuals and households rather 
than on their stock of assets or debts. This is one of the reasons why, in the EA 
inequality debate, developments in institutions comprising the labour markets and 
social policies have been discussed in more detail.  
While these contributions are of relevance to this thesis and need to be considered 
when assessing the impact of currency unification on inequality, they fail to explain 
the developments in wealth distribution. This suggests that given that currency 
unification is operating through both income and wealth channels, one should analyse 
the effect on both.  
The first paper of this thesis aims to investigate whether EA accession has had a 
uniform effect on member states, and if so whether it is associated with an increase in 
income (disposable and market) inequality for all cases. It draws on literature on the 
political economy of European monetary integration and identifies theoretical 
mechanisms (channels), which link the institutional design of the EA to inequality 
developments in the post-tax and pre-tax income distribution: the competiveness 
channel, the financialisation channel, the fiscal channel and the interest rate channel. 
These channels are tested empirically using a time-series cross-section dataset 
covering the EU15 member states for the period 1995–2008 and in subgroups of 
countries with more homogenous characteristics. 
The examination of these channels suggests that, unlike much of the established 
wisdom, the impact of the EA is not necessarily, or always, one of increasing 
inequality. On the contrary, I find modest evidence that EA accession associated 
negatively with market income inequality in countries with demand-driven growth 
models. Moreover, there is strong evidence of a negative association between EA 
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membership and disposable income inequality in the countries that experienced a 
strong convergence of real interest rates and large capital inflows.  
Building on this finding, the second paper unpacks the interest rate channel. The 
initial motivation for investigating this stems from the concern that links EA accession 
with a decline in social spending, and thus an increase in inequality. The paper builds 
on the threat that interest rate convergence and the elimination of exchange rate risk 
meant that the budget constraints under the EA resulted in a loosening rather than a 
tightening for peripheral countries. Thus, governments in peripheral economies gained 
fiscal space and room for more budgetary manoeuvre. We argue that this allowed the 
governments not only to avoid embarking on the path of welfare state retrenchment 
but also to increase social spending, especially in countries that are traditionally 
considered laggards in terms of social policy provision. In particular, we argue that 
the allocation of this fiscal space and its final distributional consequences still lay in 
the hands of national governments. While the existing literature suggests that loose 
budget constraints led to reform postponement, we suggest that the existence of fiscal 
space enabled governments to materialise ‘parametric’ changes in welfare state 
reforms, which had positive distributional outcomes. To demonstrate this dynamic we 
study the cases of Greece and Ireland in depth: two countries with different welfare 
states, the latter compliant with the EA’s fiscal rules with the former continuously in 
breach of those. We focus on one particular area of transfers, namely old-age pensions, 
which reported the higher increase in social spending during the EA years and evaluate 
the distributional consequences of this increase.  
The final paper also builds on the interest rate channel and studies in-depth the related 
housing channel. It focuses on one of the possible channels through which monetary 
integration affects inequality, namely the housing market. To different extents in 
different countries, the housing market is strongly influenced by the process of 
monetary integration due to interest rate convergence and the elimination of exchange 
risk.  
Due to these forces, housing markets in the Eurozone ‘periphery’ experienced 
significant booms. Building on the literature on Varieties of Residential Capitalism 
(VoRC) and financialisation, this paper focuses on the distributional implications of 
the housing booms in Italy and Spain in the euro years up until the crisis. At the point 
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of the euro adoption both countries were characterised by low mortgage debt as a 
percentage of GDP and high homeownership. In the euro years these two countries 
started to diverge with Spain experiencing high capital inflows, increasing 
financialisation and a very frantic housing boom. In contrast, Italy maintained rather 
modest capital inflows and a quite stringent housing and finance system but still 
experienced a housing boom even though it was less frantic. By employing inequality 
decomposition techniques I find that housing wealth inequality contributed in both 
countries to the evolution of overall wealth inequality trends. However, the analysis 
suggests that the distributional consequences of the housing channel varied across 
institutional settings. Spain, which embraced financialisation and moved towards a 
liberal variety of capitalism, had already experienced an increase in housing wealth 
inequality since the second phase of the boom. In contrast, in Italy, the housing market 
was less financialised, and the housing boom led to a slight decline in housing wealth 
inequality. 
1.8 Discussion and Outlook 
Despite their differences in substance, approach, and design, the three papers jointly 
advance the understanding of how inequality developed in the EA context. The three 
papers do not investigate competing hypotheses but complement each other in order 
to enhance our understanding on how different channels between currency unification 
and inequality outcomes have been interconnected. They take seriously the theoretical 
criticisms, which suggest that EA will generate in-equalising tendencies due to fiscal 
constraints and centralised monetary policy. The papers explore in depth the validity 
of these claims.   
I build on, but also depart from the recent comparative political economy literature, 
and identify other channels via which EA may affect inequality, and different other 
institutional features - besides wage bargaining systems-, which may define the final 
distributional outcome. While the first paper focuses on the overall income inequality 
trends to provide the empirical map and for this thesis, the next two papers 
significantly narrow down the focus. Looking at very specific aspects of income and 
wealth inequality in each of the papers (namely inequality of housing wealth and 
inequality among the elderly) allows me to answer the questions outlined above. 
Narrowing the focus enables me to observe the exact interaction between 
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macroeconomic policy shifts, - domestic policies-and redistribution outcomes and 
thus to unpack the mechanisms of interaction. The question of whether the euro had 
an impact on inequality is related to the long-term sustainability and legitimacy of the 
euro area. The idea of equality is deeply rooted in the foundation of the European 
Integration. According to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union “The Union shall 
promote economic, social and territorial cohesion”. The academic literature suggests 
quite regularly that the EA has challenged all these goals. European monetary 
integration has been considered to be largely shaped by business interests, leaving 
labour interests to member states (Hemerijck and Ferrera, 2004). Hence, if the 
adoption of the common currency is/ or is perceived by European citizens as a driving 
source of economic inequality, the already waning political support for the euro will 
be further reduced and this will put at risk the long-term sustainability of the EA 
project.   
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2. The institutional design of the Eurozone 
and income inequality: Exploring the 
linkages 
This study examines the links between EA (euro area) accession and income 
inequality. It draws on the literature concerning the political economy of 
European monetary integration and identifies potential theoretical 
mechanisms (channels) which link the institutional design of the EA to 
inequality developments in the post-tax and pre-tax income distribution: the 
competiveness channel, the financialisation channel, the fiscal channel and 
the interest rate channel. These channels are then examined empirically using 
a time-series cross-section dataset covering the EU14 member states for the 
period 1995–2008 and in subgroups of countries with more homogenous 
characteristics. The examination of these channels suggests, unlike much of 
the received wisdom, that the impact of the EA is not necessarily, or always, 
one of increasing inequality. On the contrary, the most significant finding of 
this paper is that there is a negative association between EA membership and 
disposable income inequality in the “peripheral” countries that experienced 
interest rate convergence and high capital inflows. 
2.1 Introduction  
Critics of European monetary integration have often argued that the design of the euro 
would lead to an increase in inequality since it is bound to favour the interests of 
capital over labour and creditors over debtors by prioritising price stability over full 
employment (Matthijs, 2016). In addition, the obligation of EA members to follow 
stricter budgetary rules would limit their ability to counteract economic crises with 
higher levels of social spending (Busemeyer and Tober, 2015). The eruption of the 
eurozone crisis, which has been considered by many scholars to be endogenous to the 
institutional design of the EA (De Grauwe, 2012a; Lapavitsas et al., 2010), intensified 
this perspective and shifted the academic focus towards rising income inequality and 
increasing poverty levels due to the impact of austerity policies (Bertola, 2010). 
However, the theoretical linkages between EA participation and inequality under crisis 
conditions can be different than the pre-crisis period, given that exceptional monetary 
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policy measures were taken, that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy was 
broken and that economic adjustment programmes were applied.  
Furthermore, in recent decades, the international organisations also raised concerns 
about rising inequality in other developed countries outside the eurozone. Moreover, 
it is considered that the crisis has intensified the increasing inequality trends elsewhere 
(OECD, 2011). Hence, the rise of inequality appears to be a global phenomenon, 
which makes it important to question whether there are distinctive factors linked to 
European monetary integration which lead to the increase in inequality.  
The aim of this paper is to explore the linkages between EA membership and economic 
inequality before the crisis, and to contribute to this recent but rapidly developing 
literature that has tried to understand the distributional consequences of monetary 
integration in the euro area. To achieve this, this paper re-examines the end of the 
1990s and asks whether and how this monetary regime change affected the distribution 
of income within the euro area member states when institutional membership of the 
euro area should have allowed them to pursue policy objectives to catch up with 
growth, leading to convergence between poorer and richer countries. The paper also 
builds on the political economy literature on monetary integration and identifies four 
theoretical mechanisms which link the institutional design of the EA with 
developments in post-tax and pre-tax income distribution: the competiveness channel, 
the financialisation channel, the fiscal channel and the interest rate channel. Finally, 
the paper tests these channels with the use of time-series cross-section data covering 
the EU15 member states for the period 1995–2008. 
2.2  The EA and inequality  
There is a constant discussion of the idea that developed countries have witnessed a 
rise in inequality over the last quarter of a century (Milanovic, 2012). Many studies 
have highlighted the impact of domestic forces in affecting the distribution of income, 
for example partisan politics, electoral institutions and educational systems (Huber 
and Stephens, 2014). Moreover, others have emphasised the role of labour market 
institutions and suggested that declining unionisation, lower relative levels of 
minimum wage and declining unemployment benefits have mainly affected the lower 
end of income distribution and led to higher inequality levels (Wallerstein, 1999; 
Rueda and Pontusson, 2000). There is little doubt that besides the idiosyncratic 
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country factors, common forces are also driving changes in the distribution of income 
(Bourguignon, 2017). Globalisation and technological progress are considered the 
most obvious factors responsible for the rise in the share of total income going to 
capital and the slow growth of wages and employment of unskilled labour 
(Bourguignon, 2017).  
The exponential growth of financial markets that came with globalisation is 
considered to be another factor that has worked in favour of capital income. 
Financialisation is associated with the restructuring of national economies, since 
profits are primary accrued through financial investment rather than trade or 
commodity production (Krippner, 2005).  The expansion of financial labour force 
increases wage premiums for workers in financial sectors compared to the workers of 
in production based sectors (Kus, 2012). Moreover, the increase of the size of the 
financial sector leads to the distribution of national income to more affluent 
households by increasing executive compensation, and by leading to higher returns to 
investment. This benefits households at the upper part of the income distribution 
Goldstein, 2012) 
Inequality trends around the world (according to various indicators of inequality) 
suggest that while inequality has been on the rise in recent decades in a great many 
countries – most notably when considering the inequality at the top of the distribution 
and the GINI of gross income – there is also strong heterogeneity observed in relation 
to other inequality indicators, such as the GINI coefficient of disposable income 
(Bourguignon, 2017).  
The same complex picture also holds true for the EA member states. Table 2.1 
examines whether inequality, measured by different indicators, was higher in 2008 
(prior to the eruption of the crisis) than in 1998 (prior to the introduction of the 
common currency) in the original EU14 member states3. It is clear that in the EA 
member states, there is heterogeneity among the countries but also among the 
indicators. Market income inequality (measured by the GINI coefficient, and the top 
                                                 
3  Luxembourg observations are excluded: inequality indicators are very similar in Luxembourg, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, but Luxembourg’s much higher per capita GDP and peculiar financial 
specialisation may spuriously affect regressions. 
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1%) was higher in 2008 than in 1999 for all countries in the sample. However, there 
seems to be an opposing dynamic in terms of disposable income inequality when this 
is measured both by the GINI and by S80/S20 among the “core” and “peripheral” 
member states, with the former experiencing higher income inequality levels in 2008 
than in 1998 and the latter lower levels. Moreover, there are no clear patterns between 
Eurozone insiders and outsiders.  
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Table 2.1: Change in inequality levels between 1998 and 2008 
 GINI of market 
income 
GINI of 
disposable income 
Top 1% S80/S20 
Denmark 
1999–2008 
+ + + + 
Sweden 
1998–2008 
+ + + + 
United 
Kingdom 
1998–2008 
+ + N/A + 
Germany 
1999–2008 
+ + + + 
Austria 
1998–2008 
+ + N/A + 
Belgium 
1998–2008 
+ - N/A + 
Netherlands 
1999–2008 
+ + + + 
France 
1998–2008 
+ + + + 
Finland 
1998–2008 
+ + + + 
Spain 
1998–2008 
+ - + - 
Portugal 
1998–2008 
- - +  - 
Greece 
1998–2008 
+ - N/A - 
Italy 
1998–2008 
+ Stable + + 
Ireland 
1998–2008 
+ - + - 
Data: Source GINI Market Income SWIID, GINI Disposable Income Eurostat, Top 1% WIID, S80/S20 
Eurostat EU-SILC. Notes: The change between the GINI of disposable income and S80/S20 ratio in 
Sweden and Denmark was calculated between 1997 and 2008. The change in the top 1% for Portugal 
was calculated between 1998 and 2004. 
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Against this rather complex reality, the political economy literature on monetary 
integrations provides theoretical evidence for the existence of policy-relevant channels 
between EA membership and inequality. The debate surrounding the social dimension 
of the EA is by no means new (Fernandes and Maslauskaite, 2013). Even before the 
adoption of the common currency, various scholars were discussing the social 
challenges in the EA, providing inspiring literature on which one could build in order 
to identify the channels through which the EA may also influence income inequality.  
One of the first arguments highlighted was that the EA would expand inequalities by 
contracting the welfare state. While the degree to which welfare states contribute to 
mitigating inequality depends on their respective institutional design, there is sound 
evidence that post-tax and post-transfer levels of inequality are on average lower in 
more generous welfare states; however, generosity is not predictably related to market 
income inequality (Bradley et al., 2003). Hence, if the EA reduces the ability of 
member states to freely enact accommodating fiscal and social policies, this would 
contribute to higher levels of disposable income inequality. 
There are various arguments that link the EA with welfare state retrenchment. Firstly, 
the Maastricht convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact rules, which 
require that state budget deficits should not exceed 3% of GDP and that state debt 
levels should not rise above 60% of GDP, were thought to contribute to welfare state 
retrenchment (Rhodes, 1995). Further to that, the EA could also be linked to welfare 
state retrenchment through the politics of “blame avoidance”: political actors might 
seek to shift the “blame” for contracting welfare programmes to constraints imposed 
by the EA (Beckfield, 2006). As a consequence, we should observe a negative 
association between EA membership and levels of welfare state generosity as well as 
between EA membership and total and social public expenditure (Bertola, 2010; 
Busemeyer and Tober, 2015). According to this line of reasoning, the causal 
mechanism that links political integration by way of EA membership to inequality 
runs via national fiscal policies.  
Other useful insights can be drawn from the political economy literature that has 
attempted to examine the origins of the European debt crisis. This argument builds on 
Hall (2012) and Johnston et al. (2014) who all provided an intuitional explanation as 
to what gave rise to these competitiveness imbalances in the pre-crisis years of the 
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EA. They argue that the EA’s northern economies used features of their qualitatively 
distinct corporatist wage-setting institutions to promote an export-oriented growth 
regime.  
Coordinated wage-setting institutions constrained the growth of labour costs and 
helped to deliver low inflation, which promoted real exchange rate competitiveness. 
Because the EA’s northern economies were able to produce such high levels of wage 
moderation through their coordinated collective bargaining regimes, these member 
states produced consistent current account surpluses that were mirrored in the south’s 
current account deficits. 
Building on this literature, Matthijs (2016) suggests that if there is an EA effect on 
inequality, it would not necessarily be uniform among member states but would be 
different among “export-led” growth models (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Finland, Austria and France) and domestic “demand-led” growth models (the southern 
states, Ireland). He suggests that the institutional design of the EA may have led to an 
increase in inequality in the northern CMEs in the pre-crisis years. He claims that due 
to the euro area’s institutional design, as capital flows from the north to the south 
intensified, the core countries restrained growth in their overall wages and prices in 
order to compete in a currency union with the lower-wage ‘periphery’ members. This 
was permitted by the nature of their bargaining systems which were export-favouring. 
Their collective bargaining institutions that tied wage developments in sheltered 
sectors to those in the exposed sectors limited the inflationary potential of the sheltered 
sectors and enhanced national competitiveness, but also led to lower wages, higher 
profits and in turn to higher income inequality in the pre-crisis years.  
Matthijs (2016) suggests that the domestic demand-led economies experienced a 
reduction in interest rates and capital inflows from the north. In these countries, the 
wage setters in sheltered sectors in the EA ‘periphery’, not subject to a competitive 
constraint like their exposed sector counterparts nor to an institutional constraint like 
their sheltered sector counterparts in the EA core, were able to push for inflationary 
wage increases that produced adverse consequences for national inflation. However, 
higher wages and lower returns to capital also led to a reduction in wage and market 
income inequality.  
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These intra-euro area capital inflows that were intensified between the north and the 
south have raised other concerns regarding the impact of the EA on inequality, and 
their roots can be found in the literature between financialisation and inequality. As 
Rossi (2013) argues, the EA has increased the impact of finance-related activities on 
the whole economic system. Interest rate convergence and the elimination of currency 
risk boosted intra-euro area capital flows. Banks in core countries substantially 
increased their claims on banks in ‘periphery’ countries. After the introduction of the 
euro, ‘periphery’ countries (especially Greece, Ireland and Spain) experienced 
financial cycles of increasing duration and magnitude (Franks et al., 2018).  
It was perceived by policy makes that financial institutions would allocate capital in 
efficient way and that flows of money to the southern countries reflected the real 
prospects for growth through productivity enhancing investment (Hopkin, 2015). This 
assumption has proven to be wrong (Hopkin, 2015). The reason is that pre-crisis, 
housing and mortgage debt, considered high-quality collateral, were absorbing 
(though to a different extent in each “peripheral” country) an increasing amount of 
intra-Eurozone capital inflows.  
The new lending was concentrated in sectors with low productivity (but high returns) 
especially housing, construction and other real estate activities (Franks et al., 2018).  
While this is a phenomenon which is also taking place outside the EA, it is 
unquestionable that the build-up of the housing booms has been linked with the 
lowering (or even negative) interest rates which came with the euro, and the 
elimination of exchange risk that boosted intra-Eurozone capital inflows (Bohle, 
2017). Thus, these countries experienced the rising importance of financial institutions 
and the higher contribution of the “FIRE” sector (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate) 
to gross value added (Rossi, 2013).   
These developments however may have an impact on income distribution. As 
explained above, prior research has pointed out that there are good reasons to believe 
that financialisation leads to a reduction in labour income share and an increase in the 
inequality of personal/household income (Hein, 2011). Empirical studies validate this. 
Jacob (2012) suggests that the growth in employment and value added in the FIRE 
sectors is positively associated with income inequality and unemployment. Flaherty 
(2015) argues that deregulation and expansion of the financial sector contributes to 
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the growth in top incomes in post-industrial countries. Overall, these studies highlight 
that the expansion of the financial economy is associated with higher income 
inequality. 
Surprisingly, and in contrast to the literature on financialisation, Stockhammer et al. 
(2016) suggest that in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal, the increased 
financialisation was used to generate improvements for the working classes that went 
beyond better access to credit, a phenomenon which they define as “the social 
compromise backed by financialisation”. These countries experienced a debt-driven 
growth model, a strong wave of financialisation with sharply increasing levels of 
household debt and a property price boom. However, they also indicate that these 
countries also experienced moderate real wage growth, considerably stable wage 
dispersion and an increase in the size of the welfare state. The mechanism via which 
fianncialisation can increase the size of welfare state in the EA context has been 
discussed by other scholars. Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013) suggests that the 
adoption of the euro did not entail tight budget constraints but in contrast allowed 
“peripheral” economies that experienced large capital inflows to loosen their budgets. 
This happened via two main mechanisms: a direct one which was related to the 
reduction in the cost of public debt as explained above, and also an indirect one which 
was via the increased tax revenues coming from the capital inflow-driven economic 
booms. The second mechanism, is relevant for the financialisation literature. 
Nevertheless, this goes against the early concerns which linked EA accession to hard 
budget constraints and increased inequality. Since the ERM crisis, rising interest 
payments were thought to push a sovereign state into a debt trap where it had to raise 
debt in order to service the existing stock. As a result, the reductions in interest rates 
and risk premia, which came with the EA, were very welcome, especially for highly 
indebted economies as they would reduce the cost of public debt (Schelkle, 2017). At 
the same time, the elimination of exchange risk led creditors to reduce the risk 
premium to former inflation-prone countries. This led to increased capital inflows and 
robust growth in these economies prior to the crisis.  
The main argument in the analysis conducted by Fernandez-Villaverde, Garicano and 
Santos (2013) concerns reforms: they suggest that looser budget constraints allowed 
governments to postpone reforms and this deteriorated domestic institutions even 
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further. However, their framework may be of interest to the EA inequality discussion. 
Matthijs (2016) has already built on this link and suggested that the strong downward 
convergence of interest rates and the subsequent reduction of borrowing costs would 
leave some room for fiscal policy discretion in the ‘periphery’. In this sense, the euro 
inequality debate rises from a different basis. Due to this “fiscal space”, EA member 
states could avoid the path of fiscal retrenchment and also increase social spending 
even under the “stringent” institutional framework of the EA. The extent that this room 
is used to increase social spending could also mean a decline in disposable income 
inequality. As stated previously, while the degree to which welfare states contribute 
to mitigating inequality depends on their respective institutional design, a more 
generous welfare state could lead to lower disposable income inequality.  
To summarise, there are various theoretical considerations that directly or indirectly 
link EA membership to inequality. Despite this, studies which empirically test the 
existence of a link between monetary integration and inequality remain scarce. As far 
as we are aware, there are two empirical studies which examine the links between 
monetary integration and inequality. Bertola (2010) uses data from 1995–2005 for all 
the original EA member states, including the UK, Sweden and Denmark. He finds that 
EA accession is always negatively and significantly related to lower social spending 
and higher disposable income inequality. He further finds that euro area countries 
appear to have experienced increasing disposable income inequality, mainly due to 
social policy becoming less generous. Yet, as he acknowledges, changes in the 
definition and measurement of inequality at times that broadly coincided with the 
advent of the EA may have weakened the reliability of the results. Busemeyer and 
Tober (2015) also draw on time-series cross-section data in the same sample of 14 EU 
member states for 1999–2010. Their analysis shows that, while economic integration 
exhibits no systematic relationship with inequality, political integration 4  is 
consistently associated with a more unequal distribution of disposable income. 
Furthermore, their research is similar to Bertola’s (2010) in that it corroborates that 
                                                 
4  The indicator of political integration combines information on the member states’ institutional 
participation in the Schengen Area and membership of the EA as well as compliance with EU law by 
counting infringement proceedings of the European Commission and ECJ verdicts in sectors such as 
the environment, social policy and harmonisation of legislation. 
57 
the causal mechanism linking political integration to inequality runs through national 
fiscal policies: higher levels of political integration are systematically related to lower 
levels of public spending in general and social spending in particular. Nonetheless, 
their analysis is constrained by the time-series availability. The time span only starts 
in 1999, the year that most countries (except Greece) adopted the common currency, 
and not beforehand, and it concludes in 2010, which means that there is not a clear 
distinction between crisis and non-crisis years.  
Despite the various theoretical considerations, the empirical evidence so far 
concentrates only on the impact of EA accession on disposable income inequality, 
supporting the widespread theoretical concern that there is a uniform, un-equalising 
effect of monetary integration on disposable income inequality which runs via national 
fiscal policies. 
2.3 The channels and the hypotheses 
It becomes apparent that connecting the EA to overall economic inequality is not 
straightforward; the various channels are interlinked and the impact may not be 
identical across member states. However, the theoretical overview suggests that the 
effect of the EA can play out through various policy-relevant channels of interaction. 
In addition, the above discussion reveals that the architectural design of the EA is 
linked to both the ability of member states to counteract market trends in inequality, 
but also to the impact of monetary integration on the income distribution prior to 
member states’ intervention. Thus, EA integration seems to be associated with both 
market and disposable income inequality (so both before and after taxes and transfers). 
The next section examines these theoretical motivations in more depth and identifies 
four well-defined channels. Then, four testable hypotheses which link EA membership 
with inequality are derived.  
2.3.1  EA and market income inequality: the competitiveness channel and the 
financialisation channel  
The first two channels to be analysed are the ones that are linked with the 
developments in the distribution of income prior to a government’s intervention. The 
first channel is the competiveness channel. This is based on Varieties of Capitalism 
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literature and the competiveness argument. It is important to note that this channel 
directly affects wage inequality and only indirectly market income inequality.   
According to the competitiveness channel, in demand-led economies, the absence of 
highly coordinated wage bargaining institutions and the absence of a disciplining 
central bank could lead wages in the sheltered sector (relatively sheltered from both 
foreign and domestic competition) to rise faster than manufacturing wages which are 
constrained by competitiveness considerations (Johnston and Regan, 2016). Yet, what 
happens to market income inequality depends on a) whether wages in the sheltered 
sector were lower before the introduction of the common currency, b) the share of 
each sector in the economy (sheltered and non-sheltered) in terms of wage earners and 
value added, and c) whether this inflationary pressure in wages would benefit the 
upper part of the income distribution to a greater degree.  
Before deriving a hypothesis, it is important to explore some of the descriptive 
evidence which provides useful insights for the establishment of this channel. Figure 
2.1 below reports the total compensation per hour worked in the sheltered and non-
sheltered sectors of the economies. For the sheltered sector, I selected total 
compensation and employment in public administration and defence, education, health 
and social work, and construction. For the exposed sector, I selected manufacturing as 
a proxy5.  
The data reveal that total compensation per hour worked was lower in the 
manufacturing sector prior to the adoption of the common currency in the demand-
driven economies of the EA (Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland). This goes 
against the common pattern according to which workers in export-intensive industries 
tend to earn more (export-intensive industries employ a more highly educated 
                                                 
5 When construction is not included in the calculations – see for example Johnston and Regan (2016) – the 
results are similar. They find that, in 2007, the hourly wage in the non-market services sector (which 
encompasses health and social work, education, and public administration and defence) in Italy, Spain, 
Ireland and Portugal was 38 per cent, 24 per cent, 50 per cent and 120 per cent higher, respectively, 
than the hourly wage in the manufacturing sector (EU KLEMS, 2010). In contrast, the hourly wage in 
the non-market service sector of the EA’s northern export-oriented economies was either at parity with 
(the Netherlands) or below (Austria, Belgium, France, Finland and Germany) that in manufacturing. 
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workforce, and workers in these industries have greater access to international markets 
that benefit from the industries’ investments in capital and technology).   
Therefore, the sector in the economy which will benefit is the one where wages are 
already higher and thus this will not necessarily lead to a decline in wage inequality. 
On the other hand, according to EU-KLEMS (2007), the number of employees is 
higher in the sheltered sector which would imply that higher wages in that sector 
would indeed benefit more workers.  
Thus, the impact on wage inequality, and in turn on market income inequality, is 
overall ambiguous in domestic demand-led growth models. Inflationary pressures may 
also lead to an increase in wage inequality if they would disproportionally benefit the 
upper end of the income distribution (Johnston et al., 2014). 
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Figure 2.1: Total compensation/hours worked in the export-oriented manufacturing 
sector and the sheltered sector 
 
 
Source: EU-KLEMS. 
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trend as the MMEs, and in Austria where the dynamic seems to change in the 2000s 
with the sheltered sector increasing the hourly compensation relatively to 
manufacturing). Wage-setting regimes that discipline wages in the sheltered sector 
should, all else being equal, witness lower wage inflation. To the extent that wages 
increase in the export sector more than the sheltered sector, and this sector already has 
higher wages, this could lead to an increase in wage inequality and potentially to 
market income inequality.  
Taking these considerations into account, the first hypothesis is derived:  
The competitiveness channel  
Hypothesis: Under the EA, countries with collective bargaining institutions delivered 
sheltered sector wage moderation. Manufacturing wages rise in line with (relatively 
high) productivity growth while wage bargaining does not allow service sector wages 
to keep up with the export sector. This leads to increasing wage inequality for export-
led models in the EA. Since labour income comprises the most important component 
of market income, this could be associated with an increase in market income 
inequality. 
Countries without permanent mechanisms to constrain sheltered sector wage growth, 
in which devaluation is no longer possible, experience an increase in wages in the 
non-tradable sectors. However, the effect on wage inequality and in turn market 
income inequality is overall ambiguous since it is conditional on the relative wage 
level and the relative employment share. 
The next channel to consider is the financialisation channel. Many scholars argue that 
the EA has increased the impact of finance-related activities on the whole economic 
system. In particular, in “peripheral” countries (Greece, Ireland and Spain) which 
experienced financial cycles of increasing duration and magnitude, the data reveal 
(Table 2.2) that they also experienced an increase in the value added as a percentage 
of GDP of the so-called FIRE sector consisting of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate. 
Moreover, lower-growth countries such as Italy and Portugal experienced an increase 
in the share of the FIRE sector and a dramatic reduction in the profits of non-financial 
businesses (Rossi, 2013).  
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Table 2.2: % change in the FIRE sector’s value added as a percentage of GDP (1999–
2008) 
Country % change in the FIRE sector (1999–2008) 
Austria 6.03% 
Belgium -7.41% 
Denmark 12.28% 
Finland 2.70% 
France 13.43% 
Germany -2.05% 
Greece 13.87% 
Ireland 26.61% 
Italy 20.15% 
Netherlands -7.03% 
Portugal 27.50% 
Spain 42.39% 
Sweden -12.70% 
United Kingdom 6.67% 
Source: Author’s calculations from Eurostat. 
Building on the literature which links higher levels of financialisation with higher 
market income inequality, I derive the following hypothesis:  
The financialisation channel  
Hypothesis: The downward convergence of interest rates and the elimination of risk 
premia boosted intra-euro capital inflows which were channelled to the FIRE sector 
of the “peripheral” states; the increase in this sector with its higher salaries predicts 
an increase in market income inequality.  
2.3.2  EA and disposable income inequality: the fiscal channel and the interest 
rate channel 
While the first two channels linked EA accession with market income inequality, the 
next two channels refer to inequality after a government’s intervention. The first 
channel to consider is the so-called fiscal channel. This fiscal channel, which remains 
the most tested, links EA accession to inequality via domestic fiscal policies and 
specifically through the constraints that the EA imposes on public spending. However, 
there are some considerations which need to be taken into account. First, the 
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Maastricht criteria allowed member states to maintain national responsibility vis-à-vis 
their own adjustment strategies concerning their way to the euro (Blavoukos and 
Pagoulatos, 2018). In that sense, the way budget consolidation would be achieved 
could rely both on revenue and expenditure measures and thus the distributional 
implications of abiding by the Maastricht criteria cannot be determined from the 
outset. Moreover, the institutional constraints that were supposed to keep EA countries 
fiscally balanced proved ineffective. The corrective arm of the SGP proved to be a soft 
constraint, unable to perpetuate the harder conditionality of the convergence criteria. 
SGP rules have been weakly enforced and often changed, and the resulting complexity 
of the framework has hampered effective monitoring (Eyraud and Wu, 2015). With 
these considerations in mind, I derive this hypothesis:  
The fiscal channel  
Hypothesis: EA members are obliged to follow stricter budgetary rules; therefore, we 
should observe a negative association between EA membership and levels of welfare 
state generosity and in turn disposable income inequality (mainly in SGP–compliant 
member states). 
The final channel to be considered is the interest rate channel. This channel is built 
on a different basis than the previous one and suggests that EA accession entailed 
looser rather than tighter budget constraints. EA membership for “peripheral” 
economies came with a strong downward convergence of interest rates and elimination 
of exchange risk. This actually loosened state budget constraints and created fiscal 
space via the reduction of the cost of public debt and the increased tax revenues 
coming from the capital inflow-driven economic booms. 
EA member states could not only avoid the path of fiscal retrenchment but also 
increase social spending even under the “stringent” institutional framework of the EA. 
It is indeed true that the expenditure on social protection a percentage of GDP did not 
decline everywhere (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3: Total social expenditure in % of GDP 
 1995 2008 % change 
Sweden 32.4 27.7 -14.5 
United Kingdom 24 25.8 7.5 
Denmark 31.4 28.9 -8.0 
Italy  23.3 26.7 14.6 
Ireland 18.2 20.7 13.7 
Greece 19.1 22.8 19.4 
Spain 21 21.4 1.9 
France 29.9 30.4 1.7 
Portugal 20.1 23.4 16.4 
Netherlands 28.8 26.4 -8.3 
Austria 28.9 27.6 -4.5 
Finland 30.6 25.1 -18.0 
Belgium 26.9 27.7 3.0 
Germany  27.5 27.1 -1.5 
Source: Eurostat. 
On the contrary, some of the countries in southern Europe which had to adjust the 
most in order to fulfil the Maastricht criteria experienced an increase in levels of social 
spending between 1995 and 2008. Moreover, Belgium and France experienced a slight 
increase. Social spending is declining in countries of the core after EA accession (i.e., 
Finland, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands) but this is also the case in countries 
that did not adopt the common currency (i.e., Sweden, Denmark). Several studies have 
established a strong empirical relationship between the overall level of social spending 
and various measures of inequality and inequality reduction, also including relative 
poverty (Marx and Nolan, 2012; Immervoll and Richardson, 2011). 
This evidence leads to the final hypothesis: 
The interest rate channel  
Hypothesis: In the countries where interest rates fell sharply from higher levels, the 
EA led to looser budget constraints. This allowed for more accommodating fiscal 
policies and an increase in social spending which in turn led to a decline in disposable 
income inequality. I expect this effect to be more sizable in countries that received 
high capital inflows. 
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Having explored some of the descriptive evidence, it has become clear that the 
introduction of the common currency has led to a fundamental transformation of the 
participating economies, with variable effects across a number of areas (capital 
inflows, wages, employment, interest rates, rates of growth, social spending) and 
ambivalent general equilibrium effects on inequality. However, in this part, four 
testable hypotheses describing the impact of EA accession on inequality have been 
identified. These hypotheses, which do not always point towards the same direction, 
suggest that the effect of the EA on inequality is overall ambiguous. Hence, the 
examination of the relationship between the EA and inequality (the magnitude and 
direction of any effect) essentially becomes an empirical question. 
2.4 Methods 
To examine the impact of the EA on inequality, I follow a simple empirical model 
which is based on an “event study” rationale, introducing an EA dummy as the main 
regressor of interest. In order to examine the various predictions and mechanisms as 
identified in our earlier discussion of the four channels, my approach is to introduce 
level and interaction terms of the EA dummy with various country groupings 
(categories). The model also includes a time trend, country dummies and a number of 
controls for the economy and various institutional characteristics. Thus, the main 
estimating relation takes the following form: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝛽0+ 𝛽1EMU + 𝛽2 (EMU𝑖𝑡∗CATEGORY𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 CATEGORY𝑖𝑡 + Σ𝛽K𝑖𝑡 + 
λtimet + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
This analysis uses time-series cross-sectional data covering 15 EU6 countries for the 
period 1995–2008. I employ Prais–Winsten regressions as an empirical strategy as 
these have been widely used in the empirical literature on inequality (Volscho and 
Kelly, 2012). Prais–Winsten regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and they include both panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and a correction 
for first-order auto-regression. The approach is useful for addressing the problems of 
serial correlation, group-wise heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous cross-sectional 
                                                 
6 Luxembourg is excluded from inequality regressions since this small city-state and financial centre 
contains many extreme values. 
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correlations that are common in regression analyses using time-series cross-section 
data (Beck and Katz, 1995, 2011; Plümper et al., 2005).  
In the models, yit refers to the GINI coefficient of disposable income and the GINI 
coefficient of market income are the only indicators available annually. The GINI 
coefficient of equivalised market and disposable income measures the extent to which 
the actual distribution deviated from a perfectly equalised distribution. The most 
common problem with inequality data for EA countries is that there are missing values 
for the period immediately after the adoption of the common currency7. This is the 
reason that the GINI coefficients of pre-tax and pre-transfer income are drawn from 
Solt (2009) and the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID).  
The main independent variables in the analysis are EMU𝑖𝑡, a dummy variable equal 
to unity in the year that a country enters the EA and later years. The coefficient of the 
EA dummy will capture variations associated between monetary union and inequality 
for a given country in comparison to countries that remain out and in comparison to 
the years before the adoption. The association with the EA needs to be disentangled 
from that with the time of observation, and that with permanent characteristics of the 
countries considered. I control for time via a trend and for the countries’ different 
characteristics via the inclusion of country dummies. CATEGORYit is a dummy 
variable indicating whether a country belongs to any of the subsamples which are 
derived from the theoretical framework and described below.  
Category EDP/NO EDP: To test the fiscal channel, countries are grouped based on 
whether the Council has at least once decided on the existence of an excessive deficit 
between 1999 and 2008 (the UK, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece and 
Portugal). Countries with no decision are the following: Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, 
Spain, Austria, Belgium and Finland. 
                                                 
7 For the period between 1994 and 2001, harmonised data were collected by the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP). However, the ECHP expired in 2001 and was replaced by the European 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) in 2003/2004. Due to the transition between the 
end of the ECHP and the start of EU-SILC, there is a disruption in time series between 2001 and 2005.  
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Category Export-Led/Demand-Led: To test this hypothesis, I derived the sample 
between “export-led models” (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Denmark, and to a lesser degree France) and “domestic demand-led models” 
(Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and to a lesser extent Ireland and the UK). 
Category High FIRE/Low FIRE: To test the financialisation hypothesis, countries 
are grouped based on whether the increase in their FIRE sectors (gross valued added 
as a percentage of GDP) between 1999 and 2008 is above or below the median increase 
of the sample. The countries that experienced a more pronounced increase in their 
FIRE sectors are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark and France.  
Category High Interest/Low Interest and Capital Inflows: To test the interest rate 
hypothesis, the countries are first grouped based on whether the difference in long-
term nominal interest rate between 1995 and 2000 is above or below the median 
difference of the EU15 sample. The countries where nominal interest rates converged 
from relatively high rates (above the sample median) are Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Secondly, I test the channel more 
specifically for the countries that not only experienced a decrease in their nominal 
interest rates above the median but also experienced high capital inflows. These 
countries are the “peripheral” economies of Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
It needs to note that Italy’s external imbalances are a much more modest share of GDP 
than those of the other four.8 
The interaction of the main independent variables (EMU𝑖𝑡∗CATEGORY𝑖𝑡) allows 
me to investigate the channels described in the paper. The different categories are 
tested in separate regression models, all of which also include an intercept term 𝛽0, a 
time trend t and a large set of regressors.  
Control variables are intended to account for structural differences across countries 
and periods when assessing the relationship between the EA and inequality. Many 
structural features are heterogeneous across countries. To the extent that they are 
correlated to inequality and EA membership, it would be desirable to include all of 
these in regressions meant to detect the relationship between those two phenomena. 
                                                 
8 See Chen at al. (2012)  for a detailed analysis of capital inflows in the EA 
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The small number of available observations, however, limits the extent to which 
including additional controls improves the information content of the regression 
results.  
Thus, the entire model includes the main controls used in the inequality literature. The 
variables which are used to capture the economic context are unemployment, which 
is expected to be associated with higher levels of inequality (if unemployment benefits 
are lower than wages, the higher unemployment means automatically higher market 
and disposable income inequality), and real GDP growth, which is usually found to 
depress (market and disposable) income inequality.   
Moreover, pre-tax and pre-transfer household income is heavily influenced by income 
from work. In turn, wage dispersion is heavily shaped by a number of factors, such as 
the supply and demand of skills and a country’s system of labour relations and political 
power distributions (Wallerstein, 1999; Rueda and Pontusson, 2000; Pontusson et al., 
2002). Based on this literature, Pontusson et al. (2002) suggest that since union density 
and wage coordination will affect wage dispersion, they will indirectly affect pre-tax 
and pre-transfer inequality. Thus, both wage coordination and union density are 
included as controls in the model.  
Finally, following Nickell (2004), I hypothesise that the dispersion of education and 
skills will affect wage dispersion and therefore market household income inequality. 
Thus, I also include as a control variable the percentage of the population having at 
least upper secondary education. The expected impact on market and disposable 
income inequality is negative. 
2.5 Results  
To assess the relationship between the channels of interest and the EA, the following 
tables report regressions on a dummy variable equal to unity in the year a country 
enters the EA and later years. The comparison group is of course far from ideal for the 
EU15 (including Denmark, the UK and Sweden). However, the results are not 
significantly influenced when the remainder of the EU25 countries are included in the 
sample. Tables 2.4 present the results of the Prais–Winsten FEMs with AR (1) 
disturbances and PCSEs. The first and third columns contain simple regressions of the 
EA dummy and inequality indicators for the EU15 member states. Meanwhile, the 
second and fourth columns include the full battery of controls. Furthermore, the model 
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is applied to both inequality measures. This approach suggests that there is a negative 
association between EA membership and market income inequality before the 
inclusion of controls, but the relationship changes if we include a full battery of 
controls. However, the effect is not statistically significant with or without the 
inclusion of controls. The most important finding that can be deduced from this table 
is that the coefficient of the EA exhibits a consistently negative association with 
disposable income inequality and it remains statistically significant when we include 
a full battery of controls for the EU15. The controls perform generally as expected.  
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Table 2.4: GINI of disposable/market income as a dependent variable (EU15) 
Country fixed effects included                   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 GINI 
 Market  
GINI  
Market  
GINI 
Disposable  
GINI 
Disposable  
     
EMU2 -0.0390 0.179 -0.137** -0.176** 
 (0.113) (0.149) (0.0691) (0.0823) 
Time Trend 0.118*** 0.127*** 0.0350*** 0.0491*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0235) (0.00976) (0.0153) 
GDP Growth  -0.0194  0.0280** 
  (0.0199)  (0.0137) 
Unemployment  0.181***  0.0342 
  (0.0306)  (0.0239) 
Union Density  -0.0731***  -0.0378** 
  (0.0251)  (0.0172) 
Education   -0.0471***  -0.0674*** 
  (0.0131)  (0.0152) 
Coordination   -0.0457  0.0456 
  (0.0520)  (0.0767) 
Constant 43.43*** 48.14*** 27.20*** 32.18*** 
 (0.738) (1.251) (0.352) (1.249) 
     
Observations 196 196 196 196 
R-squared 0.994 0.994 0.990 0.991 
Number of Countries 14 14 14 14 
                                                                * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
This negative relationship comes as a surprise given the “conventional” wisdom which 
suggests that EA membership would lead to higher inequality of disposable income 
since it would reduce the ability of member states to enact more accommodating fiscal 
and social policies. To examine whether this effect is only transitional, an event 
analysis is performed. The aim is to explore whether the negative EA effect on 
disposable income inequality that the previous models suggests is permanent or not. 
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The following graph plots the coefficients and the confidence intervals for the EA 
dummy (and its three leads and lags) which takes the value 1 only for the year the 
country enters the monetary union.  
Figure 2.2 reveals that disposable income inequality is decreasing as we approach 
entrance to the monetary union. Indeed, the year that the country actually enters the 
effect of the EA is negative and statistically significant. EA participation has the 
largest of the effects considered here in the year it occurs. However, one-year and 
second-year lag effects of the EA impact continue to be negative for the first years of 
adoption, but smaller and not statistically significant. Thus, this suggests that if there 
is an effect in the overall sample, this effect of institutional membership on disposable 
income inequality is transitional with inequality being on the rise after the actual year 
of adoption. 
Figure 2.2: Event analysis 
 
Despite the fact that the effect in the whole sample is transitional, the theoretical 
consideration provides a clear motivation for splitting the sample of Eurozone 
countries into smaller subsamples based on the channels. To test the hypothesis, I 
estimate the models including the interaction term of the EA dummy and the variable 
category.  
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First, I examine the channels which are linked with market income inequality, namely 
the financialisation channel and the competiveness channel. I estimate the same model 
as in the full sample with the same control variables but without country fixed effects. 
In the next table (2.5), I report the marginal effects which give the coefficients of the 
EA dummy for the different subsamples.  
Table 2.5: GINI of market income for subgroups 
 (1) (2) 
 GINI  GINI  
   
EA effects on countries   
 Export-Driven Low FIRE 
 0.097 
(0.152) 
 
-2.51 
(0.302) 
 
   Demand-Driven High FIRE 
 -0.231 
    (0.136) * 
0.001 
 (0.136) 
   
Estimation of control variables   
Time Trend  0.141*** 0.151*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0244) 
GDP Growth -0.0219 -0.0219 
 (0.0175) (0.0200) 
Unemployment 0.0771** 0.0749** 
 (0.0374) (0.0366) 
Union Density -0.00633 -0.0202** 
 (0.00866) (0.00893) 
Education  -0.0280** -0.0799*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0149) 
Coordination -0.136** -0.214*** 
 (0.0603) (0.0794) 
Constant 46.75*** 51.13*** 
 (0.813) (0.836) 
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Observations 196 196 
R-squared 0.989 0.987 
Number of Countries 14 14 
                                               * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
To begin, in order to test the competitiveness channels, the countries are divided 
according to export- and demand-led economies. The analysis reveals that while there 
is a positive association between EA membership and market income inequality in 
export-led countries, this effect is not statistically significant with or without the 
inclusion of controls. On the contrary, while the theoretical prediction was overall 
ambiguous for demand-led economies, I find that EA membership is associated with 
a decrease in market income inequality and the effect is statistically significant at a 
0.1 level of significance. This latter finding, while weak, is consistent with the analysis 
carried out by Matthijs (2016) and provides reasons to conduct a more in-depth 
investigation for the competiveness hypothesis (Matthijs, 2016). Moreover, it should 
be noted that data on wage inequality would be more appropriate for the examination 
of this channel. 
Turning to the financialisation channel, the countries that experienced an increase in 
the FIRE sector above the median of the EA sample are positively associated with 
inequality, while for countries where the increase in the FIRE sector is below the 
median increase in the sample, there is a negative association between the EA and 
inequality. However, again there is a significant relationship between EA membership 
and market income inequality. Thus, I find no evidence for the financialisation 
channel. Nevertheless, other inequality measures, such as the top 1%, would be 
preferable for the identification of this channel but they are not available annually. 
Table 2.6 reports the results for the models that test the channels which are linked 
theoretically with disposable income inequality: the fiscal and interest rate channels. 
The sample is split between countries which were under an excessive deficit procedure 
at least once and the ones which were not. The result indicates that EA accession is 
negatively associated with disposable income inequality in the countries that did not 
comply with SGP, and positively associated in the countries that did. However, the 
relationship is not statistically significant and I find no evidence for the fiscal channel.  
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Finally, column 2 presents the relationship between EA accession and inequality in 
countries that experienced a strong downward convergence of interest rates (above the 
median of the sample). The model suggests that in these countries, EA accession is 
negatively associated with disposable income inequality and the effect is statistically 
significant at a 0.1 level of significance. Hence, the interest rate channel seems to play 
a role. 
Table 2.6: GINI of disposable income for subgroups 
 (1) (2) 
 GINI   GINI  
 
   
EA effects on countries   
 EDP Low long-term 
interest rate  
 0.102 
(0.140) 
 -0.187 
(0.131) 
   
  No EDP  High long-term 
interest rate  
 -0.423 
  (0.263)  
-0.178 
  (0.099)* 
   
Estimation of control variables   
Time Trend 0.0491** -0.0181 
 (0.0199) (0.0158) 
GDP Growth 0.0246 0.0202 
 (0.0193) (0.0149) 
Unemployment  0.0674** -0.0125 
 (0.0291) (0.0286) 
Union Density  -0.0752*** -0.119*** 
 (0.0114) (0.00955) 
Education  -0.107*** -0.0552*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0123) 
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Coordination  -0.0572 0.0824 
 (0.0693) (0.0704) 
Constant 34.55*** 34.05*** 
 (0.898) (0.770) 
   
Observations 196 196 
R-squared 0.961 0.976 
Number of Countries  14 14 
                                                     * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Lastly, I explore the effect of the EA in the countries that received high capital inflows. 
The capital flows financed government debt (in Greece), financial sector borrowing 
(in Spain or Ireland), or a combination of both (in Portugal or Italy).  
The regression results suggest that the effect on disposable income inequality is 
negative and statistically significant at a 0.01 level of significance. The result is also 
sizable. This finding points to the existence of the interest rate channel.  
Table 2.7: GINI of disposable income for subgroups 
 (1) 
 GINI Disposable  
  
EA effects on countries  
  
  High capital inflows   
 -0.582 
       (0.208)***   
  
Estimation of control variables  
Time Trend 0.0250 
 (0.0198) 
GDP Growth 0.00849 
 (0.0203) 
Unemployment  -0.0238 
 (0.0275) 
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Union Density  -0.0698*** 
 (0.00800) 
Education  -0.0311** 
 (0.0133) 
Coordination  -0.390*** 
 (0.116) 
Constant   32.61*** 
 (0.678) 
  
Observations 196 
R-squared 0.967 
Number of Countries  14 
                                                          * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.0 
To conclude, while EA membership is negatively associated with disposable income 
inequality, this effect is transitional. Moreover, the empirical analysis suggests that 
the most robust evidence is that EA accession does not have a uniform impact on 
member states. Re-running the models to test the different channels for the subgroups 
of countries, we do not find evidence for the financialisation and fiscal channels. 
However, there is a negative association between EA membership and market income 
inequality in demand-led economies, supporting the competiveness hypothesis. 
Moreover, EA accession is negatively associated with disposable income inequality 
in the countries that experienced a strong downward convergence of interest rates. 
However, the results for both these channels are relatively weak. The most significant 
result is that the EA is negatively associated with disposable income inequality in the 
countries that experienced a strong convergence in interest rates and increasing capital 
inflows. This evidence points to the fact that the EA did not only come with a 
constraining fiscal institutional framework, it also opened a way to new market forces 
for “peripheral” economies which gained credibility almost overnight, and capital 
inflows increased allowing for more room for fiscal policy discretion.  
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2.6 Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the links between the EA and economic inequality. Based on 
the literature on the political economy of monetary integration, it has documented four 
theoretical links through which the EA could potentially affect inequality: the 
financialisation channel, the competiveness channel, the fiscal channel and the 
interest rate channel. It has been demonstrated that the theoretical impact of the EA 
on inequality is a priori ambiguous, with some channels leading to an increase in 
inequality and others to a reduction.  
The empirical analysis draws on time-series cross-section data covering 14 European 
Union member states for the time period 1995–2008, but the analysis is also performed 
in country subgroups with more homogenous characteristics. The most important 
finding of this paper is that post-EA, inequality evolution is not always consistent with 
both concerns expressed and previous theoretical considerations. To begin, there is a 
negative association between EA membership and disposable income inequality, but 
this effect is transitional rather than long-lasting.  
When these channels are tested empirically in regressions estimated for subsamples, I 
find evidence for the competitiveness channel. In the demand-driven economies, EA 
membership is negatively associated with market income inequality.  
Regarding post-tax and post-transfer inequality, the interest rate channel is also 
statistically significant. This suggests that there is a negative association between EA 
membership and disposable income inequality, and this effect is significant in 
countries that experienced a strong downward convergence in interest rates. 
However, EA effect is more sizable and significant in “peripheral” economies that 
experience a convergence in interest rates and an increase in capital inflows. This 
finding suggests that EA membership prior to the crisis came with market forces that 
may have operated in an equalising manner in these economies. 
However, the analysis presented in this paper has numerous limitations that point to 
avenues for further research. Regression analysis shows basic correlations. Despite the 
fact that the regression controls for a large number of potential inequality drivers, this 
analysis cannot strictly prove the existence of a causal relationship between EA 
accession and inequality. Moreover, the empirical analysis is constrained by the time-
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series availability of the income inequality measures. Further, even within subgroups, 
the heterogeneity in terms of magnitude is not captured.  
More importantly, the abovementioned analysis does not say much about the 
underlying mechanisms of the interest rate channel. This opens avenues for further 
research and highlights the relevance of investigating economic inequality in the EA 
in more depth by accounting for country characteristics and national policies. Thus, 
qualitative case study analyses should accompany this cross-country empirical 
analysis to unpack these channels and examine how domestic politics and national 
institutional domains have interacted with supranational developments in the post-
euro period and how these interactions have affected the distribution of income.  
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3. EA and fiscal space: Redistribution in 
Greece and Ireland  
Our study contributes to the literature on European monetary integration and 
the political economy of redistributive policies. Our point of departure is that 
interest rate convergence and the elimination of exchange rate risk meant that 
massive capital inflows softened rather than tightened budget constraints for 
peripheral countries in the EA. Thus, governments in these peripheral 
economies gained some room for more budgetary manoeuvre. We argue that 
this allowed them not only to avoid the path of welfare state retrenchment, 
but also to increase social spending, especially in countries that are 
considered to be laggards in terms of social policy provision. Yet, in contrast 
to the important contribution by Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013), we 
suggest that this increase in fiscal space does not necessarily lead to a 
deterioration of existing institutional arrangements accompanied by 
regressive or clientelistic patterns of social spending. Fiscal space can also 
be used to modernize and spend on transfers more equitably. By focusing on 
two rather different peripheral countries, Greece and Ireland, and spending 
on old age pensions, which lends itself to the influence of organised interests, 
we show that in both cases, planned pension reforms in conjunction with the 
newly created fiscal space allowed governments to implement reforms that 
reduced poverty and inequality among the elderly. 
3.1 Introduction  
The literature on monetary integration and inequality suggested that the convergence 
criteria, during the pre-accession phase, and the Stability and Growth Pact, post-
accession, would lead to some type of fiscal retrenchment and to a subsequent decline 
of redistribution. Nonetheless, with the benefit of hindsight, it is now known that the 
fiscal constraints were not implemented as strictly as originally claimed.9 Thus, in this 
paper, we postulate a different starting point which is based on scarce but growing 
literature. This literature suggests EA accession did not only entail a new stringent 
                                                 
9  See paper 1 of this thesis for an overview of the literature. 
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institutional framework for some countries, but also unleashed new market forces. 
More specifically, EA membership for peripheral economies directed a strong 
downward convergence of interest rates and elimination of exchange risk which 
actually softened state budget constraints. This developed mainly via two 
mechanisms: the reduction of the cost of public debt, and the increased tax revenues 
coming from the capital inflow-driven economic booms. In this sense, the euro 
inequality debate rises from a different basis. We suggest that under soft budget 
constraints, EA member states could avoid the path of fiscal retrenchment, and also 
increase social spending even under the “stringent” institutional framework of EA.  
However, an increase in social spending does not necessarily proffer an equalizing 
effect. The existing literature suggests that soft budget constraints lead inevitably to 
postponement of reforms and institutional deterioration (Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 
2013). Under soft budget constraints, especially in countries with chronic problems of 
bureaucratic inefficiencies and gross inequalities of welfare provisions, increased 
social spending could adversely exacerbate unequitable distribution of benefits and 
fiscal sustainability problems. On the other hand, the existence of soft budget 
constraints could kick-start a modernization process of these unbalanced, fragmented 
and underdeveloped welfare states, leading to positive distributional consequences.  
To examine these dynamics and their distributional consequences, this paper focuses 
on Greece and Ireland within the scope of transfers: old age pensions. These countries 
represent, respectively, the “reckless” and “prudent” fiscal managers under EA; they 
have different tax and transfer systems, but in both cases after the introduction of the 
common currency, social spending increased and it was old age pensions of all social 
transfers which were most pronounced during the euro-years. Moreover, while 
pensioners are among the most vulnerable and sizable groups in terms of poverty risk 
(Gini report Ireland 2013: 73), spending on pensions is also very path-dependent, with 
strong traditional stakeholders.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we refer to the 
literature upon which our argument is based.  In section 3 we present the country cases. 
In section 4 we provide evidence for the existence of “fiscal space” in the two countries 
and the composition of social spending. Then, by reviewing the pension reforms in 
each country case following the euro (section 5), we are offering a contextual analysis 
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of how the interaction of domestic politics with soft budget constraints led to positive 
distributional consequences. The last section concludes. 
3.2 Literature review  
Starting with the pre-euro literature, one can find a clear stream of thought arguing 
that a country’s accession in the EA would force it, via market discipline, to maintain 
balanced budgets and to implement far-reaching structural reforms. The argument is 
usually presented in conjunction with the fiscal institutional constraints that the EA 
entailed, i.e. the SGP. Vis-à-vis the implementation of structural reforms, the literature 
has presented a variety of reasons why the euro would favour structural reforms. 
During the pre-euro period, it was that the flexibility which the EA would provide to 
businesses in terms of relocation that would push EA MSs to compete among each 
other to provide the most business-friendly environment (Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 
2013: 4-5).  
Furthermore, adopting the euro as a common currency would mean that countries 
would lose the ability to devaluate while lagging behind in terms of competitiveness. 
Hence in order to lower unemployment they would have to implement structural 
reforms. Certain commentators of the time suggested that by relinquishing the control 
of monetary policy, the EA Member states would have to prepare for a negative shock 
by making sure that a flexible and efficient labour and product market is in place (Bean 
1998). It was hoped that the euro would increase market discipline on government 
borrowing because domestic private institutions would be able to lend in other 
countries of the euro area without exchange risk instead of just to their own treasuries 
(Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 2013: 4-5).  Finally, these structural reforms were also 
expected to influence social spending. In the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, policy 
makers were expected to adopt cost-containment measures. The social policy 
provision and welfare states also became a reform target (Martin and Ross, 2004).  
This stimulated the debate about inequality in the EA and whether fiscal policies have 
been the major causal link between EA and inequality of disposable income. It was 
thought that while EA would lead to lower levels of social spending it could also lead 
to an increase of disposable income inequality. While the degree to which welfare 
states contribute to mitigating inequality depends on their respective institutional 
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design, less social spending is in general associated with higher disposable income 
equality (Busemeyer and Tober, 2017).  
Despite the above argumentation, the dynamics that emerged after the introduction of 
the euro were quite different compared to the ones expected from the above literature. 
First of all, the institutional constraints that were supposed to keep EA countries 
fiscally balanced proved ineffective. The corrective arm of the SGP proved to be a soft 
constraint, unable to perpetuate the harder conditionality of the convergence criteria.  
Moreover, vis-à-vis domestic reforms it was argued that the advent of the euro had the 
exact opposite effects for a number of countries, namely Spain, Ireland, Greece and 
Portugal; i.e. not only they did omit the necessary reforms, but also their domestic 
institutions deteriorated due to euro accession (Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 2013). As 
these countries entered the Eurozone their interest rates fell dramatically, making the 
budget constraints even laxer (Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 2013: 149). Fernandez-
Villaverde et al.’s seminal paper argues that the laxity of fiscal constraints essentially 
allowed governments to postpone the necessary reforms. This is a very common 
argument for scholars working on emerging economies, who find that countries that 
undergo an increase in foreign debt or foreign aid manifest a slowdown in the reform 
process (Alesina and Drazen 1991, Alesina and al. 2008). Reforms are implemented 
only under fiscal pressure, i.e. when constraints are harder.  Another reason for reform 
postponement is that it was difficult for the respective principals of credit contracts to 
extract credible information about the performance of financial institutions and 
government agencies, i.e. their agents. If the observed outcomes in terms of 
performance and output are always positive, due to the financial boom, then signal 
extraction and agent evaluation is extremely difficult, making the hiring and firing of 
agents equally hard. Subsequently, politicians and bankers can follow popular and 
beneficial programs without much regard to their long-term costs. In that sense the 
quality of governance suffers further deterioration through the soft budget constraints 
entailing euro adoption (Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 2013:150-151). In order to prove 
its point about institutional deterioration, the paper employs a number of case studies. 
Specifically, it uses the cases of Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Germany, finding 
that only the latter experienced the rigidity of the macro policy channel, leading to 
painful reforms while in the ‘periphery’ the financial booms allowed for reform 
postponement and institutional deterioration.  
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Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013) provide an interesting starting point to approach 
our question of how the fiscal effects of abundant capital on redistributive policies and 
inequality. Peripheral economies obtained more room for budgetary policies thanks to 
market processes. Institutions like the ECB and the IMF have therefore come to talk 
about “fiscal space”.  It captures the degree to which governments have room for fiscal 
expansion while maintaining debt sustainability, which is to a large extent determined 
by the market conditions of government credit. This change in terminology is 
motivated by increasing concerns about low-growth equilibria, in which countries can 
become mired during an extended process of deleveraging (IMF, 2017). We will apply 
this post-crisis shift in emphasis to the situation of over indebtedness. 
While fiscal space is a complex concept, the most prominent definition is that fiscal 
space is the budgetary room to create and allocate funding for a certain purpose 
without threatening liquidity and sustainability of a sovereign financial position 
(Heller 2005). The underlying theme of all approaches assessing “fiscal space” is that 
a government is seen as having fiscal space when it can raise spending or lower taxes 
without endangering market access and putting its debt sustainability at risk (ECB 
2017, OECD 2016, IMF 2017). In that sense, these market forces can provide an 
important link between EA membership and inequality trends, as this potentially 
allows governments to increase spending towards social protection, something which 
would not be expected under hard budget constraints.  
However, whether this increase would be done in a regressive or progressive manner 
is not clear. According to Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013), soft budget constraints 
would lead to reform postponement and institutional deterioration. Indeed, if 
institutional deterioration is only assessed in terms of economic efficiency - then social 
spending, made possible by soft budget constraints, is by definition, distortionary.  
Yet, soft budget constraints and additional discretionary spending may benefit less 
privileged groups. Thus the effect of such an increase regarding equality, cannot be 
predetermined from the outset. Hence, the existence of fiscal space can lead to 
negative but also positive social outcomes.  
On one hand, soft budget constraints may allow for the implementation of equality-
enhancing reforms which were already on the national agendas but were not possible 
before, given the existing macroeconomic constraints. Additional fiscal space can then 
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allow governments to either compensate the losers of a reform, or even to implement 
reforms that do not create losers, avoiding the war of attrition that usually surrounds 
such reforms (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, Claussen 2002). On the other hand, if 
fiscal space is used primarily to increase hand-outs for existing beneficiaries, then the 
inequalities in fragmented welfare states worsen. 
Thus, there are three major issues which will be explored further below. The first one 
is to examine whether governments used this space to increase social spending. The 
second question is whether such use of fiscal space was tied to a particular reform 
narrative, i.e. institutional deterioration/status quo preservation or modernisation. 
Modernisation had several definitions, but especially during the Maastricht period, it 
has been perceived as entailing policies of fiscal discipline and structural reforms. 
Nevertheless, our paper adopts the original definition of modernisation which was 
dominant in the 1980s, i.e. democratisation around values like equality and social 
justice. This has been elided from the policy discussions of the time, due to the 
narratives of fiscal discipline, but it is very relevant for welfare state reforms and for 
the inequality debate (Spanou, 2017). Finally, the paper will analyse the distributional 
consequences of these policy choices. 
3.3 Greece and Ireland: presenting the cases 
We employ a comparison between two most different cases, namely Ireland and 
Greece. Firstly, they are certainly different vis-à-vis their economic performance 
before the euro, with Ireland growing very rapidly for almost a decade while in Greece 
robust growth performance started only after EA accession. Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC) literature places the two countries under very different models of political 
economy, with Ireland being a liberal market economy and Greece following the more 
recent VoC variation of mixed market economies (Molina and Rhodes, 2007, Hall and 
Gingerich, 2009).  
Secondly, the two countries are also different in terms of their tax and transfer system 
- which is used to achieve redistribution. More particularly, tax and transfer systems 
are viewed as being historically linked with the development of the welfare state. The 
two countries have different welfare state models, with Ireland being inside the liberal 
paradigm and Greece following the southern European model. These models do not 
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justify increased redistribution for either country under the euro, since both models 
are linked to low social policy provision.  
According to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology, the liberal model minimises 
solidarity and decommodification, while it delivers modest benefits via means-tested 
assistance and modest universal transfers, catering largely to a clientele of low income 
working class dependents. It favours minimal state intervention and relies on the 
market for the provision of social insurance and welfare services, either by subsidising 
private welfare schemes or by maintaining a modest level of social benefits reserved 
only for the needy. Thus, transfers are strongly concentrated at the bottom. 
On the other hand, Greece belongs to the Southern model which supplements the 
classical typology of welfare state regimes. The Southern European model has been 
characterized by highly fragmented income maintenance systems with polarised 
provision of income maintenance between hyper-protected groups (public employees, 
white collar workers, and private wage-earners of medium-sized and large enterprises 
working on full contracts) and under-protected groups (the unemployed who have 
little income support and workers in weak sectors of the extensive informal economy). 
It is also characterized by little welfare state intervention, providing a small minimum 
income for individuals in need. Welfare provision is mainly directed to old-age 
populations, relative to working age populations (Perez and Rhodes, 2014).  Indeed, 
the welfare state in Greece places great emphasis on contributory benefits, while other 
social transfers remain at an early stage of development (Matsaganis, 2005).  
Consequently, while pensions account for the greatest part of social transfers, policies 
aimed at families with children, the unemployed, or other social groups are far less 
developed. Another crucial difference for the purposes of this paper is that the 
experience of the two countries is certainly different vis-à-vis their compliance with 
the EA institutional framework. Ireland on the one hand was a country with “sane” 
public finances and always in compliance with the SGP rules, while Greece had a 
more profligate fiscal stance and was usually in breach of the SGP.  
Yet, in both countries social spending as a percentage of GDP increased after euro-
adoption. This similarity is surprising, given that the two countries are different in 
almost every other respect, including the political orientation of their governments, 
with Ireland having a centre-right coalition and Greece a social democratic 
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government succeeded by a moderate conservative one. By employing such a 
comparison of these two divergent cases, the insights we derive will allow us to 
unpack some of the dynamics which influence redistribution and inequality for a set 
of two very different countries adopting the common currency. It needs to be clear that 
the aim of the paper is not to answer what drove down the overall inequality trends. 
Inequality is a complex phenomenon which is influenced by various factors, some of 
which may owe to structural composition of household demographics, immigration, 
labour market institutions, etc. On the contrary, its aim is to focus on the distributional 
implications of government decisions to increase social spending under soft budget 
constraints, and only secondarily how this may affect overall inequality.  
3.4  Fiscal space and social spending in Ireland and Greece 
3.4.1 Evidence for fiscal space in Ireland and Greece 
In Ireland, social protection as a percentage of GDP declines in the Maastricht period, 
but increases steadily in the 2000s, reaching a higher level in 2008 than in 1995. In 
the case of Greece, between 1995 and 1999, social protection increases steadily, 
declining from 2000 to 2002 (the period this country was entering the Eurozone) but 
then it increases until 2008. Overall, in both countries social protection as a percentage 
reached higher levels in 2008 compared to 1995. Moreover, in both economies, social 
spending moved closer to the EA (12) average in 2008 compared to 1995. More 
precisely, while social spending for Ireland and Greece was 19.1 and 18.2 in 1995, 
respectively, it was 26.6 for the EA (12).  In 2008, both economies, which have been 
considered as laggards in terms of social policy provision, moved closer to the EA 
average with Greece spending 22.8 % of GDP in social policy and Ireland 20.7%, 
while the EA average remained nearly stable.  
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Figure 3.1: Social Protection as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
In order to explain this similarity we suggest, that the common thread that ties them 
together is the macroeconomic environment of EA. Below we will provide some 
evidence, which confirms that that accession to the euro entailed two mechanisms via 
which budget constraints were softened. The first mechanism is directly related to the 
reduction of interest rates, which subsequently led to a lower cost of public debt. 
“Peripheral” economies have had a windfall gain in policy credibility that will result 
in permanently lower nominal interest rates, reduction of risk premia, and big cuts to 
real interest rates (Begg, 2003). Access to the EA improved debt management and 
provided cheaper access to money markets.  
The second mechanism is indirectly related to the downward convergence of interest 
rates. The single currency led to a narrowing of spreads among member countries. 
Peripheral economies became a “safe” destination for capital inflows almost overnight 
since currency depreciation was not feasible, and meanwhile default was understood 
as unlikely. Thus, peripheral countries attracted extensive capital inflows and 
experienced a robust growth performance which resulted in increased tax revenues.  
Below we examine how the two mechanisms may have affected Greece and Ireland. 
Although the euro did not appear until 1999, it is clear that the anticipation of the EA 
was having an effect on spreads in the late 1990s. In the case of Greece, bond yields 
converged from much higher levels (from 16.96 in 1995 to 6.10 in 2000). In the case 
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of Ireland this decrease was less pronounced (from 8.25 to 5.91), but still it was more 
marked than the average decrease in the euro area. 
Figure 3.2:  Central government bond yields on the secondary market, gross of tax, 
with around 10 years' residual maturity bond, 1995-2008 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Interest rate payments on the outstanding stock of debt are an important component in 
public expenditure. According to data from the World Bank, in 1995, Greek interest 
costs amounted to 23.8 per cent of total government expenditure and in Ireland, they 
account for 10 per cent of the same.  
Thus, the decline of interest rates the years before the adoption of the common 
currency meant that the decreasing interest payments would result in savings on 
interest costs for both governments. In the case of Greece, the interest payable as a 
percentage of GDP was 10.7 in 1995 and it fell to 6.9 in 2000. In the case of Ireland, 
it was 5.1 as a percentage of GDP in 1995, falling to 1.9 in 2000.  
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Figure 3.3: Interest costs of public debt, 1995-2008 as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: Eurostat. 
At the same time, during the euro years the composition of the public debt also 
changed and the introduction to the common currency allowed governments to 
gradually replace the short-term debt with long-term debt. Before the entrance into the 
euro, short term debt was a significant component of overall debt.  According to data 
from the Greek Ministry of Finance, short-term debt as a percentage of total debt was 
17.9% in 1999 and it was reduced to 10.3% in 2006 (reaching a record low of 8.5 in 
2005). Simultaneously, in Ireland, according to data from the National Treasury 
Management Agency, short term debt as a percentage of total debt was 17.69% in 
1999, reduced to 8.7% of total debt in 2006. Interestingly, it increased quite 
substantially the next year, jumping to 14.7%.  One potential reason for this increase 
are the concerns that the 20-year period of a booming Irish economy would come to 
an end were consequently mirrored in the average maturity of public debt. 
The next figure confirms the change in the composition of public debt. It reports the 
average term to maturity for total debt. This change in the composition of public debt 
represented the reduction of the annual cost of public debt, since its repayment costs 
would be distributed over a longer period. 
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Figure 3.4: Average maturity of total debt. 
Source: OECD and Greek Finance Ministry. 
Although this first mechanism seems to be more evidently in place in Greece, the 
second mechanism seems to play an important role in the case of Ireland. The decline 
in interest rates which came with the EA, and the elimination of currency risk, boosted 
intra-euro area capital flows (Franks et al, 2018). In particular, these capital flows set 
the stage for a demand-driven growth cycle. Indeed the euro years were a period of 
robust growth for both economies. Intense growth implies an increase in incomes and 
profits and an increase in employment opportunities, along with a multiplication of 
wage earners – which led to further tax revenues for both countries.  
While tax revenues in million euros increased for both economies, taxes as a 
percentage of GDP were declining in Ireland from 1998 to 2002 but increased from 
2002 thereafter and were above the EA average. One of the reasons that tax revenues 
were decreasing in Ireland in the periods of the boom is that substantial cuts in income 
tax were implemented. Between 1999 and 2001 the government decided to reduce the 
standard rate of personal income tax from 26% to 20%, while the higher rate was 
reduced from 48% to 42%. However, total income tax revenue continued to increase 
due to expanding employment and rising incomes. The large cuts in income taxes were 
considered affordable due to significant increases in revenues coming from transaction 
taxes, such as stamp duty and capital gains tax due to the housing boom. As an 
example, stamp duty contributed to 2% of total tax revenue in 1995 and to 7.4% in 
2007. Fifteen per cent of the national income in Ireland came from house building and 
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Ireland Greece
91 
six per cent came from other forms of construction in 2006. Thus, revenue from pro-
cyclical taxes increased substantially in the case of Ireland (Report of the Joint 
Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis, Irish National Parliament, 2016).When 
the housing bubble came to an end, taxes as a percentage of GDP started falling again, 
revealing the erosion of the tax base. 
 In the case of Greece, revenues increased in the first period (1995 and 2000). The 
extra revenues had two sources: the revenues from the economic growth that increased 
profits and expanded salaried labour and from the abolishment of numerous tax 
exemptions of a social nature. During 1995 and 2000 more taxes were collected due 
to the government’s effort to reach the relevant criteria and access the EA (Ioannidis, 
2015). Immediately after the entrance to the Eurozone and as a result of political 
choice, there was a sharp decline in revenues. The governments of PASOK (socialists) 
and Nea Dimocratia (conservatives) after 2001 gradually reduced the corporate 
income tax rate from 45% in 1995 to 21% in 2008. From 2004 to 2010, revenue from 
corporate taxation decreased sharply from 46% of total income taxes to 28.7% (or 
from 4.1% of GDP in 2000 to 2.5% in 2008). Thus, tax rate of corporate income in 
Greece (18.6%) remained at levels well below the Eurozone average (27.8%) 
(Ioannidis, 2015). Given the robust growth of the period the government had space to 
proceed with such reductions. During the period of 1995 and 2008, salary earners 
increased from 54% to 65% of total employment. Given the precept that "salary-
earners do not evade," the increase in their numbers expanded the tax base and hence 
led to an increase of revenues from personal income taxes. However, in contrast to 
Ireland, tax revenues in Greece as a percentage of GDP remained lower than the EA 
average, while they did not increase markedly in the euro-years. This trend should be 
attributed to the lack of a housing bubble, but also to the high levels of tax evasion 
(Ioannidis, 2015). 
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Figure 3.5a:  Tax revenues, in millions of euros (1995 prices). 
Source: Eurostat. 
Figure 3.5b:  Tax revenues, as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: Eurostat. 
To conclude, with the cost of debt servicing declining, with growth above the EA 
average, and with increased tax revenues during the period of robust growth, it can be 
argued that there was some room for budgetary manoeuvring. However, how this 
fiscal space was used remained in the hands of the national governments and in general 
it is obvious that it could be used in multiple ways.  
It is out of the scope of this paper to identify all the potential uses of this fiscal space. 
We are only interested in providing a new insight vis-à-vis the debate of EA and 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
Greece Irenad
15.0
17.0
19.0
21.0
23.0
25.0
27.0
29.0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Euro area (12 countries) Ireland Greece
93 
inequality. In the latter the predominant current narrative is that the link between the 
two is due to welfare state retrenchment and lower social spending. We thereby dig a 
bit deeper into the composition of social spending.  
3.4.2 The composition of social spending in Ireland and Greece 
The largest part of fiscal redistribution comes from the expenditure side of the budget 
(Immervoll et al (2005), Brys et al (2016). While social spending as a percentage of 
GDP increased for both countries, the redistributive impact of transfers depends not 
only on their size, but on the transfers’ mix and the progressivity of each transfer. 
Thus, while social protection expenditure has been increasing, it is important to 
identify the main areas in which social expenditure increased the most during the 
2000s. 
Figure 3.6: Ireland social protection by function, 1995-2008. 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure 3.7: Greece social protection by function, 1995-2008. 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
In the case of Greece, the most important category among income transfers is old-age 
benefits. This is the fastest growing category of social spending, and the biggest risk 
regarding the sustainability of public finances. Government spending on old-age 
benefits (of which pension payments represent more than 95% of total spending in this 
category) rose from 9.5% of GDP in 1995 to 12.6% in 2008. A significant rise was 
also observed during the same period in public expenditure on sickness/healthcare, 
which rose from 5.7% of GDP in 1995 to 7.7% of GDP in 2008. Spending on pensions 
was higher in Greece than the EA (12) average in 2008 (12.6 and 11.4, respectively). 
Hence, other categories of social spending (i.e., disability payments, unemployment 
benefits, family/children benefits, housing benefits) remained below 2% of GDP 
during the period of 1995-2008. 
In Ireland, while social spending in all categories of social policy declined between 
1995 and 2000, social spending rose significantly more rapidly than GDP in the 2000s, 
with particularly marked increases in pensions and health. In contrast to Greece, 
family-related transfers (i.e. the universal Child Benefit payment) increased 
considerably (from 1.8% in 2000 to 2.9% in 2008). In the end of the period under 
consideration, social spending in all categories was higher in 2008, compared to 1995. 
However, the most marked increases on income transfers between 2000 and 2008 
observed are government spending on old-age benefits, rising from 3.4% of GDP in 
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1998 to 5.8% in 2008. Despite the fact that old-age spending increased almost 2.5% 
of GDP, it remained below the EA (12) average (11.4%) and in contrast to Greece, it 
did not consist of a problem of sustainability for public finance.  
Despite these marked differences among the allocation of social spending in these two 
economies, in both country cases, spending on pensions increased substantially. Yet, 
our two country cases again differ, since in Ireland spending on old-age benefits was 
below the EA average. On the contrary, the accession of Greece to the common 
currency partially depended on the reform of the pension system, given that for the 
Greek case, expenditure on pensions was a substantial component of public 
expenditure and above the EA average (Featherstone 2004).  
We claim that pensions comprise a representative case to examine whether Greek and 
Irish governments increased social spending in old-age pensions with re-distributional 
considerations in mind. Indeed, inequality decomposition studies across advanced 
economies find that pensions have a high redistributive impact.10  While we expect 
increased spending in pensions to have important distributional implications for the 
elderly, which comprise a sizeable and vulnerable group in the cases of Greece and 
Ireland, it remains out of the scope of this paper to claim that pensions drove the 
overall inequality trend in these economies. Other transfers, i.e. family benefits, may 
have a stronger redistributive impact even if government spending in these transfers 
rises less than pensions- due to more targeted provision. Indeed, non-pension social 
transfers are usually concentrated towards the bottom of the distribution to a larger 
extent than pensions (Mitrakos, 2017).    
3.5 Social-spending in old age pension and re-distributional 
considerations 
In most EA member states including Greece and Ireland, as pensions comprised the 
highest category of social spending, rationalisation of the pension system was thought 
as the unavoidable indeed a necessary step to enter the EA given Europe’s ageing 
population. Yet pension reforms would have been in national agendas even without 
                                                 
10  See for example Guillard et al. (2017) et al for a detailed analysis of the redistributive impact of 
tax and transfers across 22 economies. 
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monetary integration (Martin and Ross, 2004).  Aging populations and rising 
dependency ratios are serious problems everywhere and welfare state specialists 
usually attribute welfare reform exclusively to them. In reality however, demographic 
trends and monetary integration have crossed paths. Europe’s ageing population and 
the fiscal restraints in place were suggesting that the pie cannot always grow bigger, 
hence it was expected that the slicing would become more problematic (Featherstone 
and al. 2001: 463). It was thought that both the budgetary squeezes, necessitated by 
convergence, and the SGP narrowed government choices regarding pension reform.  
Monetary integration was thought to rule out specific options, in particular of incurring 
new debt.  Thus, a rationale for proposals of “paradigmatic reforms” developed from 
the existing system of a high-cost high-replacement rate public pension, based on 
social insurance that was topped up with smaller contributory supplementary systems 
(Martin and Ross, 2004). 
However, for the countries of Southern Europe and Ireland, the problem of the pension 
systems was not only linked only with the long-term sustainability of the system (this 
was mainly a Greek and not an Irish problem. In Ireland pension spending was below 
EU average), but also with the inability of both systems to alleviate high poverty and 
inequality levels among pensioners. In 1995, poverty levels– when poverty among the 
elderly is measured by the percentage of people aged 65 and over who live below the 
poverty line of 60 per cent of the median equivalised (disposable) income of the total 
population– was higher in Ireland and Greece than the EU average (19, 22, and 17  per 
cent, respectively).  
High inequality and poverty among pensioners on the one hand and fiscal 
sustainability on the other were highly salient issues in both Ireland and Greece. The 
political saliency of pensions is demonstrated by the fact that reform efforts started 
twenty years prior to the introduction of the common currency. Starting from Greece, 
pensioners composed an important part of the electorate and hence governments 
engaged with the issue having always in mind the potential voting dynamics that may 
arise. In effect, it appears that in Greece, younger voters are less interested about 
politics and hence less likely to vote. Conversely, voters over 40 and pensioners 
appeared to be far more interested in the political discourse of the time and much more 
willing to vote (Kakepaki 2006 in Greek). Moreover, the Greek pension system 
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suffered from two main problems in terms of structure and function. Firstly, the system 
was discretionary, it favoured particular groups while it ignored the basic social needs 
of large segments of the population. To add insult to injury it was economically 
unsustainable. This is linked to the fact that it operated as a public, pay-as-you-go, 
defined-benefit system. It comprised numerous occupational pension funds – 325 in 
1997.  This extensive fragmentation did not just increase the bureaucratic complexity 
of the system, but also created the platform for wielding pensions as a tool of electoral 
politics (Tinios 2013: 119-121).  
An effort to redress some of these problems started already from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1980s, as the pensions-to-GDP ratio almost doubled. The lowest pensions 
increased considerably, uninsured old-age persons started receiving a social-assistance 
benefit, and pensions (along with social security coverage) were granted even to 
groups that had not paid any contributions (e.g. to Greek repatriates from the former 
Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries). Yet, the system remained 
fragmented. Some efforts at improving some of the inequities and inefficiencies of the 
social welfare system were also made in the early 1990s when Greek public finances 
were in a deep crisis (Featherstone, 2003). In 1992 the conservative government 
attempted reform of the pension system (Sioufas 2013: 24 Mitsotakis 2013: 145), with 
the aim of creating a viable system that would mitigate poverty among the elderly 
(Sioufas 2013: 24). However, union opposition blocked the reforms (Nea 2004), 
Sioufas 2013: 22, Featherstone et al. 2001: 469). Subsequently, the final piece of 
legislation (Law 2084/ 1992) left structural problems unaddressed in the eve of EA 
accession. 
As in Greece, in Ireland the issue of pension reform was of high saliency for political 
parties and for unions as well. The pension system was comprised of two pillars. The 
public, first pillar is the state old-age pension: a flat-rate mandatory social insurance 
pension supplemented by the flat-rate means-tested social assistance pension. The 
private, second pillar is voluntary and includes occupational pension schemes 
provided by employers, as well as individual pension arrangements. The overall 
design of the pension system is consistent with the neoliberal economic policy 
approach, creating and preserving a strong market for private pensions. Prior to the 
introduction of the common currency, the system did not have ostensible problems of 
sustainability. 
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However, one of the fundamental criticisms of the Irish welfare state especially in the 
1990s is related with the weak links between growth and social outcomes. Thus, 
welfare has been criticised for treating high levels of relative income poverty as being 
less problematic than their reality. Social spending in Ireland was below the EU 
average and so was spending on pensions prior to the introduction of the common 
currency (Powell, 2017). Already since 1986 the Irish state established two 
independent bodies aiming to coordinate social dialogue vis-à-vis the future reform of 
the pension system; the Social Welfare Commission and National Pensions Board, 
while the National Pensions Policy Initiative established in 1996 also shared the above 
goal. In terms of actual government action and legislation, the first major government 
motion occurred already in 1990 with the passing of the Pension Act and of its 
amendments. The 1990 act introduced a wide range of measures, including the 
minimum funding requirements for pension schemes, preservation of benefits for 
people who leave their company prior to their retirement age and the establishment of 
Ireland’s major pension-related consultation forum, the Pension Board, which had a 
strong poverty reduction focus (Hughes and Maher 2016: 95). The claim that during 
the early 1990s the Irish state and the relevant social partners were invested in 
grappling with pension reforms is supported by the establishment of numerous 
consultation bodies and of certain regulatory institutions that would be necessary for 
the formatting and implementation of any future reform. 
Thus, the issue of pension reform and poverty reduction and inequality among the 
elderly was quite central for Ireland and Greece already from the 1980s. Hence, the 
respective governments’ focus on the field of pension policy is a continuation of a 
long-term strategy and approach that started already two decades before the countries’ 
accession in the EA.  
We argue that when this salient issue of poverty and inequality mitigation among the 
elderly interacted with monetary integration, additional fiscal space opened up 
opportunities for reform.  Thus, while Fernandez-Villaverde et al (2013) suggest that 
soft budget constraints led to reform postponement, we argue that, on the contrary, 
fiscal space can also stimulate pension reforms, which may lead to positive 
distributional outcomes. In order to investigate this possibility, the next part analyses 
the pension reforms in the two country cases, and their distributional consequences, in 
detail. 
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3.5.1 The case of Greece   
As Greece was striving to meet the criteria in order to enter the EA, its access was still 
partially dependent on the reform of the pension system, given its financial 
sustainability problems (Featherstone 2004). Moreover, it was a widely held 
perception among experts during that time that the Maastricht criteria would impose a 
strong budget constraint that would justify the rationalisation of the pension system 
(Featherstone et al. 2001:465-466). 
The reform that began in 1997 by the Social-democratic government of Costas Simitis 
was considered very urgent by political and economic experts in Greece and in the rest 
of Europe. These reforms are considered as one of the well-documented cases of 
reform failure in the relevant literature. However, what is important to underline for 
the purposes of this analysis is that despite the fact that this reform is considered a 
failure, it also marked two important developments which are often elided in the 
literature: a modernisation rhetoric was used explicitly and in  a central way for the 
field of social policy. This rhetoric was tied with the need to bypass the constant 
objections of reform losers. Modernization’s ‘social policy manifesto’ was central to 
a speech given by the Greek prime minister of the time on 19 October 1995 (Simitis, 
1995, pp 17-32). 
As a result, one of the goals of the government of the time was the attenuation of the 
generous guarantees for historically privileged occupational groups (especially in the 
field of pensions), accompanied by the improvement of minimum social benefits. It 
was clearly recognised that the economic stabilisation and viability of the system did 
not exclude the more equitable allocation of pensions. In fact the lack of reform was 
perceived as having significant costs given that it was helping the perpetuation of the 
previous clientelistic modus operandi (Tinios 2017). 
 As Simitis claimed, choosing between ‘stabilisation or an increase of low pensions’ 
was a false dilemma, borne of a non-rational structure of expenditure. Once the system 
was reformed, this kind of dilemma would recede (Tinios 2017: 68). Thus, both system 
sustainability and equal provision were central to the government’s vision on pension 
reform. 
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The effort to modernize the pension system towards this direction started with the 
establishment of EKAS, a means-tested cash benefit to help pensioners at risk of state 
poverty, in 1996. EKAS would be funded by the state budget and distributed via the 
pension funds, with its main aim being to support low-income recipients of old age 
and survivors’ pensions. Indeed, the number of pensioners at risk of poverty decreased 
by almost 3 per cent between 2000 and 2002. Given that the benefits were funded 
exclusively by the state budget, the establishment of EKAS did not provoke the 
reaction of other special interest groups (Matsaganis 2005: 51). Yet the limits of EKAS 
soon manifested- due to design faults and bureaucratic problems (Matsaganis 2005: 
61). The administrative problems were not only restricted in the policies which has 
been introduced the first years of the Euro but these were representative of a more 
general pattern, which reflects problems of administrative capacity of the Greek state 
(Matsaganis, 2005: 62). 
Following the establishment of EKAS the Simitis government started contemplating 
the wider reform of the pension system. The first step came in 1997, publishing the 
so-called Spraos Report on the pension system.  This report on pensions demonstrated 
a clear preference for the prolongment of working life (Committee for the examination 
of economic policy in the long term 1997: 9), while it severely criticised the 
fragmentation of the pension system. Subsequently, it suggested the vertical 
unification of pension funds, accompanied by new schemes of financial solidarity 
between them (Committee for the examination of economic policy in the long term 
1997: 9, 19-20).  
The report claimed that such a policy reform would have clear redistributive effects in 
favour of the lower income brackets since it would limit the special subsidies of 
particular occupational groups and redirect funds towards the general pension 
schemes. Once again, the elements of modernisation and distributional considerations 
were taken into account. Complementing this rationale, the experts noted that the state 
had an obligation to protect all employees equally, and hence, the subsidisation of 
particular occupational groups should cease (Committee for the examination of 
economic policy in the long term 1997: 5, 20). The Committee extended this 
suggestion by arguing that the current contribution pattern should be reversed to the 
effect of employees working in the sheltered sectors of the economy contributing more 
(hence lower subsidisation), with the employees in the more competitive sectors 
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contributing less (hence higher subsidisation) (Committee for the examination of 
economic policy in the long term 1997: 8).  
However, as in the early 1990s, all these proposals faced the fierce defiance of the 
unions and of the other parliamentary opposition parties. Unions reacted most 
forcefully to the report. The two largest trade unions in Greece, i.e. ADEDI (the main 
union for public sector employees) and GSEE (the main union for private sector 
employees) drew their membership from the labour segments of the economy that 
were better protected, and hence benefited more from the status quo and especially 
from the more privileged special pension schemes (Matsaganis 2007: 542, 545). Given 
that these major unions , that dominated the  social dialogue, did not include workers 
insured in the less beneficial general schemes, i.e. younger workers usually employed 
by private firms with flexible contracts, women that recently entered the labour force 
and immigrants with semi-permanent status in the country (Matsaganis 2007: 543-
545), union preferences were in favour of sustaining the existing regime. The unions’ 
policy line, whenever faced with questions about the viability of the social insurance 
system, was that the state had to increase its contribution to the funds in order to cover 
their ever-rising deficits.  
After its victory in the 2000 elections, the incumbent socialist government resumed its 
effort to reform the system of social security (Kathimerini 2008a). The government 
plan published in 2001, after the country’s accession to the Eurozone, focused on 
suggesting changes that would secure the economic viability of the system. It proposed 
a uniform retirement age for men and women at 65, along with longer prerequisite 
insurance periods for seniority pension eligibility. Moreover, the bill suggested a 
modest, means-tested increase of the minimum pension for future retirees (Matsaganis 
2007:548). Despite the fact that the plan was certainly less radical than the one drafted 
from the Spraos Committee, its policies would still lead to a more viable and more 
equitable system. Yet this would be done via the redirection of funds from the special 
pension schemes to the general ones.  
Reacting to this scheme, once again, political parties and social partners mounted 
heavy opposition to the reform (Matsaganis 2007: 549, Kathimerini a). Only a few 
days after the government’s proposal went public, the unions publicised their 
opposition and announced a series of strikes. 
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Following this wave of strikes, the government sought to open a broad, six-month 
consultation in which the unions took part. During this consultation they provided 
extensive input on the final legislative proposal (Matsaganis 2007: 548). The final law 
mirrored a compromise between the unions and the government. The latter succeeded 
on sustaining and expanding seniority pensions and permitting early retirement for 
public sector employees in the context of the “hard and arduous” practice, i.e. 
professions or vocations that entail heavy physical fatigue and accumulated health 
costs. The latter provision enabled numerous public servants to receive an early and 
highly beneficial retirement package (Law 3092/02 article 2).  
They also managed to secure additional state support for the pension fund of public 
employees, while the unification of funds of public sector employees would happen 
only on a voluntary basis (Law 3092/02 article 4). In exchange, the government 
managed to set a general replacement rate at 70 per cent, while it also managed to 
reduce the minimum pension at 70 per cent of the minimum wage for future retirees 
(Law 3092/02 article 3)-. However, it also managed to introduce a low-rate minimum 
pension for contributors failing to meet the standard requirement of 15 insurance 
years. 
All in all, while the fiscal sustainability of the system remained a major problem and 
while the unions managed to preserve their benefits and to avert any kind of fund 
transfer to the general pension schemes, there was also the adoption of policies that 
were indeed universal yet were also targeted towards groups facing a high risk of 
poverty and/or social exclusion: the introduction of a pension for the uninsured 
elderly, as everyone now received some kind of pension. Moreover, there were rises 
in minimum pensions and in the EKAS. This is mirrored in poverty rates among 
pensioners for this period, as poverty levels for pensioners decline after 1998. 
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Figure 3.8: Poverty among pensioners in Greece. 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Before turning to inequality indicators, it worth mentioning that the increase of 
pensions was annual and at the government’s discretion. The annual increase was 
generally progressive, with low pensions increasing more under the euro during the 
centre-left PASOK government except the year 2000, which is the year prior to the 
introduction of the common currency. After the 2004 electoral win of New 
Democracy, pensions spending as a percentage of GDP increased substantially (more 
than during the Simitis Government) and annual increases in pensions were above 
inflation but equal for all pension brackets.  
Table 3.1: Annual pension increases, Greece, 1999-2008. 
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Year 2004 2005 2006 20007 2008 
 ND ND ND ND ND 
 CPI 2.90% 3.50% 2.90% 2.90% 4.20% 
In
cr
e
a
se
s 
5% 
(<EUR 500) 
4.00% 
 4.00% 4.00% 
3% from 
1/1/08 plus 2% 
from 1/10/08 
3% 
(<EUR1 000) 
 
0% 
(>EUR1000) 
3% 
( EUR 1 000) 
3.4% 
(>EUR733) 
Source: OECD Pension at Glance (2005, 2007, 2009). 
The S80/S20 indicator is constructed by dividing the total equivalised disposable 
income of the top 20 per cent incomes of the elderly by the total equivalised disposable 
income of the bottom 20 per cent incomes of people aged 65 and over. A higher value 
of this indicator implies a higher inequality among the elderly. This indicator reveals 
two major facts:  Firstly, in the period prior to EA accession, inequality was higher for 
the elderly and above the total population; after the introduction of the common 
currency, inequality was lower for the elderly than the total population (see figure 3.9). 
As Matsaganis (2007) claims, with the pension system absorbing most of welfare state 
spending, transfers for the working age population remain low. In other words, the 
reverse of the coin of over-resourced pensions is under-resourced family 
unemployment and housing benefits.  
Secondly, according to the S80/S20 indicator, inequality among the elderly fell from 
1998 onward. Yet, this decline is not continuous, but rather depends on the 
governments’ choice on how progressive would be the annual increases in pensions. 
More specifically, despite the fact that pension spending as a percentage of GDP 
increased more from 2004 onwards under the centre-right government of New 
Democracy, inequality from 2004 to 2008 did not decline that much – since the annual 
increases in pensions were not always progressive. 
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Figure 3.9: Income inequality among total and elderly population, Greece, S80/S20 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
To conclude, our evidence suggests that as the literature claims, the rationalisation of 
the pension system and its restructuring on a more equitable basis was not realised to 
the extent of its original intention. While this result would follow the corollary of 
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013), meaning that the creation of fiscal space and the 
subsequent softening of budget constraints were the factors leading to reform 
postponement and further institutional deterioration, two reasons command caution. 
Firstly, whether it was the euro allowing for this lack of reform is rather unclear. The 
same opposition dynamics were taking place in the early reform of the 1990s, a period 
with less budgetary manoeuvre for Greek governments. Unions in that period once 
again blocked the conservative government’s pension plan. Secondly, the above 
analysis indicates that even in the case of Greece, which is usually considered as the 
country with the least progress regarding its welfare state restructuring and a laggard 
in structural reforms, there were clear elements of modernisation during the euro years. 
This took place in the context of enormous social and political resistance to any serious 
attempt of pension system recalibration. Most of the government proposals only 
remained frustrated promises, although some of them did materialize, especially the 
ones linked to the improvement of minimum social benefits which did not generate 
reactions by the insiders of the system. Thus, despite the fact that insider privileges 
remained untouched and the system continued to be highly fragmented, inequality and 
poverty among the elderly was significantly reduced.   
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3.5.2 The case of Ireland   
The discussion for a significant reform of the Irish pension system had already 
commenced in 1996 by the “Rainbow Coalition” of Christian democrats, Labour and 
the progressive left, in association with a permanent independent Committee (the 
Pension Board) that included representatives of most social partners. The discussion 
continued into 1997 with the new liberal/conservative coalition government of Fianna 
Fail and the Progressive Democrats and ended with the publication of a report labelled 
“Securing Retirement Income”. The report suggested significant reforms for both 
aforementioned pillars of the pension system. The overall reform had as an explicit 
aim “to ensure adequate provision for retirement income for all” (The Pensions Board 
1998: 8). This was motivated by the fact that despite the years of growth, poverty 
among pensioners was high compared to EU standards. 
Hence, it presented a national pension system scheme which especially emphasised 
strengthening the basic Social Welfare Pension as a means of poverty mitigation (The 
Pensions Board 1998: 3). Moreover, it suggested that mitigating poverty was not 
enough and that providing an adequate total retirement income (equal to 50 per cent 
of gross preretirement income) was crucial (The Pensions Board 1998: 10). 
Addressing these poverty-related concerns, the Pensions board proposed that the target 
pension rate should rise from 28.5 to 34 per cent of average industrial earnings (The 
Pensions Board 1998: 10).   
Recognising the fact that pension coverage was unequal between sectors and between 
full and part-time employees, the Board also noted that the goal should be 70 per cent 
coverage of the working population above 30, meaning access to supplementary 
pensions (The Pensions Board 1998: 11). More comprehensive policies were 
established, e.g. a new type of pension vehicle, the Personal Retirement Savings 
Account, access of all employees to some kind of supplementary coverage via their 
employers and equal treatment between full-time, atypical and part-time workers (The 
Pensions Board 1998: 20, 24). The report was accepted by the government and led it 
to tabling a pension amendment bill in 2001 with the aim of ensuring that all 
pensioners have an adequate income in order to live with dignity (Seanad Eireann 
2001: 1, 9). The bill included all the major suggestions found in the 1998 report like 
the establishment of the Personal Retirement Savings Account, which was aiming to 
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increase coverage to 70 per cent (Seanad Eireann 2001: 3, 5). Furthermore, following 
the report’s suggestions, the government by the end of its term, increased state 
pensions by 3.7 per cent –still falling short of its initial 34 percent goal (Hick 2009:7).  
Both the report and the bill were accepted with little opposition from the other 
parliamentary parties and the social partners, while it caused little social strife. This 
should be attributed to the system of “Social Partnership” that was dominant in Ireland 
at the time. From 1987 onward, the largest trade unions in Ireland were in close 
cooperation with the government (particularly with Fine Fail) regarding the latter’s 
strategy for wage restraint. Hence the major trade unions ended up usually aligning 
with government policies (Culpepper and Regan 2014: 736). One can see a similar 
pattern of inclusive social partnership in the field of pension policy.   
The first Social Partnership agreement that embraced such a policy line vis-à-vis 
pensions was the one published in 1997 (Department of the Taoiseach 1997). 
Following this agreement, the reform bill included clear and agreed provisions on 
pension policy. In addition to the social partnership agreement, the responsible body 
for moulding reform, the Pensions Board, had wide and all-encompassing 
membership, including representatives of all major trade unions, representatives of the 
employers and of other professional groups, three nominees from the ministry and 
departmental representatives (Seanad Eireann 2001: 2). In addition, the consultation 
before the report was quite long –around 2 years – and wide-reaching, with 143 
submissions (Pensions Board 1998: vi). All the above signified sufficient time for 
public debate on the issue and that the major social partners offered significant input 
on the formulation of the reform scheme– hence they had little ground to oppose the 
reform. 
The initial success of the reform and the absence of any marked reaction to it enabled 
the liberal coalition to continue on the same path after its 2002 electoral victory. The 
two coalition parties announced in their common program for government that they 
would continue reform of the system with the aim of ensuring adequate life standards 
for the elderly. The program went as far as to include specific measures: an increase 
to the basic state pension to 200 euros by 2007, personal pension entitlements for 
pensioners’ spouses and additional options for people of pension age who wish to 
continue working (An agreed program for Government 2002: 26).  
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Following these commitments, the Pension Board produced in 2005 the “National 
Pensions Review”, which sought to assess the progress of the reforms that were 
defined in 1998 (Pensions Board 2005: ii). The report reaffirmed the previous goals 
regarding the level of the social welfare pensions, the overall retirement income and 
the desired amount of coverage. It suggested that progress towards their achievement 
was still inadequate (Pensions Board 2005:4, 26, 32, 34-35). The report did urge the 
government to step up the efforts to reach these targets (Pensions Board 2005: iv) in 
view of the fact that the percentage of retired persons under the risk of poverty had 
risen to 31.0 in 2003 (from 6.0 in 1994) (Pensions Board 2005: 4).   
On the front of poverty mitigation, the report noted that coverage and income 
adequacy among the younger and part-time employees, of which the largest proportion 
was female, was lower (Pensions Board 2005:44). To that end, the Board proposed 
more awareness initiatives in order to increase pension awareness among women, 
while any future changes should aim to close the provision gap and benefit women 
(Pensions Board 2005: iii, 6,7,44).  
Finally, the report recognized that the funding costs of the state pension schemes 
would increase dramatically in the future and hence some change vis-à-vis funding 
should be pursued. In order to address this challenge, the board suggested either an 
increase of state funding and/or the incentivisation of workers in pension age to retire 
later, while it explicitly opposed any reduction in state pensions (Pensions Board 2005: 
iii, 7-9). In a follow-up report (Pensions Board 2006), the Board went into more detail 
about the funding challenges that a mandatory pension system would face. It proposed 
that “the most appropriate and practical approach to improving the position of 
pensioners in Ireland would be a combination of an increase in the State pension with 
a mandatory supplementary system for those at work who are not making 
supplementary provision.” (Pensions Board 2006: 19). 
The bill that was introduced by the government in 2007 was taking into account the 
above reports when it took practical steps to reach the 1998 targets. Hence, it increased 
the contributory state pensions to 223.30 euros per week and the non-contributory to 
212 euros per week, while it also introduced beneficial measures for the spouses and 
partners of contributory pensioners (Seanad Eireann 2007 a :2). The Bill also increased 
the qualified adult rate at 200 euros per week, a measure that universally benefited all 
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qualified adults aged 66 and over, and especially women who did not have an 
entitlement to a contributory pension in their own right because of home 
responsibilities (Seanad Eireann 2007a :3). Moreover, it increased the weekly pay for 
non-contributory widows and widowers at 197.80 euros, along with pay for invalidity 
pension recipients over 66 (Seanad Eireann 2007a: 10-11). It also ensured that the 
state pension was paid directly to the qualified adult– a measure with direct and 
beneficial implications for the pensioners’ spouses (Seanad Eireann 2007b: 11).  
As it was the case with the previous bill, little opposition was mounted both inside and 
outside parliament. However, there was a protracted discussion about the tax 
expenditure on private pensions. It is indeed true that the shift towards private 
provision does not remove tax burden from the public: tax support for market-based 
pensions is a frequently ignored part of welfare states (Ebbinghaus and Whiteside 
2012: 275).  In the case of pensions, tax expenditure on private pensions relative to 
GNP was almost the same as public expenditure on state pensions in 2006.  
Such criticism was part of the public debate and surfaced during the parliamentary 
debate of the upcoming 2007 bill.  In the words of the Labour politician Róisín 
Shortfall, “There is effectively a rich man-poor man approach to pensions. The State 
is subsidising the pensions of the very wealthy. The rate of transfer to the wealthy is 
approximately 33 times the rate of transfer to a person on the average industrial wage, 
simply because the better off can afford to stash away more for their pension.” The 
reason that the state supported such tax expenditures was in order to encourage 
individuals to supplement their Social Welfare pension with private pension 
arrangements. The government was claiming that these tax relief arrangements aided 
a significant proportion of the workforce to provide for supplementary pensions. 
Concretely, it was estimated that over half of those in employment were covered by 
supplementary pension arrangements.  
Thus, despite these concerns, the majority of the opposition parties did not raise any 
objections against the direction of the reform, but instead vis-à-vis its extent. Hence 
once again the government managed to include and obtain the agreement of the main 
social partners during the consultations prior to the introduction of the bill. 
Turning to the distributional consequences of these reforms, the poverty mitigation 
reform agenda that the coalition government adopted was successful. The above 
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reforms were benefitting, through increasing state pensions, the poor, low and middle 
earners and individuals who had no previous coverage. After 2001, poverty levels fall 
substantially among pensioners.  
Figure 3.10: Poverty among pensioners, Ireland. 
 
Source: Eurostat.  
However, turning to inequality trends, the dynamic is more complex. Income 
inequality among the elderly increases before EA accession. This trend was reversed 
in the early euro years where inequality among the elderly starts decreasing. However, 
inequality remains broadly stable for most of the euro-years and it slightly rises after 
2007.  
Tax expenditure on private pensions relative to GNP was almost the same as public 
expenditure on state pensions in 1999. The bursting of the dot. com bubble resulted in 
a significant loss of assets by the Irish pensions industry, and for that period between 
2000 and 2004, tax expenditure for private pensions fell while public expenditure on 
public pensions rose (Hughes and Maher 2016:106-107). 
However, tax expenditure for private pensions peaked in 2006 and was not far short 
from the public support for state pensions. Tax reliefs benefit mainly the pensioners 
at the top quintile and the huge concentration of tax reliefs on the highest earners is a 
striking example of upside redistribution. While inequality was stable, as the year’s 
tax expenditure for private pensions was decreasing and was increasing for public 
pensions, it increased when tax expenditure started increasing. However, inequality 
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was still lower in 2008 compared to 1998 and the increases in state pensions achieved 
the goal of poverty mitigation but also of inequality reduction (Hughes  and Maher 
2016:106-107). 
Figure 3.11: Income inequality among total and elderly population, Ireland, S80/S20 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
To conclude, based on a wide political consensus that the country should address the 
future systemic challenges of its pension system while its working population is still 
young and productive and for as long as the economic boom lasted, the liberal 
coalition government managed to push for the modernisation of the pension system 
and for the substantial reduction of poverty among the elderly. However, in the case 
of Ireland, despite the continuing generosity of tax relief for private pensions and the 
launching of the pension board, coverage still remained below target. Moreover, 
inequality among the elderly was never in the agenda of the conservative coalition in 
power, and its reduction in the first years was a side effect of a policy that was clearly 
aiming at poverty mitigation. This, combined with a fall of tax expenditures on private 
pensions due to the dot com bubble, led to a reduction of inequality. 
To summarize, despite the fact that pension spending increased in both countries, 
leading to reduction of poverty and inequality among the elderly, there is a 
fundamental difference on how pensions contribute to the decline of overall 
inequality. In Ireland, a non-southern country: the combined contribution of the non-
pension social transfers in reducing inequality is large and most of the times larger 
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than the corresponding contribution of pensions (Heady, Mitrakos and Tsakloglou, 
2001, Dafermos and Papatheodorou, 2012). However, in Greece pension contribute 
much more to the reduction of inequality than other transfers and studies confirm that 
this pension bias led poverty in Greece in recent years to have shifted away from the 
elderly towards younger couples with children as well as to young workers (Mitrakos, 
2017).   
3.6 Conclusion  
The paper contributes to the literature of the political economy of redistribution and 
monetary integration. It started with the premise that EA membership was linked with 
market forces that have been so far elided in the Eurozone-inequality debate. 
Stemming from that we supported that this allowed governments in peripheral 
economies to increase social spending. In order to examine in depth the effectiveness 
of this social expenditure increase – resting both on the composition of social benefits 
and the degree to which they are targeted towards those who should really need them 
to them – we focus on Ireland and Greece. 
We concentrate on pensions, since pensions’ policy is a very a highly contested and 
politicized area of transfers. We use it in order to provide hard proof of the hypothesis 
that peripheral governments were not as “feckless” as the literature implies.  In both 
countries, the fiscal space allowed them to realize modernizing elements in their 
pension reform plans, which subsequently led to lower poverty and inequality. They 
strived to introduce pension fund reforms that would entail benefits for the elderly 
who were close to the poverty line. Pension spending increased in a progressive way 
and outsiders (those not covered from the existing schemes) of the system benefited 
from this increase even in the unlikely case of Greece.Subsequently, the literature 
suggesting that the Eurozone entailed only institutional deterioration for certain 
peripheral countries tends to focus only on an evaluation based on efficiency (fiscal 
sustainability) and ignores that accession to the EA enabled governments to pursue 
reforms with positive social outcomes.  
Focusing on modernisation as a process, of democratisation around values like 
equality and social justice, our analysis revealed that even in the case of Greece, which 
is not known for much progress on its welfare state restructuring, and despite the 
enormous social and political resistance to any serious attempt of pension system 
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recalibration, there were clear elements of modernisation during the euro years. Thus, 
despite the pervasiveness and persistence of insider privileges within the pension 
system, the establishment and the increase of minimum social benefits had positive 
distributional consequences for the elderly also among the lower income classes. 
Moreover, the progressive annual pension increases, especially under the centre-left 
governments, showed clear re-distributional considerations. In fact it appears that the 
above reforms were possible because the government could, due to soft budget 
constraints, maintain almost unharmed the benefits of the groups that were most likely 
to prevail in a “war of attrition”. Hence, the narrow focus of the literature, in fiscal 
sustainability does not always provide a complete picture of the reform efforts and 
their societal effects. However, even if one follows the predominant narrative, and 
defines modernisation as entailing policies of fiscal discipline and structural reforms, 
we demonstrated that in the case of Greece, this is not mutually exclusive with an 
effort to modernize the welfare systems on the basis of equality. Moreover, we argued 
that the government has made an active effort, of making progress on both fronts. 
While, the effort bear fruits in term of fiscal sustainability, nevertheless the attempt to 
achieve both outcomes we need a more nuanced narrative in regard to the literature of 
institutional deterioration. 
In the case of Ireland under EA and soft budget constraints, the liberal coalition 
government managed to achieve a more equitable pension system and to reduce 
poverty among the elderly substantially. Inequality concerns were not really on the 
conservative coalition’s agenda, however, and the reduction of inequality was rather 
a side effect of the government’s poverty reduction strategy. Tax relief for private 
pensions continued to benefit the upper part of the distribution. Yet, the increase in 
state pensions benefited middle and lower income pensioners and this reduced not 
only poverty but also inequality. At the same the issue of fiscal sustainability, was not 
a concern since the Irish welfare system has been always criticized for low provision 
of benefits. Thus, the pension reform was crucial for reducing inequality among the 
most vulnerable.  
Our study sheds light on the debate about inequality in the EA as how it is imperative 
to consider market forces and their effects on fiscal space. Through this mechanism, 
budgetary policies were not constrained and disciplined but, on the contrary, set free 
to realise reform agendas that predated the advent of the euro.  
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This paper focused on only one particular area of transfers; namely, pensions. A 
continuing pension bias may lead to intergenerational inequalities and may shift the 
problem of poverty towards the younger part of the population. However, we have 
shown that the above mentioned reforms, were reforms which did not benefit existing 
beneficiaries of the pension system but the ones in need and those not covered from 
the existing schemes. Hence, they had an equalizing impact: i.e. this was not in case 
of further entrenching the advantages of an already advantaged social group.  
Despite the fact that there was progress in targeting low income pensioners we 
nevertheless do need to underline that the pension bias still remains one of the 
characteristics of the Greek welfare state: it thus remains the case more broadly that it 
is the working age population that remains most   vulnerable (Mitrakos, 2017). Thus, 
it should be also studied how this continuity in pension bias may have affected inter-
generational inequalities. Lastly, this effect on intergenerational inequality may be 
different for a non-Southern state, such as Ireland where the composition of social 
security is more balanced. Moreover, while these two cases cover a wide spectrum of 
pension systems and reforms, it would still be desirable to explore the rest of the 
peripheral countries that experienced a strong convergence in interest rates and high 
capital inflows. . This would allow the examination of the interaction between market 
forces that were unleashed with the adoption of the euro, with domestic political 
responses. Subsequently, we will be able to examine the distributional outcomes that 
were produced by these responses. 
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4. Monetary integration and wealth 
inequality: The housing channel in Italy 
and Spain 
This paper focuses on one of the possible channels via which monetary 
integration affects inequality – namely the housing market. Although to 
different extents in different countries, the housing market is strongly 
influenced by the process of monetary integration, due to interest rate 
convergence and elimination of exchange risk. Due to these forces, as is well 
known, housing markets in the Eurozone ‘periphery’ experienced significant 
booms. Building on the literature on Varieties of Residential Capitalism and 
financialisation, this paper focuses on the distributional implications of the 
housing booms in Italy and Spain. At the point of euro-adoption, both 
countries were characterised by low mortgage debt as a percentage of GDP 
and high homeownership. In the euro-years, the two countries started to 
diverge subsequently, with Spain experiencing high capital inflows, 
increasing financialisation, and a very frantic housing boom; and Italy 
maintaining rather modest capital inflows, a quite stringent housing and 
finance system, but still experienced a housing boom yet less frantic. By 
employing inequality decomposition techniques, I find that housing wealth 
inequality mattered in both countries for the evolution of overall wealth 
inequality tends. However, the analysis suggests that the distributional 
consequences of the housing channel varied across institutional settings, and 
Spain which embraced financialisation experienced an increase in housing 
wealth inequality already from the second phase of the boom.  While in Italy, 
the housing market was less financialised, and the housing boom led to a 
slight decline of housing wealth inequality.  
4.1 Introduction  
European monetary integration has often been criticised for being the outcome of a 
broad elite consensus driven by neoliberal ideas (McNamara, 1998) which benefited 
mainly capital owners and not the middle classes. The crisis of 2008 has intensified 
this rhetoric, with politicians and public opinion shifting focus towards the perceived 
rising inequality and increasing poverty levels inside the Eurozone, especially in the 
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countries most affected by the crisis, arguably placing the “euro” and the architecture 
of the EA (euro area) at the forefront of inequality discussions in the public discourse 
(Bertola, 2010). The introduction of the common currency has led to a fundamental 
transformation of the participating economies, with variable effects across a number 
of areas (employment, investment, exports, interest rates, rates of growth, etc.) and 
ambivalent general equilibrium effects on inequality. Due to the multiplicity of 
channels via which monetary integration can affect income inequalities (Bertola, 
2010), disentangling the direct and overall effects of monetary integration on 
inequality is particularly challenging.  
In response to this, in this paper I look at one particular aspect of inequality (housing 
wealth) focusing on one of the possible channels – namely the housing market. 
Although to different extents in different countries, the housing market is strongly 
influenced by the process of monetary integration, due to two important processes that 
are strongly linked to the process of monetary integration: interest rate convergence 
(implying declining, or even negative, real interest rates in ‘periphery’ countries) and 
elimination of exchange risk (implying sizeable capital inflows, towards the 
‘periphery’). Due to these forces, as is well known (Bohle, 2017), housing markets in 
the Eurozone ‘periphery’ experienced significant booms, with fast rising demand as 
well as supply and a rapid expansion of the construction sector.11 Of course, the extent 
to which this happened depended on a number of factors, including – as we argue later 
– the degree to which national governments facilitated the expansion of the housing 
market by following particular programmes of deregulation of the mortgage market 
and of financialisation, more generally.  
Despite the strong trends seen in the housing markets of the Eurozone economy ever 
since the introduction of the euro, and despite the importance of housing as a source 
                                                 
11  As is well known, this housing boom turned into a crash with the advance of the global financial 
crisis, resulting also in a significant contraction of construction. These developments have been 
studied extensively elsewhere (i.e. Toledano, 2017) but they are outside the scope of this paper.  
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of wealth for most households and, in policy terms, for access to housing, the literature 
has tended to neglect this aspect in its analysis of inequality until recently.12 
Under these considerations, the purpose of this paper is twofold. On the one hand it 
falls to examine the influence that the housing boom (associated with the interest rate 
convergence dynamic instigated by the euro) had on wealth inequalities in countries 
most affected by these dynamics (the ‘Eurozone south’) and in particular on 
inequalities in housing wealth and in housing asset holdings by households. On the 
other hand, it examines how national policies aiming to liberalise the mortgage and 
housing markets (including through banking and financial market deregulation) 
influenced the effect that the dynamic unleashed by interest rate convergence had on 
housing wealth inequalities. For this purpose, the paper takes an in-depth perspective 
in analysing the two cases of Italy and Spain. These two countries had, at the point of 
euro-adoption, low mortgage debt as a percentage of GDP. Soon after their accession 
to EA, both countries experienced fast declining real interest rates and accelerated 
housing prices, albeit to different degrees.  
On the other hand, the two countries differ markedly in their policy approach to 
financial and housing market liberalisation – with liberalisation policies in Spain being 
more drastic and going much further than in Italy.  As a result, despite their similar 
institutional vantage point in the early 2000s, which allowed them to be classified 
under the same ‘variety of residential capitalism’ (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009), the 
two countries started to diverge subsequently, with Spain experiencing high capital 
inflows, increasing financialisation, and a very frantic housing boom; and Italy 
maintaining rather modest capital inflows, a quite stringent housing and finance 
system, and a less frantic housing boom. As has been discussed in the literature 
(Hopkin, 2015), under the process of the institutional membership in the euro area, 
Spain experienced fast growth, above the EA average (catch-up convergence) and was 
considered as the “success story” within the Eurozone; while in Italy growth was 
sluggish already in the first decade of the 2000s. The examination of whether this 
growth performance may indeed be attributable to the particular path followed in the 
                                                 
12  For exceptions see: Atkinson (1983), Dorling (2014), Allegre and Timbeau (2015), Aalbers 
(2016), Arundel and Ronald (2016). 
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housing market and the related policies of financialisation and housing market 
liberalisation goes beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, in this paper we focus on 
the extent to which these developments link to particular developments with regard to 
the inter-household distribution of wealth, and of housing wealth in particular.   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section the importance 
of focusing on housing wealth as a key dimension of wealth inequality is explained. 
In section 2, I give a detailed overview of the housing market developments in the two 
countries under study in the Eurozone years. In section 3, I present the dataset and the 
methods. In section 4, I examine the distributional changes in housing wealth in the 
two countries, using household-level data from the Spanish Survey for Household 
Finances (EFF) and the Italian Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) and 
employing decomposition techniques. I then turn to the role of domestic housing and 
finance systems (section 5), offering a contextual analysis of how these may have 
influenced the trajectory of housing and overall wealth inequality seen in the two 
countries. The last section concludes, drawing some important implications for policy 
and in particular with regard to the role of actions in managing the distributional 
pressures instigated by the process of monetary integration.  
4.2 Housing and inequality 
A small but growing body of scholarly literature in international and comparative 
political economy has established the centrality of housing finance in contemporary 
capitalism (Bohle, 2017). Housing absorbs global liquidity, and innovations in 
housing finance have been considered as one of the main causes of the financial crisis 
(e.g. Aalbers 2016, Ansell 2014, Schwartz 2009, Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009). 
Schwartz and Seabrooke (2009) underline that housing and the associated mortgage 
debt are “the single largest asset in people’s everyday lives and one of the biggest 
financial assets in most economies” (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009).  
In the Eurozone for example, housing wealth grew from 13.2 trillion euro in 1999 to 
24.2 trillion euro in 2006 (Aalbers, 2016). Despite its weight in households’ portfolios, 
property wealth is usually more equally distributed than other assets such as stocks.  
This fact has often led scholars to neglect it, as an explicit dimension of inequality. 
Nonetheless, it is exactly because other assets do not represent a significant source of 
wealth for the vast majority of the population that they are less significant for the 
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economic prospects for most of them. Even if housing is not as liquid as other capital, 
it can still be leveraged and in some cases act as catalysing agent for the accumulation 
of more capital. In this sense, scholars like Dorling (2014) are arguing for a better 
understanding of the housing wealth dimension. Piketty’s analysis and the subsequent 
academic debate have put housing in the spotlight. Indeed, recent debates have 
identified the role of housing as being central in recent wealth dynamics (Rognlie, 
2015): when it comes to real outcomes of inequality, housing wealth matters both in 
the present and, even more so, over the longer term. Recent institutional and 
socioeconomic developments have further reinforced the role of housing wealth. 
Common trends are pointing towards an increasing role of homeownership and 
commodification of housing wealth even in societies where the market has historically 
played a lesser role (Aalbers, 2016). Housing wealth can be and is used as a financial 
resource across the life-course providing finances for meeting a range of welfare needs 
(Lowe et al., 2011). It acts as a store of permanent, as opposed to transitory, income 
and as a hedge against labour market risk—a form of “self-insurance” against hard 
times (Ansell, 2014). Being peoples’ key asset, housing also creates immediate and 
different partisan policy effects over tax resistance, preferences for cash in hand over 
social services, orientations towards inflation and preferences for the party that best 
protects property or property values regardless of which party that happens to be in 
power  (Schwartz, 2009). Thus housing and housing inequalities can also create 
structural effects on politics.  
Despite this increased focus in the housing wealth dimension, the euro-inequality 
debate has not taken this angle into account prior to the crisis, and most of the studies 
focused on the links between monetary integration and income distribution. One 
potential reason is the lack of wealth data, for most EA countries. The second reason 
is that it was mainly after the crisis that the distributional effects of monetary policy 
attracted a lot of attention from policy makers and the public at large. This was due to 
the exceptional monetary policy measures, and a literature emerged explaining the 
several channels through which monetary policy potentially affects inequality.13  
                                                 
13  For a detailed analysis see Coibion et al. (2012).   
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One of the channels works through the real estate markets. In the case of “peripheral” 
countries the decline of interest rates, which came with Maastricht, should allow 
households to enter homeownership by stimulating the demand for housing, thereby 
increasing housing prices. What is particular in the case of the EA is that while the 
nominal interest rate is set by ECB since 1999, inflation differentials remained, leading 
to very low real interest rates among some member states (De Grauwe, 2012a). In 
countries with lower real interest rates, the demand for housing and housing 
investment is stimulated further.  
On the one hand, it is thought that the decline of interest rates should allow households 
to enter homeownership. Moreover, this house price increase can even make all agents 
in the economy better off especially in countries where homeownership is widespread 
also among the poorer households.  Recent research challenges this view and suggests 
that the decline of interest rates, which led to rising housing prices and this, combined 
with intensified financialisation, exposed less wealthy homeowners to increased risk, 
and also led to a further concentration of housing stock in the upper part of the 
distribution through secondary property (Stiglitz, 2012a).  That led to diverging 
housing opportunities as they promote wealth accumulation to housing market insiders 
while contributing to an increase of barriers in homeownership entry to those without 
sufficient economic capacity (Arundel, 2016).  
The degree of stratification that the connection of interest rates and housing prices 
produces would depend on series of institutional characteristics of the different 
economies.  Schwartz and Seabrooke (2009) in their work on Varieties of Residential 
Capitalism (VoRC) focused exactly on that cross-sectional variation, suggesting that 
the structure of a country’s housing systems, “filters differently the recent global 
trends – acting as prism of secularly declining interest rates, rising house prices and 
homeownership, integration of global financial markets, and the rise of neoliberal 
discourses emphasising the self-management of assets and justifying market-driven 
income and wealth disparities.” Schwartz and Seabrooke (2009) classify the housing 
system based on two dimensions: the owner occupation rates, and the level of 
mortgage debt relative to GDP, reflecting the degree to which housing finance is 
considered ‘liberal’ or ‘controlled’. By doing this, Schwartz and Seabrooke (2009) 
developed four residential capitalism types:  
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Table 4.1: Owner occupation rate and mortgage to GDP ratio. 
 Owner Occupation rate, 
average of 1992 and 2002  
Low High 
Mortgages 
as a % of 
GDP, 
average of 
1992 and 
2002 
High Corporatist Market: 
DK, NLD, DE 
Liberal Market: 
USA, UK, CAN, AUS 
Low Statist-developmentalist: 
JP, FR, AUT  
Catholic-familial:  
IT, IRL, SPN, BEL 
Source: Schwartz and Seabrooke (2009:10). 
The first, liberal market type is characterised by high levels of owner occupation, 
mortgage debt and liberal mortgage markets; and contrasts with the statist-
developmentalist capitalism with low levels of owner occupation, mortgage debt, and 
highly controlled mortgage markets. The corporatist-market capitalism has low levels 
of home ownership but high levels of mortgage debt despite relatively controlled 
mortgage markets, whereas familial residential capitalism reports very high 
homeownership levels and low mortgage debt.  
According to Schwartz & Seabrooke (2009), this classification of the housing and 
finance systems directly affects the degree of wealth inequality. More precisely, 
falling interest rates create strong potential for increased stratification in liberal 
housing markets. As they argue, in liberal housing markets, where houses are 
effectively assets, falling interest rates bestow capital gains in housing market insiders. 
In liberal mortgage markets banks have an incentive to extend as much credit as 
consumers demand and externalise risk by passing it to investors or this risk is retained 
by homebuyers as flexible rate loans. Because most people buy houses based on a 
monthly payment they can afford, falling interest rates mean that people can afford a 
higher purchase. This boosts housing prices, and conveys windfall gains on housing 
market insiders (who are usually older established households) while it burdens the 
new entrants with increased debt. These stratifying effects are muted in countries with 
less developed housing finance, where banks do not externalise their risks and do not 
encourage borrowers buying up in the market. This has an effect of dampening 
housing prices and therefore mitigates stratification by wealth. To summarise, the 
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impact of international common forces- such as the downward convergence of interest 
rates- on inequality of housing wealth will be mediated or reinforced by domestic 
institutional domains and this cross-country heterogeneity which needs to be taken 
into account in the evaluation of housing wealth inequality outcomes in the Eurozone. 
4.3 Italy and Spain: Housing booms under EA 
To investigate how the decline of interest rates, which came with EA, affected the 
housing wealth distribution (and in turn overall wealth inequality trends) this analysis 
focuses on two similar countries: Italy and Spain. There are some features that set 
apart housing and finance systems of the Eurozone’s “peripheral” countries from the 
“core” in late 1990s. According to VoRC both Italy and Spain belong to the familial 
variety of residential capitalism.  
Spain and Italy had comparable housing and mortgage markets and similar housing 
tenure prior to the adoption of the common currency (Burbarelli, 2016). The role of 
the family in providing housing is central in Italy and Spain, with families helping the 
younger generation financially in the acquisition of their own homes. Italy is a country 
of a high homeownership level. Moreover, Italy traditionally did not have a very 
developed mortgage market. With reference to Italy, in the 1980s and the 1990s, 
Jappelli and Pagano (1989) and Guiso et al. (1994) have concluded that small size is 
not due to a low propensity of Italian households to incur debt, but rather due to a 
backwardness in the development of credit supply.  
In Spain, homeownership was among the highest in Europe –almost 80% at the end 
of the 1990s (Allen, 2009). Prior to the adoption of the common currency, Spain was 
also one of the countries with a relatively undeveloped mortgage market until the early 
2000s. According to data from the European Mortgage Federation (EMF) the 
outstanding mortgage debt as a percentage of GDP was 23.9% in 1998 in Spain, which 
is higher than in Italy where it was 7.8% for the same year, but remained low 
7compared to the rest of the EU27 countries (32.4%). As Bohle (2017) suggests, they 
were “debt-free” (below EU average), high homeownership societies (above EU 
average). 
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Table 4.2: Selected characteristics of housing and finance systems in early 2000 
 Homeownership Mortgage debt to GDP Mortgage debt per capita 
Italy  80 7.8 1.19 
Spain  83 23.9 3.24 
EU 27 63.5 32.4 6.20 
Source: European Mortgage Federation (2005: 114, 2010: 70f.). 
Both countries were exposed to the same change in the international environment due 
to creation of the monetary union which exposed both countries to a regime of low 
interest rates (Figure 4.1). However, the two “peripheral” states had a very different 
experience in terms of growth performance under EA.  
Figure 4.1: Long term nominal interest rate 
 
Source: AMECO database. 
Indeed, the above EA average growth rates through the 2000s gave Spain the 
appearance of a dynamic and forward-looking economy while in Italy growth was 
anaemic. Moreover, income growth under monetary union differed markedly with 
Spain enjoying consistently high income growth until the crisis, and with Italy 
experiencing almost stagnant income growth. Capital inflows were lower in Italy 
compared to Spain. Spain was one of the euro countries with the largest current 
account deficits on the eve of the crisis and Italy’s current account did not move into 
large deficit prior to the crisis (Perez and Rhodes, 2015).   
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Figure 4.2: GDP Growth rate  
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Yet, despite these differences, both countries were exposed to housing and mortgage 
booms, and busts in the 2000s. In the case of Spain the boom turned into a bubble, but 
housing prices even in the Italian case increased almost 50 per cent (Figure 4.3).  
Figure 4.3: Nominal house prices 
Source: OECD. 
Falling interest rates definitely made mortgages more affordable and more appealing 
even to low and middle-income households and boosted house prices while the 
elimination of exchange risk made financing of mortgage credit much easier (Mosley 
and Singer 2009; Schwartz 2009; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011; Rajan 2011; 
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Helleiner 2011). According to EMF data, representative interest rates on mortgages 
were 4.9 in 1998 in Spain and 5.45 in Italy, while in 2005 they were 4.10 and 2.36, 
respectively (European Mortgage Federation, 2010: 89). Both countries experienced 
credit growth coinciding with EA participation and after the end of the 1990s the 
mortgage lending to households grew very fast. According to data derived from the 
ECB, the average growth rate of loans for house purchase between 1998-2008– which 
is considered as one of the determinants for the increase of housing prices (e.g. 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004; Lecat and Mésonnier 2005) – was 20.3 in Italy and 19.8 
per cent in the case of Spain. It has to be noted that the average growth of the rate of 
loans for house purchase in the euro area was 10.4, putting the two southern economies 
high in the ranking. The residential mortgage debt as a percentage of GDP increased 
massively in Spain (from 23.9% in 1999 to 62% in 2008). In Italy, residential 
mortgage to GDP also increased significantly (from 7.8% in 1999 to 19.6% in 2008) 
but it remained quite low compared to EU27 standards, which was 49.9% for the same 
year (Figure 4.4).  
Figure 4.4: Mortgage debt to GDP 
 
Source: European Mortgage Federation (2010: 70). 
Despite this shift to a regime of price stability, inflation differentials remained, leading 
to very low real interest rates (De Grauwe, 2012a). According to data from Eurostat 
the average inflation rate between 1999 and 2008 was 3.2 in Spain and 2.4 in Italy. 
While EA reduced the real cost of capital in both economies, this increase was more 
pronounced in the case of Spain (Figure 4.5). Thus, as the low real interest rates lead 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Italy Spain EU27
2000 2008
126 
to housing bubbles which spill over into credit markets, local banks which see the 
collateral of their housing loans increase are tempted to increase credit, fuelling further 
the bubble.  
Figure 4.5:  Real long term interest rates 
Source: AMECO database. 
The negativity of real interest rates encouraged further investment in housing in Spain. 
In the case of “stagnant” Italy where interest rates did not move to negative levels, 
capital inflows were lower, interest rate convergence led to house price increases but 
housing investment did not increase that much. During the pre-crisis years, the 
production of the new dwellings in Spain was higher than the sum of the new 
dwellings in Germany, France and Italy together (Akin et al, 2014). It is often argued 
that Spain was different because it has a strong demand by foreigners for holiday 
homes (Alcidi and Gros, 2012). Data from EMF reports that housing starts in Italy 
remained much lower than in Spain, reaching a peak of 317,391 in 2006 while in Spain 
they reached 760,179 the same year.  
Table 4.3: Real gross fixed investment in housing in Spain, annual change in % 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Spain   10.9 11.4 10.3 7.5 7.0 9.3 5.9 6.1 6.2 3 
Italy  -1  1.4 4.7 1.7 2.5 3.3 2.8 4.9 4.0 0.8 
Source: European Mortgage Federation (2010: 96). 
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Despite a similar institutional vantage point, Spain under EA can be seen as a case of 
a dynamic economy, open to capital inflows, its housing price boom has been also 
accompanied by a strong construction boom. Interestingly, despite the fact that Italy’s 
mortgage debt to GDP remained low, the role of the building sector in the economy 
was not very prominent, capital inflows were modest, and it still experienced an 
increase in housing prices and mortgage credit.  
What is interesting for this analysis, though, is not only to underline how the strong 
downward convergence of interest rates contributed to the emergence of the housing 
and credit booms, even in the unlikely case of Italy, but to examine the distributional 
implications of these different housing booms for housing inequality trends, and in 
turn, overall wealth inequality trends in these two economies.  The next sections turn 
to an empirical evaluation of housing wealth inequality outcomes. 
4.4 Methods  
The empirical section aims to answer some key questions: Are the trends moving 
towards decreasing or increasing housing wealth inequality? How much of the wealth 
inequality trend is explained by developments in housing wealth? How do different 
institutional settings explain the evolution of housing inequality trends? 
In order to document and quantify the distributional consequences of housing booms, 
I use data from EFF (Spanish survey form household Finances) and the Italian Survey 
on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). Using the information from EFF and the 
SHIW, I then construct a total wealth dataset.14 Total gross wealth is defined as the 
current value of total household assets, and total net wealth as total assets minus the 
current value of debts, where total assets are the sum of real and financial assets. For 
both surveys I define net housing wealth as equivalent to the net equity in owner-
occupied housing and other real-estate assets:  that is the difference between the gross 
value and the outstanding debts related to the purchase of the main residence, or other 
real estate. Moreover, I take the household as the unit of observation. The distributions 
of total wealth for both countries and their main components are computed by 
weighting each household by either the original sample weights without making any 
                                                 
14  For a detailed description of the datasets see Appendix 3. 
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allowance for the household size or composition. I use data, from all surveys available 
during the focus period (2002, 2005 and 2008 for Spain; and comparatively, 2002, 
2006 and 2008 for Italy). In the first empirical part I explore the first two questions by 
employing the inequality decomposition technique. In the second part, I discuss the 
third question by looking into the two countries’ housing and mortgage markets.  I 
report other inequality indicators besides GINI and provide microeconomic evidence 
about household housing wealth and its relation with income, homeownership rates 
per wealth quintile, and I examine whether the observed trends in housing wealth 
inequality are related to homeownership access or secondary dwelling acquisition. 
4.5 Inequality and decomposition  
The analysis starts by reporting the evolution of mean net wealth and its components 
in real terms. The period prior to the crisis in Italy, mean financial wealth decreased 
but the mean wealth of real assets was on the rise. Overall mean net wealth, 
experienced an increase of 23% between 2000 and 2008. This suggests that it was 
mainly the increase in mean real wealth which compensated for the low growth 
performance of the Italian economy. In Spain mean net wealth was rising sharply 
between 2002 and 2008. In contrast to Italy, mean financial wealth was also on the 
rise and mean wealth of real assets increased much more than in the Italian case. 
Liabilities experienced a significant increase especially compared to Italy. In both 
countries in the pre-crisis period mean gross housing/net wealth in real terms (2000 
prices) increased. However, in the case of Spain the housing boom was more frantic, 
i.e. gross/net housing equity increased more than in the case of Italy (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4: Percentage change in mean wealth and its components in real terms 
(baseline: prices in 2000) 
 
 
Net 
wealth 
Financial 
wealth 
Liabilities Real 
assets 
Housing 
wealth 
Net 
housing 
wealth 
Percentage change in real terms in the pre-crisis years 
Italy  
(2002-2008) 
23 -31 55 28 39 37 
Spain 
(2002-2008) 
51 27 86 58 52 56 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the EFF and the SHIW databases. 
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The evolution of GINI of net wealth over time shows that since the adoption of the 
common currency, inequality initially declined in both countries (Figure 4.6). Yet, 
whereas both countries experienced a rise in wealth inequality during the crisis years, 
in Spain inequality started rising much earlier, since the middle of the boom. 
Interestingly, inequality of wealth is higher in Italy and it remains the whole period 
under consideration 
Figure 4.6: GINI of net worth 
 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the EFF and the SHIW databases. 
What is particularly interesting for this analysis is how much housing wealth has 
contributed to this trend.  
In order to show how much of wealth inequality is explained by single wealth sources 
and more specifically, housing, I decompose the inequality indices to investigate how 
the different wealth components combine to produce the overall degree of net wealth 
inequality. We decompose between real estate assets, financial assets and debt. I also 
report other real assets, but these developments do not particularly concern our 
analysis, due to their relatively small share in net wealth – compared to real estate 
assets - and also due to the fact that their concentration remains almost stable in both 
country cases. 
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I am using the decomposition of the GINI index proposed by Pyatt, Chen and Fei 
(1980).15 They factorised the GINI coefficient (labelled G) of net wealth as follows: 
 𝑮 = ∑
𝝁𝒌
𝝁
𝑮𝒌𝐑
𝒏
𝒌=𝟏
 
Where μ is the mean wealth, μk is the mean of wealth component, Gk is the GINI 
index of wealth component k and R= cov [wk, r(w)]/ cov [wk , r(wk)] is the rank 
correlation ratio with r(x) being the ranking of households according to variable x. The 
rank correlation is equal to unity only if r (w) =r (wk), i.e. if households have the same 
ranking with respect to w and wk. The results of the GINI decomposition are reported 
in the next tables. The first column presents the percentage share of each wealth 
component; the second column, the GINI index of each wealth component; the third 
column, the rank correlation ratio; and the last two columns, the absolute and the 
percentage contribution of each component to overall wealth inequality. This  
decomposition analysis will answer the first two questions, namely, whether housing 
wealth inequality is increasing or decreasing, and how much of the wealth inequality 
trend is explained by developments in housing wealth.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
The decomposition analysis looks at the overall gross housing equity trends. There is 
a benefit of first looking at housing values, without subtracting mortgages. Net 
housing equity builds up slowly over the life cycle as the mortgage matures, and that 
is why it entails a necessary intergenerational inequality element. To make sure that 
the observed inequality is not a reflection of differences in mortgage stage over the 
life cycle, we use gross housing equity for this first decomposition exercise. 
 
 
                                                 
15      Brandolini et al. (2004) also used this technique to decompose wealth inequality for Italy between 
1989 and 2000, and Azpitarte (2010) used decomposition techniques for the first wave of 2002 
for Spain. 
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Table 4.5: Decomposition of the GINI Index for Italy 
Wealth 
component 
Percentage 
share in net 
worth 
GINI Index Rank 
correlation 
ratio 
Absolute 
contribution 
Percentage 
contribution 
2002 
     
real estate assets 74% 0.611 0.961 0.436 69.14% 
other real assets 12% 0.907 0.847 0.092 14.65% 
financial assets 17% 0.809 0.830 0.117 18.58% 
debt -4% 0.924 0.435 -0.015 2.36% 
total wealth 100% 0.631 1.000 0.630 100.00% 
2006 
     
real estate assets 82% 0.601 0.971 0.478 77.71% 
other real assets 11% 0.913 0.830 0.085 13.75% 
financial assets 11% 0.769 0.753 0.065 10.50% 
debt -4% 0.926 0.296 -0.012 1.96% 
total wealth 100% 0.616 1.000 0.616 100.00% 
2008 
     
real estate assets 84% 0.593 0.971 0.485 79.00% 
other real assets 11% 0.909 0.843 0.082 13.32% 
financial assets 10% 0.763 0.754 0.056 9.19% 
debt -5% 0.907 0.219 -0.009 1.51% 
total wealth 100% 0.614 1.000 0.782 100.00% 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the SHIW database. 
For Italy, table 4.5 indicates that inequality of net wealth decreases between 2002 and 
2008 (GINI coefficient is decreasing by 3%). The inequality of real estate assets also 
follows a similar trend as net wealth inequality, and it falls from 0.611 to 0.593 and 
the percentage share of real estate assets to total net worth increases in the whole 
period prior to the crisis 2000-2008 (from 74% to 84%) . The proportion of total 
inequality accounted by housing assets increases from 69% in 2000 to 79% in 2008, 
as a result of its more equal concentration and its increased share in net worth. 
A simple counterfactual exercise for Italy reveals that, ceteris paribus, had the GINI 
index of real estate assets remained unchanged at 0.611 rather than decreasing at 
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0.593, net wealth would have shown a GINI index 3.74% higher than its actual value. 
This shows that real estate assets that increased their share in net wealth and became 
(slightly) more equally distributed, have contributed to a decrease in overall inequality 
of net wealth in the period prior to the crisis.  
At the same time, the fall in the concentration of financial assets, and their decreased 
share in net wealth, also contributed to a decrease in overall inequality of net wealth. 
As a result, if the value of the GINI index of financial assets had been the same in 
2008 as in 2000 (i.e. 0.809 instead 0.763), ceteris paribus, the GINI index of net wealth 
would have been four percentage points above its actual value. The percentage share 
of debt in net wealth is only slightly increasing (from 4% to 5%) and interestingly in 
the pre-crisis period its distribution becomes more equal, and the overall percentage 
contribution of debt to overall net wealth inequality remains stable (2%).  
Table 4.6: Decomposition of the GINI Index for Spain 
Wealth 
component 
Percentage 
share in net 
worth 
GINI Index Rank 
correlation 
ratio 
Absolute 
contribution 
Percentage 
contribution 
2002 
     
real estate assets 86.21% 0.517 0.949 0.423 73.53% 
other real assets 8.92% 0.958 0.854 0.073 12.67% 
financial assets 14.21% 0.802 0.810 0.092 16.03% 
debt -9.35% 0.801 0.171 -0.013 2.23% 
total wealth 100.00% 0.576 1.000 0.576 100.00% 
2005 
     
real estate assets 88.11% 0.499 0.945 0.415 73.52% 
other real assets 9.91% 0.962 0.876 0.084 14.80% 
financial assets 12.22% 0.800 0.800 0.078 13.86% 
debt -10.24% 0.788 0.152 -0.012 2.17% 
total wealth 100.00% 0.564 1.000 0.564 100.00% 
2008 
     
real estate assets 88.38% 0.512 0.927 0.419 70.81% 
other real assets 11.18% 0.962 0.891 0.096 16.19% 
financial assets 12.00% 0.805 0.796 0.077 13.00% 
debt -11.57% 0.798 0.003 0.000 0.05% 
total wealth 100.00% 0.592 1.000 0.592 100.00% 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the EFF database. 
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In the case of Spain, inequality of net worth falls in the first phase of the boom and 
increases from 2005 to 2008. Overall, the increase is 3 percentage points between 2002 
and 2008. This is exactly the opposite dynamic from the Italian case. The GINI 
coefficient of real estate assets follows the same trend as overall net wealth inequality: 
its distribution becomes more equal (from 0.517 to 0.499) in the first phase of the 
housing boom, while it increases in between 2005-2008 (0.499 to 0.512).  The 
percentage share of real estate assets in net worth increased slightly from 86% in 2002 
to 88% at the end of the boom (2008)  
I conduct again the same counterfactual exercise for Spain. If the value of the GINI 
index of real estate had been the same in 2005 as in 2002 (i.e. 0.517 instead 0.499), 
the decomposition in table 4.6 suggests that the GINI index of net wealth would have 
been around 1.5% percentage points above its actual value. In the second phase of the 
boom ceteris paribus, if the value of the GINI index of real estate had been the same 
in 2008 as in 2005 (i.e. 0.499 instead 0.512) the GINI index of net wealth would have 
been around 1.5% percentage points below its actual value. 
In contrast to Italy, the percentage share of debt in net wealth increases from 9% to 
12% prior to the crisis, and interestingly the distribution becomes more equal. Since 
the GINI index and the share of financial assets in net worth remains almost stable, 
we can conclude it is mainly the developments in housing wealth that drive down net 
wealth inequality in the first and the second phase of the housing boom. 
To sum up, the decomposition revealed the role of housing equity seems to be central 
in wealth dynamics since it the most valuable item in the balance sheet of households 
while it remains the singular component more equally distributed than all other wealth 
sources. Real estate assets had an equalising impact in the case of Italy -despite their 
relatively stable distribution- mainly due an increase of their share in net wealth 
contributing to a reduction inequality of net wealth. While it was mainly financial 
assets which drove the overall decreasing trend, housing contributed almost equally to 
the reduction of overall wealth inequality in the pre-crisis years.  
In Spain it was mainly the developments in housing distribution which drove the 
overall wealth inequality trends. While the share of housing in overall net wealth 
remained almost stable, it was the developments in the inequality of housing wealth 
itself which drove the overall net wealth inequality trends. Housing wealth became 
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initially more equally distributed and this contributed to a decrease in overall net 
wealth inequality in the early 2000s while in the second phase of the boom, Spain was 
experiencing an increase in gross housing equity which drove up overall net wealth 
inequality. 
It must be underlined that the decomposition analysis regarded the overall gross 
housing equity trends. Yet, net housing wealth reflects the current housing wealth of 
a household. The GINI coefficient of net housing wealth follows the same trends as 
the one of gross housing wealth; it decreases for the years prior to the crisis for Italy, 
however this decrease is not substantial (1%). In the Spanish case, the fluctuation in 
the GINI, when mortgages are subtracted, is almost (-3%) between 2002 and 2005, 
while there is an increase of (5%) percentage points, between 2005 and 2008 (Figure 
4.7).   
Figure 4.7: GINI of housing wealth 
 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the EFF and the SHIW databases. 
Given this divergent path it is of value to explore the factors that have contributed 
towards the different inequality trends in the second phase of the housing boom. As 
discussed above, the final outcome of the monetary redistributive channel would 
depend on a variety of institutional characteristics of the different economies. While 
the rapid expansion of mortgage market in the 2000s in Spain transformed its housing 
and finance to a liberal one, in Italy fast growth in credit was not adequate to displace 
its traditional variety of residential capitalism. 
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4.6 Housing and inequality under EA: The case of Spain and Italy  
Building on heterodox analyses of financialisation, Fernandez and Aalbers (2016) 
argue that within the past one to two decades, a global pool of liquid capital seeking 
investment opportunities – has been built up. Housing and mortgage debt, which are 
considered high quality collateral have absorbed an increasing amount of liquidity 
(Fernandez and Aalbers 2016, Schwartz 2009, Jordá et. al 2014). Fernandez and 
Aalbers (2016) suggest housing and finance systems have proven to be far more 
dynamic than the literature of VoRC (Varieties of Residential Capitalism) suggest. 
They claim that there was an uneven rate of absorption of excess liquidity in the 
housing market across national models and that the global pool of liquidity in housing 
markets varies significantly across institutional settings.  
For this purpose they look to a wider set of variables16 than Schwartz and Seabrooke 
for the late 2000s and identify different trajectories that the countries followed in terms 
of absorbing finance, since this is an uneven process across countries. Italy belongs to 
a trajectory which includes CEE countries, some Mediterranean EU member states 
(Greece, Portugal) and some emerging economies (Brazil, Mexico and Turkey). These 
countries combine high to very high rates of homeownership (69–96%) with 
comparatively low to very low cross-border capital flows and a modest financial sector 
in terms of diversification and size (World Bank, 2009, 2012). The dominance of 
privately-owned housing stock, mostly free of mortgage debt, means that the housing 
market has not yet been financialised. However, Spain which was once following this 
trajectory and also had low private debt levels and cross-border capital flows, 
transformed radically in the brief period of the late 1990s to the collapse of the bubble. 
Fernandez and Aalbers put Spain in the same trajectory as Iceland, Ireland, Spain, 
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, which intertwines high 
levels of homeownership and high to very high mortgage-to-GDP levels. These 
countries have large cross border capital flows and, with the exception of Spain, a deep 
and sophisticated financial sector (World Bank, 2012). According to the mortgage 
                                                 
16    They look at variables such as fixed capital formation and construction sector employment to show 
the countries where financialisation led to an increase in stock and the ones that did not. They also 
use the IMF index the depth of mortgage market. 
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market index compiled by the IMF, which is a tool to measure institutional differences, 
the depth of the mortgage market of the two economies is not the same. In 2008, the 
index was 0.26 in Italy and 0.4 in Spain, revealing that mortgage credit has been more 
accessible in the latter. 
Even before the adoption of the common currency, the FDI-oriented growth strategy 
of the Spanish governments since the 1980s has made them more sensitive to calls for 
liberalisation in sectors such as finance. In the Spanish case, the process of financial 
deregulation, although running initially contrary to the interests of Spanish banks 
which obtained higher rents from protection, was considered indispensable for 
attracting capital into the country (Molina and Rhodes, 2007). Moreover, the Spanish 
market was opened to foreign acquisitions relatively early, with British mortgage 
lender Abbey National opening in Spain in the early 1990s, and Deutsche Bank 
acquiring the Banco Zaragozano. Domestic banks feared losing their market share and 
also increased the availability of the mortgage loans. The increased competition started 
already prior to the adoption of the common currency. Spain started transforming its 
housing and finance system the late 1990s. Prior to the adoption of the common 
currency, Spain’s mortgage debt as a percentage of GDP remained lower than the EU 
average but it accelerated in the euro years.  
During his first years as prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar showed an almost obsessive 
determination to ensure that Spain would be able to join the euro and optimise 
membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (Powell, 2001). With the advent 
of the EA, the domestic banking system was able to raise substantial additional 
resources without any exchange risk. Additionally, due to the perception that real 
negative interest rates – effecting a reduction in the cost of capital – were understood 
to be permanent, this led to a perceived need for an increased optimal long run housing 
stock. 
Spain under the EA was indeed successful in attracting foreign direct investment, 
which transformed Madrid into a major corporate and banking centre (Santos, 2014). 
According to Rodriguez and Bastillo (2008), 40% of the total FDI was foreign real 
estate investment. Securitisation was an important source of funding for the Spanish 
sector, with Spain being the second largest European securitisation market after the 
UK. Although the Bank of Spain regulated banks relatively tightly, Spain’s dual 
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banking system of private commercial banks and public savings banks – the cajas –
played a central role in the development of the bubble (Santos, 2014). The cajas had 
strong links with regional and local governments, regulated by both national and 
autonomous community governments, and managed to build unsustainable exposures 
in the housing market (Santos, 2014).17 
It is interesting to mention the attitude of the Bank of Spain to the mounting 
imbalances in the Spanish economy, and more particularly, in the real estate sector. 
Jaime Caruana, as its Governor between 2000 and 2006, had a distinct attitude towards 
the housing market. He explicitly denied the existence of any real estate bubble. This 
led the rank and file of the examiner body of the Bank of Spain to submit a letter to 
then Deputy Prime Minister and economy minister, Pedro Solbes, alerting that the 
risks in the Spanish financial sector were much higher than what one could infer from 
Governor Carauna’s speeches (Santos, 2014).  The letter precisely pointed out that the 
Spanish institutions were becoming increasingly dependent on wholesale short-term 
funding in the euro-market, and as a result they were increasingly exposed to sudden 
changes in funding conditions – prophetic of what followed some years later.  
Overall, the macroeconomic environment, with the support of domestic forces and the 
political and economic elite of the Spanish banking system, was opened early on and 
absorbed capital inflows which were oriented to the real estate sector – moving it 
towards a liberal housing market and an expansion of the existing housing stock. This 
was also facilitated by the liberalisation of land zoning laws under the Aznar 
government (Perez and Rhodes, 2015). Moreover, Spain has traditionally offered a 
standard interest rate deduction. However, a key element stems already from 1985, 
when the opportunity for mortgage interest rate deduction was extended to second 
homes. Moreover, the tax reform of 1998 led to the elimination of the taxation of 
imputed rents and the income tax code which was allowed for the deduction of rentals 
between 1992 and 1998 was also eliminated. There being an increase in the limits of 
interest and principal payments deductions are a clear tax advantage to 
homeownership against its counterpart of renting a house (Meliveo, 2014).  
                                                 
17  For a detailed analysis on the governance of the Cajas see Santos (2014). 
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According to VoRC, liberal housing markets are associated with higher inequality 
mainly via two mechanisms: house price increases will benefit house price insiders 
which are usually wealthier households that can use their existing housing stock as 
collateral to buy property since banks are willing to expand credit. This however 
would be permitted if there is also an expansion of the housing stock, while fiscal 
incentives may also contribute to these trends. All these explosive ingredients were in 
place in Spain. The real cost of capital being very low, capital inflows being high, 
housing stock increasing and the nature of the country’s banking sector allowed both 
banks and cajas to increasing their loans to real estate developers, construction 
companies, and mortgages (the latter had more exposure to real estate than did banks).  
Secondly, higher housing prices will reduce access to homeownership for low income 
households which would be mainly burdened with increased debt. In order to identify 
what these dynamics meant for housing wealth inequality, the distribution of net 
housing equity (as net value after owned mortgages) is analysed. I use net housing 
wealth since it reflects best the current housing wealth of a household and also because 
it is necessary to take into account housing debt in order to capture the differences 
among the two countries’ housing and finance systems. 
In Spain the concentration in the top 10 and 1 per cent reveals the same picture as the 
evolution of the GINI coefficient: there is a decrease in concentration among top 
housing equity holders between 2002 and 2005. However, between 2005 and 2008 the 
housing equity concentration increases again to reach higher levels than in 2002. 
Lastly, in Spain the percentage share held by the bottom 50 per cent remains nearly 
stable in the period prior to the crisis. As a result, the P90/P50 ratio decreases in the 
case of Spain between 2002 and 2005 and increases in the second phase of the housing 
boom to reach higher levels than in 2002. This means that the increase in inequality is 
driven by the upper and, mainly, the very top part of the distribution.  
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Table 4.7: Housing equity concentration and P90/50 Spain 
 
2002 2005 2008 
Bottom 50% 14.12 14.81 14.17 
Top 10 37.6 35.72 38.4 
Top 1 9.27 8.81 10.7 
P90/P50 3.0 2.7 3.1 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the EFF database. 
Secondly, I recalculate the GINI for the three periods separately for (a) full sample, 
(b) households with only one house, and (c) households with at least one house (Table 
4.8).  
Table 4.8: GINI coefficient in Spain 
 
2002 2008 
a) GINI index, all 0.53 0.54 
b) GINI index, one house 0.38 0.37 
c) GINI index, at least one house 0.45 0.47 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the EFF database. 
The GINI for households with one house actually decreases as the GINI index for 
households that own at least one house increases between 2002 and 2008 (following 
the trend of overall GINI) demonstrating that indeed multiple ownership has 
contributed to an increase in housing equity inequality, rather than the price effect. 
The increase in the difference is small but this may also be due to the fact that the 
GINI is not a good indicator in capturing the upper part of the distribution. However, 
this finding is also consistent with the findings of Toledano’s analysis (2017) in which 
she combines different sources (tax records, national accounts, wealth surveys and the 
capitalisation method), and finds that the composition of secondary housing evolves 
in a similar manner to the composition of total net housing wealth, with the top 1% 
rising in its concentration during the years prior to the burst of the bubble, due to the 
larger increase in secondary dwelling acquisitions (quantity effect). The  findings are 
also consistent with what should be expected in a liberal housing market where top 
housing equity holders can use their existing housing stock as collateral to acquire 
multiple housing (Stiglitz, 2012a). Table 4.9 reports the percentage of owners of 
secondary housing among the top holders of housing equity (1% and 10%). In the 
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Spanish case, there is a consistent rise in ownership of secondary housing in the top 
10 per cent, while there is slight decline in the top 1% between 2002 and 2005, then 
increasing between 2005-2008, resulting in higher levels at the end of the housing 
boom than in the early 2000s. 
Table 4.9: Multiple ownership among top housing equity holders in Spain  
 2002 2008 
More than one house, top 1 %  94%  99% 
More than one house, top 10%  78%  85% 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the EFF database. 
Regarding access to homeownership, the issue of affordability was a salient feature in 
policy discussions and in the press, extending itself as the dominant theme of the 
economic policy debate leading up to the general election of 2004. Politicians reacted 
to this concern by proposing measures directed towards the increase in the supply of 
housing (Santos, 2014). Looking at the trends in homeownership rates based on the 
data from EFF (Table 4.10), there is a slight increase in homeownership rates in the 
Spanish case among the bottom 20 and 50 of the distribution.   
Table 4.10: Homeownership rates among the wealth distribution in Spain 
 2002 2008 
Homeownership, bottom 50%  66.05 67.80 
Homeownership, bottom 20% 21.19 25.11 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the EFF database. 
The Italian experience was very different under the EA. Interest rates made some 
contribution to domestic demand but this effect was muted by the need to restrain 
public sector debt following an initial short post-EA boost (Perez and Rhodes, 2015). 
Homeownership remained high and the personal tax system also provided incentives 
to owner occupation, with no taxation in imputed rents and mortgage interest tax relief 
in the euro years (Hemmelgarn et al. 2011). The effective personal income tax on 
housing was lower than in Spain (Hemmelgarn et al. 2011). While the decline in 
nominal interest rates increased housing prices, real interest rates did not move to 
negative levels, and construction activity remained lower than in the case of Spain. As 
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mentioned above, the EA allowed banks in Italy and Spain access to “easy money”. 
Looking at how mortgage lending was funded indeed Italy’s banking systems 
increasingly depended on wholesale inter-bank funding in the first decade of the euro. 
However, there was important difference with Spain: in the interbank market, Italian 
banks borrowed to a more limited extent, and did not use this funding to provide credit 
to property developers (Quaglia and Royo, 2015). In Italy the dynamic was different, 
as easy money found its way to government bonds.  
It is true that the organisation of the mortgage market has also changed the case of 
Italy in the 1990s and 2000s. Not only has the external regulation changed in order to 
adapt to a more ‘European’ banking system, but the internal regulation of the banks 
also changed. The Amato Act (1990) allowed banks to provide mortgage loans, which 
in the past was possible only for specialised credit institutions (Quaglia and Royo, 
2015). With this reform, Casse in Italy (formerly public saving banks) had been 
merged with commercial banks and the reform led to a reduction of the involvement 
of political and local authorities in bank management (Quaglia and Royo, 2015). 
However, despite these reforms, the sector remained highly politicised and oriented 
inwards (Hopkin, 2013). It is often discussed in the literature that Italy in the euro-
years shut out investors and tried to protect domestic interests (Hopkin, 2013). Prodi’s 
government coalition that steered Italy’s entry to the Eurozone was not the one that 
led the country’s accession (Quaglia and Furlong 2009). More than once, Berlusconi 
underlined that national interests should be protected and expressed support for a more 
intergovernmental Europe (Quaglia and Furlong 2009). A characteristic example of 
this protection of national interests in the Italian case was the banking sector.  
After the establishment of EA, and the endorsement of the Financial Service Action 
Plan (FSAP) by the EU, foreign banks tried to enter the Italian market (Hopkin, 2015). 
The Bank of Italy, under Governor Fazio with the aim of protecting the Italian banks 
operating in Italy opposed foreign shareholdings and did not authorise any foreign 
takeover (Quaglia, 2013). In 2005 two proposed takeovers of Italian banks – Banca 
Nationale del Lavoro by a Spanish group and Banca Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria; and 
the other of Banca Antoniana Popolare Veneta (Antonveneta) by ABN Amro – made 
headlines. In both cases, Governor Fazio blocked the foreign takeover bid, while 
endorsing counter-bids launched by two Italian financial institutions, Banca Popolare 
di Lodi and Unipol, respectively. The foreign banks which participated in the failed 
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takeovers made a complaint to the European Commission. An antitrust enquiry 
launched by European Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes was dropped on the 
grounds of a lack of conclusive evidence. The European Internal Market 
Commissioner, Charlie McCreevy sent a letter to Governor Fazio in 2005 to state his 
concerns (Buck, 2005). Eventually, this pressure led to the resignation of Fazio, and 
the banking competition policy was transferred to a competition authority, 
independent from the central bank and the banking system of Italy opened up to 
foreign operators (Aalbers, 2009). It was only after 2005 that the competition in the 
mortgage market has increased because of the entry of foreign players into the Italian 
credit market. The new entrants saw providing mortgages to Italians as an attractive 
growth market and Italian banks also increased their availability of mortgage loans as 
not to lose their market share. Indeed, changes occurred in Italy’s mortgage markets. 
This resulted in higher possible LTV (loan to value)-ratios and LTI (loan to income)-
ratios However, compared to Spain, differences in lending practices to finance 
homeownership persisted. In 2007 the typical loan to value ratio for a first time house-
buyer was 72% in Spain, while it remained lower in Italy at 65%.  
Overall, in the case of Italy there have been some changes in its mortgage market but 
the national model of capitalism was protected by political interventionism until 2003. 
Pressure from other EU member states, EU bodies and financial markets brought a 
change of competition policy in the banking sector in Italy only in the 2000s (Quaglia, 
2013).  
According the VoRC framework, the stratifying effects of house price increases are 
muted in countries with “less developed” housing finance such as Italy, where banks 
do not externalise their risks and do not encourage borrowers buying up in the market.  
Housing equity concentration trends do not fluctuate extensively in the Italian case. In 
contrast to Spain, concentration among top holders of housing equity in Italy falls 
slightly in the expansionary period of the euro (Table 4.11). However, the share of 
housing equity among the bottom also slightly decreases. This is the reason that the 
P90/P50 ratio remains constant between 2002 and 2008 in the case of Italy.  
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Table 4.11: Housing wealth concentration and P90/P50 in Italy 
  2002 2006 2008 
Bottom 50% 10.6 8.73 8.96 
Top 10% 42.7 41.49 41.43 
Top 1 % 11.49 10.37 10.47 
P90/P50 3.3 3.4 3.3 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the SHIW database. 
I recalculate the GINI for the three periods separately for (a) full sample (b) 
households with only one house, and (c) households with at least one house.  
Table 4.12: GINI coefficient in Italy 
  2002 2008 
a) GINI index, all  0.61 0.60 
b) GINI Index, one house 0.37 0.37 
c) GINI Index, at least one house 0.46  0.45 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the SHIW database. 
In contrast to Spain, where the bulk of secondary housing among top deciles 
contributed to inequality, this seems not to be the case in Italy. Here, the GINI of 
households with at least one house actually decreases over time, suggesting that the 
concentration of housing wealth due to multiple ownership did not take place. 
Regarding the GINI index for the households with one house, it remained stable. This 
is consistent with the fact that in familial housing and finance systems, the decline of 
interest rates does not have a strong impact on inequality trends. However, looking at 
the SHIW data, in Italy – which is traditionally characterised by restricted access to 
homeownership in lower wealth households – the bottom 20 per cent of wealth 
distribution does not increase its homeownership levels, which remain close to zero 
for the whole period of the housing boom while the bottom 50 per cent sees a slight 
decrease in its homeownership rates. Other studies confirmed that affordability 
remained out of reach for many low-income households during the boom, in an 
environment where house prices were high, the mortgage market was more 
conservative and public provision of housing was limited (Bianchi, 2014).  
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Table 4.13: Homeownership rates in Italy 
 2002 2008 
Homeownership, bottom 50% 42.7% 40.30% 
Homeownership, bottom 20% 0%   1% 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the SHIW databases. 
By linking the distribution of income and wealth, I also observe that in the case of 
Spain, the lowest income quintile benefitted substantially in terms of wealth growth 
but still less than the top 10 per cent (this may be due to the fact that  homeownership 
was more widespread in Spain among low income households  and house prices 
increased). In the case of Italy the increase in relative terms of housing wealth was 
very limited for the poorest part of the income distribution but at the same time the 
increase in the top 10 per cent was not that pronounced (Table 4.14).  
Table 4.14: Housing net wealth, percentage change between 2002-2008, per income 
quintile 
 
1 2 3 4 5  Top 10% 
Italy  15% 33% 43% 37% 45% 34% 
Spain  61% 53% 48% 51% 27% 66% 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on data from the EFF and the SHIW databases. 
To conclude, under the EA, transformation of the two countries’ housing and finance 
systems evolved differently. The mismatch between ECB’s interest rate, which 
became very accommodating for rapidly growing Spain, and increased credit 
availability contributed to the frantic housing boom. Simultaneously, Spain 
domestically embraced liberalisation quite early and the nature of the banking system 
allowed banks to channel the flows into the construction and real estate sector, thereby 
also increasing the housing stock. Italy’s experience was different under EA, as the 
reduction of interest rates increased housing prices but capital inflows remained 
modest and easy money mainly went to government bonds. Mortgage markets 
expanded but the national model of capitalism was protected by political 
interventionism and the country retained its traditional variety of residential capitalism 
with mortgage market as a percentage of GDP remaining lower than the EU average.  
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In the Spanish case, the bulk in secondary housing, increased housing concentration, 
and the share of housing wealth among top housing equity holders. Housing wealth 
inequality was on the rise in the second half of the boom, while in Italy this was not 
the case and housing wealth inequality remained almost stable. Nonetheless, 
differentiated housing market opportunities also arise in the Italian “familial” case, 
where housing wealth remained more unequally distributed than the case of Spain and 
low income households did not benefit that much. 
The crisis stimulates a new period which entails severe consequences for over- 
indebted households. These consequences were very clear from 2008 onwards for the 
case of Spain. With hindsight, it is known that the housing boom turned to a massive 
bust in the case of Spain, leaving a large number of households to experience negative 
equity (Fuentes et al., 2013). What needs to underlined is that according to data from 
the 2011 EFF wave, the number of households which experience negative equity is 
significantly high in the case of Spain, with 8% of the lowest net worth quartile being 
under water already in 2011. In the first two trimesters of 2012 alone, 94,500 dwellings 
were repossessed in the case of Spain (Fuentes et al., 2013). In Italy, the percentage 
of households with negative equity remained much lower than in the case of Spain 
(less than 1% in 2012).  
4.7 Conclusion and discussion  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of currency unification via the wealth 
distributive monetary channel that operates through housing markets. It focused on 
two countries that represent “positives and negatives” of what we would expect from 
two former high-inflation economies, and suggested that the downward convergence 
of interest rates had distributional effects for both economies despite the differences 
in their housing and finance systems. Yet, the final distributional outcome of the 
monetary regime change depended on the interaction between the monetary policy 
regime changes and national institutional domains. 
Therefore, this paper shows how European monetary integration together with 
domestic institutions shaped the housing market and, in turn, housing inequality 
trends. The decomposition of wealth inequality revealed that changes in housing 
equity were important for the overall wealth inequality trends in both economies 
despite their institutional differences. In the case of Spain it was mainly the 
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developments in the housing wealth which account for the evolution of overall wealth 
inequality. On the other hand in Italy it was mainly the decrease in financial wealth 
which drove down the overall wealth inequality trends but still housing wealth also 
contributed substantially in the decrease of overall wealth inequality between 2002 
and 2008.  
Then by building on the literature of housing financialisation and VoRC, it discusses 
the reasons for these divergent housing inequality trends in the pre-crisis period. In 
the case of Spain, interest rates were negative, and the increased capital inflows were 
channelled to construction, which led to a housing and construction boom. The 
mortgage market was more financialised, and fiscal incentives also underpinned first 
and second homeownership.  The housing and finance system country moved towards 
a liberal variety of capitalism. Top housing equity holders increased their share in total 
housing wealth in the second phase of the housing boom, and housing wealth 
inequality increased due to multiple ownership. 
In Italy the effect of interest rates was less marked than in Spain. The growth of capital 
flows was lower, and interest rates did not move to negative levels. At the same time 
while politicians and policy makers faced pressure to introduce elements that make 
housing finance systems liberal, an “inward looking and sclerotic form of crony 
capitalism” (Hopkin, 2013:10) held Italy to its traditional variety of VoRC, and 
housing equity concentration trends did not move that much. The country’s mortgage 
market started growing in the end of the 1990s, yet it still remained conservative and 
construction activity was not excessive. This inhibited the accumulation of housing 
wealth by the upper part of the distribution. However, more restrictive mortgage 
markets in combination with rising housing prices did not lead to a broad 
homeownership expansion. Housing inequality remained higher in Italy than in Spain 
in the end of the boom and homeownership remained lower for the poorer quartiles. 
This suggests that the housing boom under a familial housing and finance system did 
not exacerbate inequalities but it came with the reproduction of the existing inequality 
patterns in terms of housing wealth.  
This paper has shed some light on how the interaction of the euro adoption and the 
diversity of housing and finance systems affected wealth inequality in the years of the 
housing booms. The analysis above implies the interest rate channel and the housing 
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channel contributed to a growth model that lifted almost all boats especially in the case 
of Spain that embrace fianncialisation (some more than others). This has shifted the 
balance more towards embracing a financialized growth model. The ‘rising tides’ even 
in the unlikely case of Italy, which lifted perhaps not all, but many ‘boats’ helps us 
explain why these peripheral countries voluntarily participated in this large-scale 
monetary experiment, which is a puzzle for those who perceive the euro as being 
detrimental for middle and lower classes. 
However, the long-term effects remain to be examined. Especially the recent crisis 
might have reverted some of the main developments in housing and inequality as 
briefly sketched above. Thus, future research needs to expand by way of including 
such enquiries for the crisis period, focusing on how monetary policy measures 
interacted with national crisis management to affect wealth inequality. Moreover, the 
scope of the analysis needs to be extended to countries outside of the Eurozone, since 
differences in EU integration did not mean that there were no lending and housing 
booms in countries which did not adopt the euro. More precisely, in hindsight, it 
known that “non-EA member states of EU found functional equivalents such as 
borrowing in foreign currency denominated loans and piggybacked on interest rates 
set for much less inflation prone countries” (Bohle, 2017). By expanding the research 
in terms of time and space, future research would provide policy makers with 
additional insights on how to deal with this interplay between supranational processes 
and domestic institutional domains, and subsequently, how it affects wealth inequality. 
The fact that this interaction may be inconsistent with the preferences of the public, 
which may have long-term effects in political behaviour and influence the financial 
stability of the economy, therefore adds more value to such research. 
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5. Conclusions 
This thesis examined the relationship between the adoption of the common currency 
and economic inequality in the so-called “peripheral” countries. The later became 
major casualties of the EA crisis. But I will explain below that I see these country 
crises as self-fulfilling manifestations of the financial crisis (De Grauwe and Yi 2013, 
Schelkle 2017: ch.6). The years prior to the introduction of the euro created certain 
vulnerabilities, notably household over indebtedness, asset bubbles and soft budget 
constraints for governments. But these vulnerabilities did not make bond market 
attacks inevitable. 
The predominant narrative, in the years prior to the introduction of the euro, was that 
the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank with an austerity 
bias, and the fiscal constraints coming with the EA, would lock countries into a 
“golden strait jacket” leaving no room for democratic politics and redistributive 
concerns. After accession to the EA, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) proved to 
be an ineffective constraint, while the ECB’s monetary policy rates were seen as too 
accommodative for the EA ‘periphery’. Yet, this misfit of ECB’s monetary policy rate, 
due to inflation differentials, led to new concerns and discussions for a new potential 
mechanism via which the “euro” could prove to be detrimental for inequality. The 
increased capital inflows in the ‘periphery’, which found their way to the real estate 
markets leading to housing bubbles, and the increasing financialisation of these 
economies, revived the debate that the EA design favoured capital, top wage earners 
and home owners over lower income and less wealthy households. Yet, neither the old 
fears nor the new concerns were clearly reflected in disposable income, wealth or even 
market income inequality data. Inequality trends do not consistently point upwards, 
and in some countries of the periphery income and wealth inequality even fell 
substantially in the pre-crisis years. After establishing this complex evidence, my 
thesis tries to understand if and how EA membership can account for this unexpected 
pattern.  
My thesis builds on, but also qualifies, recent contributions to the comparative political 
economy of monetary integration and redistributive politics. There are already a few 
theoretical contributions, which suggest that the interaction between the EA 
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architectural design and domestic institutional features of the “periphery” may explain 
this diversity of trends. Moreover, emphasis has been given so far to the wage-
bargaining systems as a major factor of explaining these trends. Hall (2012) and 
Johnston et al. (2014), provide indirectly an explanation for the surprising finding that 
there is no uniform trend towards more inequality in the EA. They suggest that this is 
due to the domestic institutions in domestic demand-led economies. In these countries, 
the wage setters in sheltered sectors were not subject to a competitive constraint like 
their exposed sector counterparts nor to an institutional constraint like their sheltered 
sector counterparts in the EA core. They were able to push for inflationary wage 
increases that produced adverse consequences for national inflation. However, higher 
wages and lower returns to capital also led to a reduction in wage and market income 
inequality. In that sense, the comparative political economist may claim that the 
decreasing inequality trends in the ‘periphery’ can be a side effect of the “problematic” 
institutional design of the EA.  
Moreover, while supranational economic forces do matter for inequality, government 
policy and political choices and domestic institutions also played a role in the final 
distributional outcome. This thesis claims that it was rather the interaction between 
market forces, unleashed by euro-adoption, and government policies responding to 
electoral pressures which explain that inequality of disposable income did not increase 
or even fall in the cases of the periphery. In contrast to what has been often suggested 
in the literature, the fiscal space created in the pre-crisis years by the euro adoption 
did not lead to institutional deterioration in the periphery but it also allowed 
redistributive policies to take place. Turning to wealth inequality, interest rate 
convergence, has led to an increasing in housing prices in the peripheral states. Yet, 
once again different housing and finance systems absorbed this reduction and shaped 
the final distributional outcome. This proves that again there was room for domestic 
policy manoeuvre.  
The first section presents a synthesis of the findings of the three research papers of the 
thesis and explains why there is a focus on inequality of disposable income and on 
wealth inequality. In the second section some of the limitations of the research project 
in terms of data and methods will be pointed out. The third section explains how the 
findings of this thesis are linked with the broader debates in political economy.  In the 
fourth section avenues for further research. Lastly, in the final remarks I discuss how 
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the insights of this thesis can travel beyond the Eurozone and whether they are relevant 
post-crisis given the changes in EA governance.  
5.1  Summary of the results of the three papers 
The debate on the euro and inequality was so far dominated by the idea that the loss 
of monetary and fiscal autonomy would restrain governments’ options with negative 
consequences on inequality outcomes. But the inequality outcomes are too diverse and 
cannot really support this generalisation. On the contrary, this thesis suggests that there 
is a crucial factor which was until recently underestimated in the euro-inequality 
discussion: monetary integration for the countries of the “periphery” unleashed market 
forces that did not constrain and in some policy areas might even have expanded 
national governments’ degrees of freedom. This phenomenon enabled national 
politicians to draft and implement policies that would affect and reshape the final 
distributional outcome in the EA context. The first paper demonstrated that the 
theoretical impact of the EA on inequality is a priori ambiguous, with some channels 
leading to an increase in inequality, while others to its reduction. By building on the 
existing literature’s “old fears” and “new concerns”, it provides policy-relevant and 
well defined channels, via which EA could potentially affect inequality: the 
financialisation channel, the competiveness channel, the fiscal channel and the interest 
rate channel. 
The first two channels focus on market income inequality. The first hypothesis is 
examining whether the downward convergence of interest rates and the elimination of 
risk-premia boosted intra-euro capital inflows which were channelled to the FIRE 
sector of the peripheral states, leading to an increase in market income inequality. The 
second hypothesis is examining whether the impact of EA accession is filtered by 
wage bargaining systems leading to divergent trends. More specifically, it examines 
whether EA accession is associated positively with inequality in countries with 
collective bargaining institutions delivering sheltered sector wage moderation. On the 
contrary, it tests empirically whether the association between EA accession and 
inequality is positive in countries without permanent mechanisms to constrain 
sheltered sector wage growth, in which devaluation is no longer possible, experiencing 
an increase in wages in the non-tradable sectors. The last two channels are linking EA 
accession with inequality of disposable income- but predict a different relationship 
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between EA and inequality. On one hand, I examined whether a negative association 
between EA membership and levels of welfare state generosity and, in turn, disposable 
income inequality exist (mainly in SGP–compliant member states). On the other hand 
I examine whether in the countries where interest rates fell sharply from higher levels, 
and received high capital inflows, ended up allowing for more accommodating fiscal 
policies and an increase in social spending, ultimately leading to a decline in 
disposable income inequality. 
The most important finding of this first paper is that post-EA, the evolution of 
inequality is not always consistent with both concerns expressed and previous 
theoretical considerations. Empirical analysis provides support for the competiveness 
channel and the interest rate channel. According to the predictions of comparative 
political economists, inequality of market income is negatively related to EA 
accession in domestic demand-driven economies of the EA. Moreover, there is a 
negative association between EA membership and disposable income inequality, and 
this effect is significant in countries that experienced a strong downward convergence 
in interest rates. Both of these results, though, are rather modest. However, the EA 
effect is more sizable and significant in “peripheral” economies that experience a 
convergence in interest rates and an increase in capital inflows.  
This finding suggests that EA membership prior to the crisis came with market forces 
that may have operated in an equalising manner in these economies. But since the 
effect was discernible in the greater equality of disposable income only, it is likely that 
domestic redistributive policies and politics played a crucial role as well. Building on 
that finding, the second paper tried to unpack the interest rate channel. It started with 
the premise that EA membership was linked with market forces that have so far been 
elided in the Eurozone-inequality debate. The elimination of exchange rate risk 
attracted capital inflows which led to a decline in interest rates which also lowered the 
costs of public debt. This led to increasing revenues, providing governments with extra 
fiscal space. This paper suggested that the existence of fiscal space enabled 
governments to increase social spending and fund “parametric” changes in welfare 
state reform which had positive distributional outcomes.  
To demonstrate this dynamic, we focus on the case of Greece and Ireland: two ex-high 
inflation countries, with different welfare states. The latter was compliant with the 
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EA's fiscal rules while the former was continuously in breach of the fiscal criteria. 
Despite their differences, both countries increased social spending after EA accession. 
We focus on one particular area of transfers, notably old age pensions which were a 
salient redistributive policy even before the adoption of the euro in both countries. 
This area of social spending recorded the greatest expansion in both countries during 
the early years of the EA. Then we evaluate the distributional consequences of this 
increase. We find that fiscal space allowed governments in both Greece and Ireland to 
fund reforms which benefitted the elderly who were close to the poverty line. The 
literature suggesting that Eurozone accession entailed only institutional deterioration 
and reform postponement for certain “peripheral” countries tends to focus only on an 
evaluation based on efficiency (fiscal sustainability) and ignores that accession to the 
EA and fiscal space also enabled governments to follow reforms with positive social 
outcomes. Since pension policy is a very highly contested and politicized area of 
transfers, I use it in order to provide hard proof of the hypothesis that peripheral 
governments were not as “feckless” as the literature implies.  I explain how even in 
the case of pensions, which is considered as a very clientalistic area of transfers 
(especially in the Greek case) pension spending increased in a progressive way and 
outsiders (those not covered from the existing schemes) of the system were benefiting 
from this increase even in the unlikely case of Greece. I suggest, that while one may 
argue that the pension bias continued in the case of Greece, and this may contribute to 
intergenerational inequality, the reduction of poverty and inequality among elderly 
was of major significance since in the Greek case since pensioners they were among 
the most vulnerable parts of the distribution. Research points out that increase in 
pension spending in Greece, led to a reduction of overall inequality trends. Also 
despite conventional wisdom, out paper suggests, effort of rationalisation was made 
from the side of the government. In the case of Ireland, transfers increased also 
elsewhere i.e. family benefits. Yet, again the increase in pension spending in Ireland 
targeted the low income pensioners and reduced poverty among the elderly. While the 
question of intergenerational inequality, is something which needs to be explored -
since it seems to be very relevant both for the housing market, but also for the pension 
case- the two papers emphasized that handouts were not given to insiders of the system 
in the first years of the euro.   
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The last paper of this thesis looks again into the interest rate channel, but this time 
with a focus on wealth distribution. The reason is that although to different extents in 
different countries, the housing market is strongly influenced by the process of 
monetary integration, due to interest rate convergence and elimination of exchange 
risk. Building on the literature on Varieties of Residential Capitalism and 
financialisation, this paper focuses on the distributional implications of the housing 
booms in Italy and Spain. Prior to the introduction of the common currency, both 
countries were characterised by low mortgage debt as a percentage of GDP and high 
homeownership. In the euro-years, the two countries started to diverge, with Spain 
experiencing high capital inflows, increasing financialisation, and a frantic housing 
boom. Meanwhile, Italy maintained rather modest capital inflows and a quite stringent 
and traditional housing and finance system, but still experienced a housing boom – 
although a less frantic one. What is interesting for this analysis, though, is not only to 
underline how the strong downward convergence of interest rates contributed to the 
emergence of the housing and credit booms, even in the unlikely case of Italy, but to 
examine the distributional implications of these different housing booms for housing 
inequality trends. In the case of Spain, interest rates were negative, and the increased 
capital inflows were channelled to construction, which led to a housing and 
construction boom. But the distributional consequences of the housing channel varied 
across institutional settings. Spain, which embraced financialisation and developed a 
liberal variety of capitalism, experienced an increase in housing wealth inequality 
already from the second phase of the boom. In Italy, the housing market was less 
financialised, and the housing boom led to a slight decline of housing wealth 
inequality.  
The next table briefly presents the empirical puzzles of the governing question and the 
result of each one of the three papers of the thesis.  
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Table 5.1: Summary of papers 
Essays on  
the Euro and 
Inequality   
Paper 1 
The Institutional 
Design of the 
Eurozone and Income 
Inequality: Exploring 
the Linkages 
Paper 2 
EA and Fiscal space 
: Redistribution in 
Greece and Ireland  
Paper 3 
Monetary Integration 
and wealth Inequality: 
The Housing Channel in 
Italy and Spain 
Empirical 
puzzle 
Why does disposable 
inequality decline in 
some of the EA 
member states? 
Why is social 
spending increasing 
in the EA 
‘periphery’?  
Why do housing booms 
caused by interest rate 
convergence lead to 
different outcomes in 
wealth inequality? 
Governing 
questions 
Is EA accession related 
with inequality 
outcomes? Is there a 
uniform euro effect 
across member states?  
Does fiscal space 
lead to reform 
postponement and 
institutional 
deterioration? Are 
loose budget 
constraints linked 
with positive social 
outcomes and 
inequality?  
What is the impact of 
EA accession on housing 
wealth inequality via the 
housing channel? Do 
differences in national 
housing and finance 
systems affect the 
distributional outcome? 
Result The most significant 
result is that EA 
accession is negatively 
associated with 
disposable inequality 
in EA member states 
where real interest 
rates converged from 
higher levels and 
which experienced 
high capital inflows  
The fiscal space 
opened up by low 
interest rates 
allowed 
governments to 
increase social 
spending. Soft 
budget constraints 
thanks to the surge 
in capital flows 
allowed 
governments to 
implement 
‘parametric’ 
welfare state 
reforms that were 
more redistributive. 
The final distributional 
outcome depends on 
national housing and 
finance systems. When 
the decline of interest 
rates is absorbed by 
“liberal” housing and 
finance systems, then the 
housing boom is 
associated with an 
increase in housing 
wealth inequality. In 
traditional familial 
systems, housing booms 
led to the reproduction 
of existing inequality 
patterns. 
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The three papers together contribute to the literature EA and inequality in several 
important ways. First by synthesising the insights of several literatures, it provides a 
theoretical map which documents well-defined and policy-relevant channels between 
the EA and inequality. Secondly, this thesis provides empirical evidence of the 
relevance of these channels. The in-depth case studies allow a closer examination of 
the interaction between supranational processes and domestic institutional domains 
contributing to the understanding of a rather complex reality. The identification of the 
channels has showed that monetary integration is operating through both income and 
wealth channels. The two case studies point to the importance of looking at different 
dimensions of inequality and also among different groups, which is relevant for 
answering the broader question of this thesis, namely, whether the EA has locked 
member states in a “golden straitjacket” at the expense of democratic politics? 
Most of the literature focusing on the impact of EA participation on inequality looks 
at income distribution and there is clearly more attention paid to the flow of income 
to individuals and households than to their stock of assets or liabilities. One reason for 
this observation is the lack or the low quality of long-time series wealth data. Another 
reason for this lack of focus is probably because day-to-day economic life is 
dominated by income (Hills, 2016). Hence, this study also argues that research on 
research on households’ net worth as created by housing and mortgage markets needs 
also to be put at the forefront of this debate.  
The case studies of Italy and Spain point to the importance of looking at household 
wealth. Access to credit can determine whether one can afford to buy a house in the 
catchment area of the most popular state primary and secondary schools. Moreover, 
people trading down their property can help their children get on or move up the 
housing ladder and to live parts of the country where there are more work opportunities 
(Hills, 2016). Along with current income and living standards, the presence or absence 
of assets represents an important aspect of a household’s situation in terms of poverty 
and exclusion, and housing represents the most widespread form of asset holding in 
the case of the European ‘periphery’. More importantly, housing ownership influences 
political subjectivities and objective preferences, which are linked with public 
spending, the level of inflation and the nature of taxation. The characteristics  of the 
housing markets and finance systems  have electoral consequences, because,  they are  
linked with voter preferences The institutional feature of housing and finance systems 
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has important ballot-box consequences similar to those of welfare institutions 
(Schwartz and Seabrook, 2009).  
The case studies of Ireland and Greece contribute to the political economy of re-
distribution. By focusing on the relationship between monetary integration, social 
spending and inequality, it sheds light on the long and ongoing debate about whether 
and how EA member states’ accession to the euro-area has been an important factor 
restraining welfare state spending (Busemayer and Tober, 2015). The relevant 
literature suggested that the convergence criteria, during the pre-accession phase, and 
the SGP, post-accession, would lead to some type of fiscal retrenchment and to a 
subsequent decline of redistribution. However, we have demonstrated that countries 
in the ‘periphery’ not only experienced an increase in redistribution but also in social 
spending. Moreover, we have provided an explanation of how EA, via the creation 
fiscal space, can contribute to an increase in social spending. In order to examine the 
dynamics of this increase, we focused on the case of pension spending and thus on 
inequality among the elderly. The focus on older persons is a reflection of the fact that, 
before social transfers, the at-risk-of-poverty rate is quite high among pensioners, but 
is also chosen because this group makes up a large, and fast-increasing, share of the 
electorate.  
Lastly, the first paper of this thesis, has tried to reconcile two strands of related 
literatures on the political economy of monetary integration and inequality. The pre-
EA inequality literature focused on how the constraints of monetary and fiscal policy 
would put pressure on member states to reduce welfare spending.  During the crisis 
period, the exact argument is reiterated for the EA “peripheral” countries, i.e. that they 
had no room for policy manoeuvre. The “programme countries” had to turn to supply-
side reforms and internal devaluation in order to achieve the necessary adjustment– a 
policy mix that has been considered to be detrimental for low income strata. However, 
for the “good euro area years” the argument shifts and stresses very different 
mechanisms. While these different angles in the EA inequality debate do not seem to 
be reconcilable, this thesis argues that there is a common theme binding together these 
three period: what seems to matter on how the discussion between EA and inequality 
evolves is how tight the “golden straitjacket” is. 
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5.2  Limitations: data and methods 
The analysis presented in these papers suffers several important limitations. The 
limitations of this thesis fall under two broad categories: data and methods. To begin, 
data availability has been one of the major limitations of this thesis. Eurostat 
measurement methods for inequality have changed, in terms of both definitions and 
underlying data, roughly at the same time as the EA.  To overcome this problem of 
missing values in paper one, I am using the SWIID dataset, which currently 
incorporates comparable Gini indices of disposable and market income inequality for 
192 countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to the present; the goal of the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) is to overcome these 
limitations. Nonetheless, this dataset does not provide information about the different 
socioeconomic groups and income groups. Thus, for paper two the data for inequality 
is drawn from publicly available data from the Eurostat –this is based on ECHP and 
EU-SILC, despite the break in series. Data on wealth remains even scarcer. The first 
problem with the data availability is that for testing some of the channels identified in 
the thesis other measures would have been more relevant had that data been available. 
As an example: for the financialisation channel the top 1 percent income share would 
have been useful, however,  the lack of annual data does not allow for this. Moreover, 
while wage dispersion data is available on OECD, these data are not availably 
annually. Moreover, besides data availability the second problem comes from the 
measurement of inequality. While Gini coefficient is one of the most commonly used 
measures in the inequality literature, like any single summary measure of a set of data 
it cannot capture all aspects that are of interest to researchers. One of its widely 
reported flaws is that it is supposed to be overly sensitive to changes in the middle of 
the distribution. With this in mind this thesis tries to bring to light additional 
perspectives by using different inequality indicators when going in depth into the case 
studies. .  
When it comes to measures of wealth, the data generally suffers from two major 
shortcomings: limited time series (compared to income data) and lack of cross-country 
comparability. In paper three data from the Spanish Survey of housing finances is used 
(EFF) along with the Italian Survey of household income and wealth (SHIW). Survey 
data are well known to suffer from a tendency of interviewees to underreport their 
wealth, consciously or otherwise. . A further problem for survey-based wealth 
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estimates stems from the high concentration of wealth and the low probability of 
including the wealthiest households in the sample. An important feature of the EFF 
survey is thus the oversampling of wealthy households:  a necessary condition in order 
to obtain an accurate picture of aggregate wealth, given that an important share of total 
assets belongs to the richest households. The SHIW data do not benefit from 
oversampling. Hence, those results will still tend to reflect the imprecise 
representation of the upper tail of the wealth distribution, and we reiterate the warning 
to interpret them with caution. The experience to date suggests that sample surveys 
are unlikely by themselves to provide a fully satisfactory source of information about 
the size distribution of wealth and income as a whole (Atkinson and Harrison, 1978). 
Nevertheless, sample surveys are the primary source for wealth and income 
distribution data (Brandolini et al, 2004) and hence this thesis remains constrained by 
these wider data issues.  
Closely related to these data problems, there are also methodological limitations which 
need to be taken into account. To begin, the regression analysis in paper one shows 
basic correlations. Despite the fact that the regression controls for a large number of 
potential inequality drivers, this analysis cannot strictly prove the existence of a causal 
relationship between EA accession and inequality. Moreover, the empirical analysis 
is constrained by the time-series availability of the income inequality measures. While 
for the regression analysis I use the GINI coefficient to measure inequality market and 
disposable income inequality , other measures would have been more appropriate for 
the identification of some of the channels ( i.e. for the fiancialisation channel of the 
top one per cent,). Yet, the lack of annual data did not allow to use these indicators in 
the empirical exercise of the first paper. Lastly, while the second paper focuses on one 
area of transfers (pensions), a more complete picture of how fiscal space has been used 
for redistribution would require the evaluation of the impact of all reforms on tax and 
transfers policies under the euro. Such a synoptic survey however was beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Nevertheless it is worth noting that one potential way of doing 
that would be by using EUROMOD, i.e. a tax-benefit micro simulation model for the 
European Union that enables researchers and policy analysts to calculate, in a 
comparable manner, the effects of taxes and benefits on household incomes. However, 
the break in the time series does not allow for the use of EU-SILC dataset.   
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5.3  The links to broader political economy debates 
Despite the methodological limitations, this thesis contributes to the literature of 
monetary integration and inequality. It starts, by providing a more nuanced picture in 
the euro-inequality debate. It is well known that inequality developments, are a result 
of an interaction between supranational forces and idiosyncratic country factors. The 
picture is even more complex in a monetary union where monetary policy is 
centralized, while other policies remain largely in national hands. There are 
macroeconomic dynamics at work- which start from the interest rate convergence - 
fiscal space, asset prices movements – which are then filtered by domestic institutional 
settings. While this thesis has identified various channels of interaction between euro 
adoptions and inequality outcomes, it concentrates mainly on inequality of housing 
wealth and inequality of disposable income. The next sections explain in depth the 
reasons for this selection and how the in depth investigation of the interest rate channel 
adds to the political economy scholarship.  
5.3.1  The new insights to comparative political economy of monetary 
integration 
Most of the comparative political economy literature of monetary integration has been 
focusing on the different performances of the different variants of capitalism under a 
single currency. On one hand, CMEs with their centralized unions relied upon export-
led economic growth. On the other hand, MMEs with their fragmented trade unions 
generated economic growth through domestic demand. If one begins from this 
framework then winners and losers of the EA participation were mainly determined 
by the labor markets and its institutions.  
Yet recently, scholars have pointed out that residential housing and housing finance 
systems have significant causal consequences on the structure of welfare states, and 
macroeconomic outcomes. Schwartz and Seabrooke (2009) developed a typology 
which explains how the housing and finance systems are organized in the different 
political economies. Moreover, the crisis led comparative and international political 
economists to explore whether finance is a key causal force for domestic and 
international economic and political outcomes.  
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In this thesis, I interrogate all three interlinked debates and identify links between EA 
and inequality. I  explain how interest rate convergence and  the elimination of 
exchange rate risks, increased intra-EA capital These flows found their way to housing 
and mortgage debt; which is considered as high-quality collateral. While this is a 
phenomenon which is also taking place outside the EA, it is unquestionable that the 
build-up of the housing booms has been linked with the lowering (or even negative) 
interest rates which came with the euro, and the elimination of exchange risk that 
boosted intra-Eurozone capital inflows (Bohle, 2017). I showed in the thesis that 
housing and finance systems also matter for inequality outcomes and housing price 
variations had wealth implications for the political economies of the periphery.  
Hence, this thesis adds to the political economy of housing literature. It looks in-depth 
at how the housing channel operated in Italy and Spain and explains how the decline 
of interest rates was absorbed by different institutional settings, and how this played 
out differently in wealth distributions. Spain, which had more a financialized housing 
system, experienced an increase in inequality with top wealth earners acquiring 
multiple houses, while in Italy, which remained in its familial variety of capitalism, 
the distribution of wealth remained almost stable.  Moreover, I demonstrate that these 
varieties are not static (something which has been acknowledged by Schwartz and 
Seabrook), and that institutions also may change under the impression of capital flows 
(liberalization of the Spanish mortgage markets etc. - paper 3). 
Additionally, I add to the literature of financialisation  which  suggests that growth in 
financial sectors and the financial labour force is a crucial determinant of wage 
disparities and it leads to the concentration of income towards the households that are 
better off  (Flaherty, 2015; Godechot 2016; Kus 2012). I depart form this view and my 
analysis confirms the analysis of post-Keynesian economists such as Stockhammer 
and his co-authors (2016), who explained that that the European variant of increasing 
finacialisation and the corresponding bubble came with moderate increases in real 
wages, a stable wage dispersion and increases in welfare spending (Stockhammer et 
al, 2016). 
This thesis also adds to the analysis of post-Keynesian economists by providing a clear 
documentation of two channels via which euro adoption may have led to increased 
welfare spending and a reduction of inequality. After all, increased capital flows can 
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have a variety of effects. The literature on financialisation explains how they are linked 
with housing bubbles. Yet, the Euro experience shows that capital inflows increased 
tax revenues. Moreover, lower interest rates on public debt can create fiscal space- 
namely budgetary room for manoeuvre that is determined by financing costs but also 
the maturity of debt. The political economy literature of public finances, by contrast, 
tends to stress only the repercussions of easy finance. Yet, this fiscal capacity could 
actually provide alternatives and room for additional domestic policy-making and 
even welfare expansion.  
All these findings provide new insights into the literature of EA and inequality. Using 
the case of pensions, for example, we explain that the fiscal space allowed for reforms 
which aimed at reducing inequality among the elderly. This comes as a surprise since 
pensions are a very highly contested and politicized area of transfers which 
traditionally benefits (especially in case of Greece) the insiders of the system. 
Moreover, in the Irish case, even though public pension provision has traditionally 
been low, the new fiscal space allowed for the implementation of reforms which 
reduced poverty among the elderly.   
Yet, it needs to be noted that an increase only in pension provision may contribute to 
intergenerational inequalities. For this reason it is significant that we could also 
demonstrate that in the case of Ireland transfers also increased elsewhere (e.g. family 
benefits). In the case of Greece, while the pension bias of the welfare system continued 
to follow institutional path dependencies, the reduction of poverty and inequality 
among the elderly was nevertheless of major significance since in the Greek case 
pensioners were among the most vulnerable parts of the distribution. Also, and against 
conventional wisdom, our paper suggests that an effort of rationalisation of the 
pension system was indeed made by the PASOK government.  
Finally, my findings suggest that income inequality plays out very differently in 
different national contexts. Government policy and political choices matter. On the 
one hand, it seems that the classic left-right divide was less significant that we might 
presume. In the case of Spain there was a continuity between Aznar (People's Party , 
PP) and Zapatero (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE) in economic policy in 
relation to the housing bubble and under both governments the issue of affordability 
was raised. Yet, Aznar, liberalized the land zones, in order to deal with the issue of 
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affordability (which also benefitted upper classes). In the case of Ireland the 
conservative coalition government established a consensus and institutionalized a low 
taxation regime and it was mainly interested on poverty reduction, rather than 
inequality. In the case of Greece, the center-left government increased spending in 
pensions in a more progressive way than the center-right and yet regardless of their 
political orientation, both parties actually had redistributive considerations in mind.  
In other words, the methods may have varied but the additional fiscal space enabled 
governments of varied ideological persuasions to act to reduce inequality.  Hence, 
while I find evidence that political parties do matter, the main contribution of this 
thesis is how the markets themselves were more permissive than we have tended to 
think This finding is crucial for advancing our understanding of the tension between 
deep economic integration and social protection. 
5.3.2  The debate on integration and democracy: What have we learned from 
the four country cases 
Especially after the crisis, the argument has been repeatedly made that deep economic 
integration is not compatible with social protection. This thesis challenges this view. 
Its in-depth case studies allow us to identify clearly aspects of hyperglobalisation and 
of social protection that do not undermine one another, and in fact reinforce one 
another. The Maastricht process and EA accession were considered to be a “golden 
straitjacket” on very different economies.   
However, Rodrik’s trilemma is based on the view of the markets as “the rational right-
wing foreign direct investor”.  I find that markets can be much more permissive as 
long as growth rates are good (high race for yield).  The financial markets played a 
major role for the intra-country redistribution concerns. This thesis supports the claim 
that that the satisfaction of domestic preferences was not crowded out by the 
straitjacket as many thought for the euro and there was much more leeway for 
governments. Market forces, assured by freedom of movement and freedom from 
exchange rate risks, seized the opportunity for cross-border lending and investment in 
search for higher yields. As explained in the introduction of this thesis, one of the 
major long-term reasons why EA membership was considered desirable for 
“peripheral” candidate countries was the expected effect on interest rates and the cost 
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of capital. Historically, they had to pay a significant and highly volatile risk premium 
on top of the borrowing rates compensating lenders for higher inflation, if they wanted 
to borrow in their own currency. Borrowing in foreign currency, such as US dollars or 
the D-Mark, exposed them to the risk of a currency crisis triggering insolvency of 
private borrowers. For public borrowers, the advent of EA made the differentials 
between yields on government bonds almost disappear. This had a sizeable positive 
impact on the public finances of countries that were highly indebted, especially where 
their debt was financed on a short to medium-term basis. 
Similarly, prior to the EA, the cost of funds in interbank markets of the ‘periphery’ 
was determined by the supply and demand of funds within these countries and the cost 
of foreign exchange. With the advent of the EA (and prior to the financial crisis), the 
domestic banking systems were thus able to raise substantial additional resources 
without any exchange risk and this provided the finance for large continuing 
investments within a construction boom in both economies. Interest rate convergence 
decreased the cost of public debt especially for countries like Greece and Italy with 
high debt levels and the elimination of exchange risk, boosted intra-Eurozone capital 
inflows for Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal (and to a lesser extent, Italy) and led 
to an expansion of domestic banking leverage and to the inflow of investment capital.  
These developments which came with globalisation were not operating at the expense 
of democratic politics. It has been extensively discussed in the literature that Ireland 
complied with the rules on budget deficits and debt but institutionalized an 
unsustainable low tax regime over time (Regan, 2013). This low tax regime was 
supported by international bodies such as the IMF and the OECD and was welcomed 
by the financial markets (ibid). The growth of credit markets in Ireland was based on 
debt-financed consumer spending. This debt in Ireland was mainly based on 
household mortgages, contributing to the shift from ‘State’ to ‘privatized’ 
Keynesianism. Government policies were very supportive of house-price inflation 
which would allow households to leverage credit and use it for consumer spending. 
Irish banks benefited from the ECB’s low interest rate policy and borrowed 
excessively on the interbank money markets.  Centre-right governments deregulated 
finance and mortgage markets and implemented a whole series of tax breaks for 
property construction (ibid). The outcome was a notably frantic bubble in house prices.  
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However, as this thesis demonstrates, the housing bubble allowed the government to 
increase its expenditure. This thesis not only examines what led to the crisis but 
focuses on this increase in welfare payments and asks whether this increase was 
progressive. We find that among the transfers that saw the highest increase was 
pension spending (yet other transfers such as family benefits also increased 
substantially). For the case of Ireland, one of the major criticisms for its welfare state 
is that it is almost non-existent and that the fruits of growth are not allocated to and 
enjoyed by everyone (Powell, 2017). By focusing closely on the case of increases in 
pension spending, we found that the Irish government not only increased spending but 
it did so in an equalizing way via  a focus on the lower income strata, thus reducing 
inequality and poverty among the elderly. Despite this increase in welfare spending, 
the pro-cyclical fiscal stance kept the markets satisfied. The European Commission 
and international rating agencies never questioned Ireland’s fiscal policy regime. We 
can hence verify the argument that capital flows loosened the straitjacket in the case 
of Ireland: the demands of foreign investors were in line with the needs of domestic 
constituencies. It was the growing economy and the redistribution of the growth 
dividend that ensured a higher yield. 
The Spanish case resembles that of Ireland in many ways.  The introduction of the 
euro brought a significant reduction of real interest rates and Spain experienced an 
asset price (housing) boom in the EA years. This was clearly enabled by cheap credit, 
not government spending. Spain actually ran a fiscal surplus in 2005, 2006 and 2007 
(European Commission, 2010).  However, in contrast to Ireland, there is a lot of 
evidence which indicates that the risks were well understood. The real estate bubble 
was a much-debated political issue, policy makers discussed in public about the 
caveats of the bubble, and the research department of the Bank of Spain reported the 
possible overvaluation in the housing sector already from 2003 (Santos, 2014). There 
were clear concerns related with the overexposure of the banking sector, particularly 
in the cajas.  Yet there was little done by national governments to address these 
concerns, and whatever relevant government action was undertaken it always towed 
the line of what would be also “desired by the markets”. A very characteristic example 
is that in the general election of 2004, two debates with different policy implications 
emerged. First, there was a popular debate centred on the issue of housing affordability 
(Santos, 2014). Politicians reacted to this concern by implementing measures which 
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increased the supply of housing but also putting forward suggestions that exacerbated 
the speculation in the housing market. A second debate was centred on the detrimental 
consequences of a potential housing crash. Yet, again very little was done to control 
the bubble. The concerns about increasing systemic risk were not taken in to account. 
Why then the lack of greater political pressure?  
Once again, this thesis shows that this is linked with the fact that capital flows loosened 
the straitjacket and there were real welfare gains: The massive employment increase 
in the construction sector reduced income inequality (Perez and Rhodes, 2014). With 
more than 80 per cent homeownership in Spain during the boom, the middle classes 
and lower classes observed their housing wealth increasing. Moreover, the banking 
and FIRE sectors of the economy were hugely benefiting.  Hence, again some of the 
needs of the electorate were satisfied by the capital inflows.  
The Greek problem was definitively fiscal, related to government spending and 
specific to its own national economy. In the case of Greece one can claim that the 
country was always breaching the SGP and was never under the straitjacket – yet even 
in the case of Greece there was a tendency of the deficit to converge to 3 per cent. Yet, 
via the massive reduction on the cost of public debt and the increasing revenues 
coming from the boom, governments gained room for political and economic 
manoeuvre. However, our analysis confirms an interesting pattern for Greece: there 
was some effort to achieve fiscal sustainability even in the euro years during which 
the country had already guaranteed its membership. 
Our analysis in pension reforms and spending clearly shows that there were some 
attempts to improve public finance under the centre-left government in Greece. If we 
rethink the Rodrik’s trilemma again, even in the unlikely case of Greece, which is 
commonly accused of being a traditional laggard in terms of fiscal prudence, the 
intention of reforms was not only to alleviate poverty and inequality but also to 
rationalise the pension systems, which was of major concern to markets. The 
institutional framework of the EA entailed a standardized accounting framework that 
would, in theory, make the member states’ public finance accounts far more 
transparent to the financial markets and to the European institutions. Given that 
pension spending and pension debt in Greece were considered as unsustainable, both 
prior and after the country’s accession in the EA, they were the major sources of 
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concern for financial investors (Featherstone and al. 2001: p.465). Yet, domestic 
interests, as explained in the paper, made these attempts unsuccessful. This was in 
order not to lose the capital inflows and increased revenues from the boom, which 
seemed to work as structural funds did in the 1980s ‘periphery’ countries: they 
contributed to high levels of growth and worked as a side payment to increase political 
support for national governments which signed to the EA.  
In the case of Italy, the dynamic was different as easy money found its way mainly to 
government bonds (Hopkin, 2013). Italy’s stagnant growth rates were attributed to an 
inward-looking and sclerotic form of crony capitalism (ibid). A characteristic example 
of this protection of national interests in the Italian case was the banking sector as 
discussed in chapter 4. While the government’s non-market friendly policies, its focus 
on national sovereignty, and low growth prospects of the economy all kept capital 
inflows into Italy more modest, there was some fiscal easing and a mild housing boom 
did emerge.  Italy shut out foreign investors and sought to protect declining domestic 
industries (Hopkin, 2013). Berlusconi underlined the protection of national interests 
and expressed support for a more intergovernmental Europe (Furlong and Quaglia, 
2009). 
 Housing prices did go up and again the high percentages of home-ownership led to 
the increase in the wealth of many households – which, up to an extent, compensated 
for the low growth performance, and middle classes moreover watched their wealth 
increase. Moreover, as Hopkin (2015) claims, the Berlusconi government exploited 
the easing of fiscal pressures after the euro, with interest rates on debt falling sharply, 
mainly to satisfy his many supporters – small business owners and the self-employed 
by reducing taxation (Hopkin,  2015).  Hence, the case of Italy is rather different – 
neither does the government embrace the market logic of reform nor, more 
importantly, does it even try to signal this, the markets are also not rewarding via 
capital inflows as in the rest of the “peripheral” states. Yet, both the housing boom 
and fiscal easing – allow for some sort of very modest electorate compensation 
(increase in housing wealth and lower taxes).  
5.4  The generalisability of the channels and the crisis 
All country cases seem to share a common element. The capital inflows played a very 
important role in the euro-inequality story. Although most observers agree that the 
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initial shock started from the other side of the Atlantic, there are different narratives 
about the origins of the crisis, which are complementary to each other (Jones, 2015). 
Most of the interpretations start from the fact that the source of rising economic 
imbalances between countries in the EMU’s core and its periphery stems from the 
influence of monetary union on nominal interest rates.  The increased availability of 
cheap credit for the private and public sector without exchange rate risk, in turn led to 
worsening current account balances. Once the confidence of foreigners was lost, the 
EA member states experienced a crisis on the balance of payments (Hancke, 2013).  
What is different among the different strands of the literature, is that each one 
concentrates on a different agent in the domestic economy. Borrowing from Erik Jones 
(2015), the explanations of ‘household debt’ and ‘government finances’ start from the 
liberalisation of the capital account that allowed households and governments to 
borrow more cheaply. In ‘household’s debt’, it was households that did not behave 
with prudency, and in ‘government finances’, it was governments that borrowed 
without responsibility. In ‘competitiveness’ as discussed above wage negotiators are 
under the microscope. My thesis builds on the ‘sudden stop’ interpretation of the crisis.  
This explanation is not focusing on “who is to blame” for the crisis (Jones, 2015). It 
rather focuses on the fact that markets have tremendous power in a monetary union 
(De Grauwe, 2018).  
There were countries with sustainable fiscal stances like Ireland and Spain. It is true 
that even in the case of Greece, governments ‘were pretending to do’ and markets 
‘were pretending they made’ efforts to boost market confidence. Even more interesting 
is the case of Italy, where there was a clear inward-looking rhetoric, but capital inflows 
still eased fiscal constraints. In Rodrik’s framework this is an interesting dynamic. The 
markets’ interests were temporality at least ‘compatible’ with democratic concerns. In 
other words, the tension described in the trilemma was not all that strong: the growth 
of the economy and the distribution of the growth dividend were necessary for higher 
returns on investment. National governments were there to welcome the rising tide, 
and to make sure it would lift all boats so that electoral support would be strong. In 
that sense, in the case of the EA, where advanced capitalist states gained credibility it 
seems that democratic concerns were taken into account by national governments. In 
the case of Greece and Italy, one can claim that preserving national sovereignty - either 
by non-compliance or by protecting domestic interests - did not dissuade ‘markets’ 
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from rewarding these economies. Interestingly, the vast decline in the cost of public 
debt and the milder housing booms created benefits for the median voter. Especially, 
in Spain, Ireland and Greece which experienced financial cycles of increasing duration 
and magnitude, the ‘rising tides’ lifted perhaps not all, but many ‘boats’ (Franks, 
2018).  
The crisis changed the scenery completely. Investors thought that pulling money out 
of these economies was the optimal course of action. This led to the realisation of a 
self-fulfilling prophecy: ‘peripheral’ countries have become insolvent because 
investors fear insolvency (Schelkle, 2017). When investors lost confidence in the 
‘peripheral’ countries, they massively sold the government bonds of these countries, 
pushing interest rates to unsustainably high levels. It is important to underline that the 
‘sudden stop’ does not imply that the introduction of the euro did not contribute to 
increasing vulnerabilities, such as increasing private debt, housing booms and loose 
budgetary constraints. Indeed, some of the countries were affected by a loss of 
competitiveness, irresponsible government finances, or households living beyond 
their means as explained in detail in the introduction (Jones, 2015). However, these 
problems were not only found in the ‘periphery’ but still markets attacked particularly 
these states. There was a massive outflow of liquidity from these Member states, and 
hence their governments could not fund or roll over their debt obligations.  The fiscal 
easing stopped and the tax revenues evaporated (De Grauwe, 2012a).  
Matthijs (2017) focuses on the crisis period and examines the gradual weakening of 
democratic processes in the countries of the periphery. He suggests that that EA’s 
response to the crisis did not allow for any real choice in economic policy. It led to 
opaque and technocratic decision making processes and delivered poor economic 
results. The periphery seemed to have made concessions in terms of democracy and 
national sovereignty in the name of monetary integration. It is true that market forces 
originally pushed these economies to their knees and interest rates on bonds increased 
to very high levels.  
If one concentrates on the first years of the crisis, indeed one may question the 
relevance of the channels described in this thesis beyond the first years of the boom. 
The “competitiveness channel” might play in reverse with inequality increasing in the 
periphery during the crisis as the literature points out and as explained in the first paper 
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(Matthijs 2016). Southern MMEs had no choice but to respond to the euro crisis by a 
series of deflationary spending measures and price and wage cuts. These policies 
intensified recessions and led to widening income inequality. The Northern CMEs 
were not so much hit by the crisis and by letting their automatic stabilizers kick in, 
domestic inequality declined (Matthijs 2016). Regarding the fiscal channel, the effect 
of the tightening of fiscal rules at the supranational level cannot be yet assessed (since 
it still remains on paper and the new rules which aim at improving budgetary 
compliance have not been not implemented), but the implementation of austerity 
programmes may result in the fiscal channel becoming more relevant. Hence, this 
channel is not expected to play in reverse, but rather for its effect to be magnified since 
fiscal policies will be further restrained. 
Having said that, I consider that the main channel discussed in the thesis, “the interest 
rate channel” is relevant not just for the period of crisis but also for cases outside the 
Eurozone, especially if one focuses on the years after the ECB’s announcement of 
OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions). Booms and busts (even if amplified in the 
EA) are endemic to capitalism, and they do occur even beyond the case of the EA. 
The crisis was an event comparable to the Great Recession which operated far more 
widely than within the EA. The ECB’s crisis management measures, ultra-low interest 
rates, and the QE (Quantitative Easing) have actually led some researchers to argue 
that that fiscal space has been increased due to historically low interest rates. Hence, 
the interest rate channel seems to be relevant even in periods of extreme hardship.  
Thus, the question of how fiscal space is used and under which circumstances it is 
used for progressive redistribution remains important for understanding the interaction 
between market forces and democratic politics even during the busts. In fact, the 
question becomes even more relevant in a period of low growth performance and 
increasing inequality globally. In this context it is important that international 
organisations ask critical questions about how much leeway national policymakers 
have. Moreover, democratic backsliding confirms that re-distributional concerns will 
remain high in the political agenda. Since booms and busts occur in capitalism, the 
periods of cyclical upswing can define how a nation should build buffers for the 
unprotected and the outsiders of system.  
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Lastly, this thesis documents that national contexts matter even within the peripheral 
group of countries and government policies are important for the final distributional 
outcome. One of the main findings of this thesis is that inequality tends to play out 
very differently in the different national contexts of the periphery. This leads us to 
explore whether those differences are still relevant for the period of economic 
hardship. Existing research supports the argument that national contexts matter on 
how fiscal adjustment in Southern Europe affects economic performance 
(Monastiriotis, 2017). Research on the period of fiscal adjustment paths of the four 
Southern Europe members during the Maastricht period reveals that policy choices 
vary also significantly (Pagoulatos and Blavoukos, 2008). 
The housing channel provides an interesting case to investigate whether national 
contexts matter during the crisis period. To begin with, the 2008 global financial crisis 
revealed more than anything the importance of housing and asset price bubbles on 
national economies. Housing bubbles also have important equity implications and 
sudden increases and declines in housing value can generate progressive or regressive 
effects for middle and poorer households. However, this thesis argues that domestic 
policy choices and path dependencies define both the magnitude of the boom but also 
its distributional consequences. The same holds for the bust: different government 
responses can lead to different distributional consequences, and effective policies 
actually prevented evictions and repossessions (Fuentes et al., 2013). In many EU 
Member states it was strong societal pressure which led governments to implement 
policies that would tackle the problem of repossessions. This is clearly suggesting that 
in advanced capitalist states, democratic concerns cannot be abandoned and national 
policies do matter. Yet, once again these policies differed among member states. As 
an example, the Irish case was more effective than the Spanish case in preventing 
mortgage arrears leading to repossessions (Fuentes et al., 2013). 
Even in the crisis, inequality trends in the periphery are not similar. Some countries 
experienced a more modest increase than others (Italy compared to Spain) or even a 
decrease (in Portugal inequality did fell between 2008 and 2015). Thus, inequality 
scholars should focus exactly on this interaction between macroeconomic un-
equalizing forces and domestic policy responses and analyze together, rather than 
separately, the global and idiosyncratic country factors. It is the understanding of this 
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interaction that can provide insights for policy makers and enhance our understanding 
with regard to the symbioses between capitalism and democracy. 
5.5  Future research  
This thesis focused on the impact of a unique monetary regime change on inequality 
outcomes in the EA ‘periphery’.  Using both empirical analysis and in-depth country 
cases, it focused on some of the channels of interaction between EA accession and 
wealth and income inequality outcomes- with a focus on housing and finance systems. 
It confirmed that housing and finance systems are rather dynamic and not static.  
However, the reasons why these regime changes are evident or not remained out of 
the scope of this study. Yet, the examination of the reasons/ driving forces of this 
change provides avenues for further research.   
While most of the literature points to the fact that there is a tendency of these regimes 
to move towards a more liberal variety, the post-crisis financial regulation can be an 
opposing force to this dynamic. Hence, a closer look on the path trajectories that 
housing and finance systems followed in pre-and post-crisis area and the driving forces 
behind them is a promising path – especially for the literature of political economy of 
housing and finance systems which is recently gaining momentum. Moreover there 
are clear tendencies in the literature of political economy to understand heterogeneity 
in housing inflation. To do so, it is vital to understand dynamics between different 
domestic institutions i.e. labour market, shaping households’ incomes, and the market 
for mortgages, which shaping households’ access to financial resources (Regan, 
2013).  Future research should focus on how these interactions shape inequality 
outcomes both on wealth and income distributions. Moreover, while this thesis has 
looked at the distribution of income and wealth in different country cases the previous 
section has provided insights of how the housing channel could link the developments 
in wealth but also in the income distribution. Hence, an additional layer which could 
be added on the political economy of housing literature is to investigate the links via 
which second order effects (increase in employment in the construction and real estate 
sector) it might affect the income distribution. 
While this thesis focused on the so called “peripheral” countries- there are countries 
of the core which also seem to follow up to an extent, similar paths both in terms of 
housing booms but also in terms of fiscal space expansion. As an example, Belgium 
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had very high debt as a percentage of GDP, while the Netherlands has experienced a 
housing boom. Focusing on two countries of the core of the EA and comparing the 
findings with those of EA ‘periphery’ countries would also give some interesting 
insights on whether this core-periphery divide would play a role in the final 
distributional outcomes.  
Moreover, while the second paper of this thesis has focused on one particular area of 
transfers, namely pensions and their distributional consequences future research 
would benefit from looking policies and the re-distributional consequences of other 
transfers and taxes. This would allow obtaining a more complete picture of how 
governments have used fiscal space. In our study more emphasis was given on the part 
of transfers – since most of the redistribution happens from the expenditure side of the 
budget (Immervoll et al. (2005). Yet, this does not mean that taxes have no role.  
Revenues traditionally need to finance social spending- at least this is what was done 
traditionally to finance welfare states. Yet, we have seen that in the case of Ireland and 
Spain tax base did erode, and in the case of Italy and Greece, tax evasion increased 
substantially under EA. There needs to be closer examination of the distributional 
consequences of taxation policy during these years. 
Finally, while this study has focused on inequality of disposable income and wealth 
among households, future research should also concentrate to intergenerational 
inequalities in the Euro-area context. This stems almost naturally from the evidence 
of this thesis. To begin, inter-generational inequalities are a crucial axis of inequalities 
today. Housing is central to this perceived inequality: older generations own more 
housing assets and they typically acquired them when housing was more affordable 
than it is now. It is also important to identify who won and who lost, from this housing 
price increase. Younger households who bought houses within the boom may will be 
more at risk of going underwater in the crisis. However, in the familial type of housing 
markets in the periphery, families often share the same house which has acted as a 
safety net for younger people.  
Housing isn’t the only area in which intra-generational inequality has widened over 
time. As discussed extensively in paper two of the thesis, in Ireland and Greece before 
the adoption of the common currency, pensioners have been a vulnerable part of the 
distribution and pension spending towards low income groups was limited. The 
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increase in pension spending in a progressive way, allowed for the reduction of 
poverty among pensioners. However, the focus of the welfare spending only on 
pensions- especially in the Greek case, could shift the risk of poverty and inequality 
among younger households and working age population. Hence, there are good 
reasons to investigate in future research what are the intergenerational distributional 
consequences of these developments.   
174 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Aalbers, M. (2008) ‘The Financialization of Home and the Mortgage Market Crisis’,  
Competition & Change, 12(2), pp. 148–166. 
Aalbers, M. (2009) ‘Residential Capitalism in Italy and Netherlands’, in Schwartz, H. 
M. and Seabrooke, L. The Politics of Housing Booms and Busts. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave McMillan, pp. 146–169.  
Aalbers, M. (2016) The Financialization of Housing: A Political Economy Approach. 
New York: Routledge. 
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2000) ‘Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic 
Development’, The American Economic Review, 90(2), pp. 126–130. 
Acemoglu, D. Autor D.,   Dorn D., Hanson G. and Price B. (2016): “Import 
competition and the great US employment sag of the 2000s”, Journal of Labor 
Economics, vol 34(1), pp. 141–98 
Adam, K. and Tzamourani, P. (2015) ‘Distributional consequences of asset price 
inflation’, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, No 27/2015. 
Agnello, L. and Schuknecht, L. (2011) ‘Booms and Busts in Housing Markets: 
Determinants and Implications’, Journal of Housing Economics, 20, pp. 171–190. 
Ahearne, A. and Delgado, J. (2008) ‘A Tale of Two Countries’, Bruegel Policy Brief, 
2008/04. 
Akin, O., Montalvo, J.-G., Villar, J.-G., Peydró, J.-L. and Raya, J. M. (2014) ‘The real 
estate and credit bubble: evidence from Spain’, Journal of the Spanish Economic 
Association, 5(2-3), pp. 223–243. 
Albanesi, S. (2007) ‘Inflation and Inequality’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(4), 
pp. 1088–1114. 
175 
Alcidi, C., Gros, D. (2012) ‘The Spanish hangover’, vox.eu (accessed 01 September 
2018). 
Alesina, A. and Drazen, A. (1991) ‘Why are stabilisations delayed?’, The American 
Economic Review, 81(5), pp. 1170–1188. 
Alesina, A., Ardagna, S. and Galasso V. (2008) ‘The Euro and structural reforms’, 
NBER Working Paper, 14479. 
Allegré, G. and Timbeau, X. (2015) ‘Does Housing Wealth Contribute to Wealth 
Inequality? A Tale of Two New Yorks’, Sciences Po OFCE Briefing Paper, 9. 
Allen, J., Barlow, J., Leal, J., Maloutas, T. and Padovani, L. (eds.) (2004) Housing and 
Welfare State in Southern Europe. London: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Ansell, B. (2014) ‘The Political Economy of Ownership: Housing Markets and the 
Welfare State’, American Political Science Review, 108(2), pp. 383–402. 
Argitis, G. and Pitelis, C. (2001) ‘Monetary Policy and the Distribution of Income: 
Evidence for the United States and the United Kingdom’, Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics, 23(4), pp. 617–638. 
Arundel, R. (2016) ‘Equity Inequity: Housing Wealth Inequality, Inter and Intra-
generational Divergences, and the Rise of Private Landlordism’, Housing, Theory 
and Society, 34(2), pp. 176–200. 
Arundel, R. and Ronald, R. (2016) ‘Parental Co-residence, Shared Living and 
Emerging Adulthood in Europe: Semi-dependent Housing across Welfare 
Regime and Housing System Contexts’, Journal of Youth Studies, 19(7), pp. 885–
905. 
Assa, J. (2012) ‘Financialization and its Consequences, The OECD Experience’, 
Finance Research, 1, pp. 35–39. 
Atkinson, A. B. (1983) The Economics of Inequality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Atkinson, A. B. (2015) Inequality: What Can Be Done?. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
176 
Atkinson, A.B. and Harrison, A.J. (1978), Distribution of personal wealth in Britain, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 
Azpitarte, F. (2010) ‘The Household Wealth Distribution in Spain: the Role of 
Housing and Financial Wealth’, Hacienda Publica Española/Revista de 
Economia Publica, 94(3), pp. 65–90. 
Baccaro, L. and Pontusson, J. (2016) ‘Rethinking Comparative Political Economy: 
The Growth Model Perspective’, Politics & Society, 44(2), pp. 175–207. 
Baldini, M. and Poggio, T. (2014) ‘The Italian housing system and the global financial 
crisis’, Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 29(2), pp. 317–334.  
Banca d’Italia (2002f.) Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) 2002, 2006, 
2008. Rome: Banca d’Italia. 
Banco de España (2002f.) Survey of Household Finances (EFF) 2002, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2014. Madrid: Banco de España. 
Barr, N. (2012) Economics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bean, C. (1998) ‘Monetary Policy under EMU’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
14(3), pp. 41–53.  
Beck, N. and Katz, J. N. (1995) ‘What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-
Section Data’, The American Political Science Review, 89(3), pp. 634–647. 
Beck, N. and Katz, J. N. (2011) ‘Modelling Dynamics in Time-Series-Cross-Section 
Political Economy Data’, Annual Review of Political Science, 14(1), pp. 331–352. 
Beckfield, J. (2005) The consequences of regional political and economic integration for 
inequality and the welfare state in Western Europe. PhD Thesis. Bloomington: 
Indiana University, USA. 
Beckfield, J. (2006) ‘European Integration and Income Inequality’, American 
Sociological Review, 71(6), pp. 964–985. 
Beckfield, J. (2009) ‘Remapping inequality in Europe: The net effect of regional 
integration on total income inequality in the European Union’, International Journal 
of Comparative Sociology, 50(5–6), pp. 486–509. 
177 
Begg, I. (2003) ‘Complementing EMU: Rethinking Cohesion Policy’, Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy, 19(1), pp. 161–179. 
Bertola, G. (2010) ‘Inequality, Integration, and Policy: Issues and Evidence from 
EMU’, Journal of Economic Inequality, 8(3), pp. 345–365. 
Bianchi, R. (2014) ‘National Report for Italy’, in ZERP (ed.) TENLAW: Tenancy Law 
and Housing Policy in Multilevel Europe. Bremen: University of Bremen, ZERP. 
Blavoukos, S. and Pagoulatos, G.  (2008) ‘The Limits of EMU Conditionality: Fiscal 
Adjustment in Southern Europe’, Journal of Public Policy, 28(2), pp. 229–253. 
Blyth, M. (2008) ‘The Politics of Compounding Bubbles: The Global Housing Bubble 
in Comparative Perspective’, Comparative European Politics, 6(3), pp. 387–406.  
Bohle, D. (2014) ‘Post-Socialist Housing meets Transnational Finance: Foreign 
Banks, Mortgage Lending, and the Privatization of Welfare in Hungary and 
Estonia’, Review of International Political Economy, 21(4), pp. 913–948. 
Bohle, D. (2017) ‘Mortgaging Europe’s periphery’, LEQS Paper, No. 124/2017. 
Bourguignon, F. (2017) ‘World changes in inequality: an overview of facts, causes, 
consequences and policies’, BIS Working Papers, No. 654. 
Bouvet, F. (2010) EMU and the Dynamics of Regional Per Capita Income Inequality 
in Europe. Rohnert Park: Sonoma State University. 
Bover, O. (2005) ‘Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF): Description, 
Methods and Preliminary Results’, Economic Bulletin of the Bank of Spain, 
January. 
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Appendix 1: Data and Variable Description 
for Chapter 2 
 
Variable Variable Description Source 
GINI coefficient of 
disposable income  
 
 
 
 
The GINI coefficient measures 
the inequality among levels of 
disposable income. A GINI 
coefficient of zero expresses 
perfect equality, where all values 
are the same (for example, where 
everyone has the same income). A 
GINI coefficient of 1 (or 100%) 
expresses maximal inequality 
among values. 
Solt, Frederick. 2016. 
“The Standardized 
World Income 
Inequality Database.” 
Social Science 
Quarterly 97. SWIID 
Version 6.1, October 
2017. 
GINI coefficient of 
market income  
 
The GINI coefficient measures 
the inequality among levels of 
market income. 
Solt, Frederick. 2016. 
“The Standardized 
World Income 
Inequality Database.” 
Social Science 
Quarterly 97. SWIID 
Version 6.1, October 
2017 
Real GDP Growth  Growth of real GDP, percent 
change from previous year 
Source: OECD (2017), 
"OECD Economic 
Outlook No. 101", 
OECD Economic 
Outlook: Statistics and 
Projections (database) 
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Variable Variable Description Source 
(Downloaded: 2017-
07-04). 
Unemployment  
 
Annual Average  ( from 15 to 74 
years) 
 
Eurostat,  
(data accessed  November 
2017)  
 
Education 
 
Labor force with secondary 
education is the share of the total 
labor force that attained or 
completed secondary education as 
the highest level of education. 
 
ILO (data accessed  
October  2017)  
 
Coordination  
 
An indicator from 1-5 capturing 
the degree, of coordination based 
on a set of expectations about 
which institutional features of 
wage setting arrangements are 
likely to generate more or less 
coordination 
J. Visser, ICTWSS Data 
base. Version 5.1. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
Institute for Advanced 
Labour Studies (AIAS), 
University of Amsterdam. 
September 2017.  
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Variable Variable Description Source 
Union Density Net union membership as a 
proportion wage and salary 
earners in employment (union 
density). 
Armingeon, Klaus, 
Virginia Wenger, 
Fiona Wiedemeier, 
Christian Isler, Laura 
Knöpfel, David 
Weisstanner and Sarah 
Engler. 2017.  
Comparative Political 
Data Set 1960-2016. 
Data used to construct the categories  
FIRE 
Gross value added financial 
insurance and real estate activities  
as a percentage of GDP ( author’s 
calculations from Eurostat ) 
 
 
Eurostat ( accessed 
September 2017) 
Nominal long term 
Interest Rate  
 Source AMECO : 
accessed September 
2017) 
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Variable Variable Description Source 
Inflation Growth of harmonised consumer 
price index (CPI), all items, 
percent change from previous 
year; used as a measure for 
inflation. 
Source: OECD (2017), 
"Key short-term 
indicators", Main 
Economic Indicators 
(database) 
(Downloaded: from  
Armingeon, Klaus, 
Virginia Wenger, 
Fiona Wiedemeier, 
Christian Isler, Laura 
Knöpfel, David 
Weisstanner and Sarah 
Engler. 2018.  
Comparative Political 
Data Set 1960-2016. 
Accessed September 
2017 
 
Real long term  
interest rate  
Nominal Long interest rate minus  
inflation  
Author’s calculations 
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Variable Variable Description Source 
Capital Account 
balance 
The Capital account covers all 
transactions that involve the 
receipt or payment of the capital 
account. It is either expressed as 
% of GDP 
 
Source Eurostat 
(accessed  May 2018) 
Data sources for tables  
Total 
compensation/hours 
worked 
 
 
 
EU KLEMS Database, 
March 2007, see 
Marcel Timmer, Mary 
O'Mahony & Bart van 
Ark, The EU KLEMS 
Growth and 
Productivity Accounts: 
An Overview, 
University of 
Groningen & 
University of 
Birmingham; 
downloadable at 
www.euklems.net 
Accessed (November , 
2017)  
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Variable Variable Description Source 
Total expenditure on 
social protection as 
a percentage of GDP  
 
 
 
 
Eurostat ( Accessed 
November, 2016) 
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Appendix 2: Databases for Chapter 4 
The EFF includes an extensive range of questions to households on their real and 
financial assets, liabilities, income, expenditure and socioeconomic characteristics. 
The years that the survey is conducted are 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011. This means 
that the waves are capturing the developments prior to and after the eruption of the 
crisis. The sample used comprises about 6000 households. 
The Italian survey on household and Income wealth is conducted every other year. 
The SHIW began in the 1960s to gather data on the incomes and savings of Italian 
households’ wealth and other aspects of households’ economic and financial 
behaviour. The sample used in the most recent surveys comprises about 8,000 
households (20,000 individuals) forming a representative sample.18 
It needs to be noted that many assets are subjectively evaluated by respondents. For 
instance, all interviewees in SHIW were asked the following question: “In your 
opinion, what price could you ask for the dwelling in which you live (if sold 
unoccupied)? In other words, how much is it worth (including any cellar, garage or 
attic)?”  While in the Spanish questionnaire the question is the following “what is the 
current value of your home? (i.e. how much would you obtain if you sold it today?).  
Similar questions are asked for every piece of real estate, for both surveys. The limits 
of household surveys are well known, but sample surveys consist the primary source 
for wealth data in these countries. 
Lastly, I acknowledge that regional variations play an important role especially in the 
Italian case, but the purpose of this analysis is to uncover the macro-level picture of 
inequality dynamics across Italy and Spain. It is clear that there is geographical 
heterogeneity in house price developments and capital flows, among regions. 
However, taking a macro-approach is in itself useful in analysing how spatial 
variations across regions may result in important macro-level inequalities in housing 
equity dynamics. 
                                                 
18 Participation was voluntary and not remunerated. 
